Deficiencies in online privacy policies : factors and policy recommendations by Sowell, Jesse H., II (Jesse Horton)
Deficiencies in Online Privacy Policies:
and Policy Recommendations MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
by SEP 2 0 2010
Jesse H. Sowell, II
LIBRARIES
B.S., Computer Science, Clemson University (2001)
M.S., Computer Science, Michigan State University (2005) ARCHIVES
M.S., Criminal Justice, Michigan State University (2007)
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Technology and Policy
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 2010
@ Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2010. All rights reserved.
V Jy
Author 
..... Engineering Systems Division
July 8, 2010
C ertified by.... ..... , ....... ......................
Dr. David D. Clark
Senior Research Scientist, Computer Science and Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory
fl*
Thesis Supervisor
A ccepted by ....... ................
Dr. Dava J. Newman
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Director, Technology and Policy Program
Factors
2
Deficiencies in Online Privacy Policies: Factors and Policy
Recommendations
by
Jesse H. Sowell, II
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division
on July 8, 2010, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Technology and Policy
Abstract
Online service providers (OSPs) such as Google, Yahoo!, and Amazon provide cus-
tomized features that do not behave as conventional experience goods. Absent fa-
miliar metaphors, unraveling the full. scope and implications of attendant privacy
hazards requires technical knowledge, creating information asymmetries for casual
users. While a number of information asymmetries are proximately rooted in the
substantive content of OSP privacy policies, the lack of countervailing standards
guidelines can be traced to systemic failures on the part of privacy regulating insti-
tutions. In particular, the EU Data Protection Directive (EU-DPD) and the US Safe
Harbor Agreement (US-SHA) are based on comprehensive norms, but do not provide
pragmatic guidelines for addressing emerging privacy hazards in a timely manner.
The dearth of substantive privacy standards for behavioral advertising and emerging
location-based services highlight these gaps.
To explore this problem, the privacy policies of ten large OSPs were evaluated in
terms of strategies for complying with the EU-DPD and US-SHA and in terms of their
role as tools for enabling informed decision-making. Analysis of these policies shows
that OSPs do little more than comply with the black letter of the EU-DPD and US-
SHA. Tacit data collection is an illustrative instance. OSP privacy policies satisfice by
acknowledging the nominal mechanisms behind tacit data collection supporting ser-
vices that "enhance and customize the user experience," but these metaphors do not
sufficiently elaborate the privacy implications necessary for the user to make informed
choices. In contrast, privacy advocates prefer "privacy and surveillance" metaphors
that draw users attention away from the immediate gratification of customized ser-
vices. Although OSPs do bear some responsibility, neither the EU-DPD nor the
US-SHA provide the guidance or incentives necessary to develop more substantive
privacy standards.
In light of these deficiencies, this work identifies an alternative, collaborative ap-
proach to the design of privacy standards. OSPs often obscure emerging privacy haz-
ards in favor of promoting innovative services. Privacy advocates err on the other side,
giving primacy to "surveillance" metaphors and obscuring the utility of information
based services. Rather than forcing users to unravel the conflicting metaphors, collab-
orative approaches focus on surfacing shared concerns. The collaborative approach
presented here attempts to create a forum in which OSPs, advertisers, regulators,
and civil society organizations contribute to a strategic menu of technical and policy
options that highlight mutually beneficial paths to second best solutions. Particular
solutions are developed through a process of issue (re)framing focused on identifying
common metaphors that highlight shared concerns, reduce overall information asym-
metries, and surface the requirements for governance and privacy tools that address
emerging risks. To illustrate this reframing process, common deficiencies identified in
the set of privacy policies are presented along with strategic options and examples of
potential reframings.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. David D. Clark
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ratory
Proposal
Innovative secondary uses of consumer information, most commonly for customization
of services, is a key competitive differentiator for online service providers (OSPs) such
as Google, Amazon, and Facebook. Unless harms can be clearly demonstrated, re-
active privacy regulatory environments such as the US accommodate secondary uses
as a necessary component of technological innovation. In contrast, the EU's more
stringent privacy regulations proactively espouse socially protective policies that pri-
oritize individual privacy as a fundamental human right. Among other transnational
conflicts, the Internet milieu brings these privacy paradigms formally insulated by
terrestrial boundaries into increasing conflict. Most recently1 , the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive's attempt to protect EU citizens' privacy created economic externalities
that threatened to halt trans-Atlantic dataflows to countries deemed to have "inade-
quate" privacy regimes (in particular, the US). Despite international agreements on
FIPs as guiding principles, substantially different policy instruments arise when in-
terpreted and implemented under different governance paradigms [17, 18]2. Initial
reactions from the legal and political science literature indicate the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive is a failed attempt at policy convergence [19, 77] and the compromise
that resolved the conflict, the US Safe Harbor Agreement, is an empty formalism that
actually exacerbates and prolongs the conflict [103]3.
Given this context and motivation, the thesis will evaluate whether the US Safe
Harbor Agreement is in fact an empty formalism and evaluate its efficacy as a hybrid
privacy regime. Empirical evidence will be drawn from a substantive content analysis
of ten major OSP privacy policies 4subject to the US Safe Harbor Agreement. A key
trade-off is the tension between the economic efficiency of OSPs and privacy controls
required by regulation [101]. To understand the dynamics of this trade-off, the thesis
iWestin [131] provides a nice, succinct history of international information privacy conflicts that
have occurred since the mid-1960's.
2Although Bennett's survey of privacy policy instruments in the US, UK, West Germany, and
Sweden was performed before the EU Data Protection Directive came into effect, the categorization
of policy convergence strategies and the source of policy instrument differences is both valid and
useful for describing the critical path through a governance structure from abstract FIPs to a concrete
policy instrument. Bennett's original work [17] is cited extensively as a seminal work on differences
in governance structures [1 and is followed by [18].
3 Reidenberg is the only author to flat out indicate the US Safe Harbor agreement is an empty
formalism. Others [19, 71, 77, 101] perform fairly impartial analyses that imply it is an empty
formalism but do not say so explicitly.
4 As of 30 July 2009 these ten policies covered 18 of the top 40 web sites ranked by Alexa. Four
of the top five are covered by the privacy policies of Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, and Microsoft.
will explore how OSPs, based on their publicly posted privacy policies, conform to the
fair information practices (FIPs) set out by US Safe Harbor Agreement, will evaluate
these privacy policies as decision making tools for consumers, and elaborate the atten-
dant conflicts that arise from differences in interpretation and operationalization of
privacy concepts and assumptions under conventional and hybrid privacy regimes. A
preliminary analysis of OSP privacy policies indicates compliance with the black letter
of the US Safe Harbor Agreement FIPs, but only in the weakest (broadest) interpre-
tation. In other words, OSPs' privacy policies, especially those of OSPs vested in the
less stringent US privacy paradigm, deviate from stronger interpretations preferred
by EU states. It is expected that a deeper analysis will provide empirical evidence
that the US Safe Harbor Agreement is an empty formalism.
The tension between OSPs' economic efficiency and privacy controls is exacer-
bated when a FIPs operationalization favors one group of stakeholders over another.
OSPs' claim that privacy advocates' strong interpretations of privacy regulations
create "onerous" technical and management burdens is an example of an argument
against an operationalization favoring strong consumer privacy. More recent argu-
ments by OSPs highlight advertising, most recently customization via behavioral
advertising, as the essential factor in the economics of "free" online content. This lat-
ter argument is still one of economic efficiency versus individual privacy, but narrows
the discussion to the information asymmetries identified in the preliminary analysis of
OSPs' privacy policies. The content analysis takes these arguments into account and
will illustrate (1) the nominal data categories and uses of consumer information and
(2) how information asymmetries hobble the self-regulatory enforcement espoused by
the US Safe Harbor Agreement.
Finally, the criticisms of the US Safe Harbor Agreement as a hybrid privacy regime
are not intended to condemn hybrid privacy instruments as a whole. Rather, these
criticisms are intended to highlight the implications and effects of the US Safe Harbor
Agreement as the negative results of a privacy policy experiment. Lessons learned are
expected to inform how broadly-scoped privacy concepts are interpreted and the detri-
mental implications of the empty formalism for innovations that can better surface
actual privacy preferences. The thesis intends to proffer attendant recommendations
and design implications that inform stakeholders of the importance of precise privacy
standards regarding choice and subsequent implications. Perhaps more importantly
to this adversarial regulatory space, the thesis also intends to recommend charac-
teristics of a framework for incentivizing the consistent, sustainable development of
standards through collaborative processes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
[T]he primary civil-liberties issues raised by the uses of computers are not
matters of information security to be resolved by technical specialists but
are instead policy choices as to privacy, confidentiality, and due process.
Alan Westin and Michael Baker, Databanks in a Free Society [132]
As online services such as search engines, social networking platforms, and online
marketplaces increasingly mediate individuals' daily lives, extant and emerging pri-
vacy risks become more noteworthy. Some features of online services do not behave
as conventional experience goods1 , requiring technical knowledge to unravel the full
scope and implications of attendant privacy hazards. For the casual, non-technical
user, the result is an information asymmetry that limits users' ability to identify and
reason about certain categories of privacy hazards. Ideally, privacy hazards and their
implications should be clearly and prominently explicated in online service provider's
privacy policies. The dearth of privacy standards attendant with tacit data collection
performed by online service providers is an illustrative instance of a privacy policy
information asymmetry. The motivated, technically proficient user can evaluate and
understand tacit data collection mechanisms to derive a more comprehensive set of
privacy implications 2, but the signals and experience necessary to recognize these
implications are not a prominent part of the casual user's experience.
This thesis identifies factors contributing to deficiencies in privacy policies that
are proximately rooted in the content of online service provider privacy policies, but
that can also be traced to the systemic implications of institutional design decisions.
'Nelson [88] contrasts search goods with experience goods. For search goods, inspection is suffi-
cient to determine the utility of a particular good. If inspection before purchase (here engagement)
is not sufficient, if it pays to evaluate by purchasing the good and the price of the good is sufficiently
low, the process of searching for the good is less value. The process of evaluating through purchase
is what Nelson calls "experience" and goods that are more effectively evaluated by experiencing one
or more purchases is a conventional experience good. The assumption of conventional experience
goods is that the consumer (here the user) can, based on their possibly limited technical capabilities,
trace the effects of the good back to a particular experience or set of experience with the good and
understands the implications of purchasing the good.
2Following the description of an experience good, this is an instance of a costly search process
that is much greater than simply purchasing (engaging) the service.
Empty formalism is evident both proximately in online service provider privacy poli-
cies and in the application of the US Safe Harbor to online service provider privacy
policies. Walker's articulation and reflection on empty formalism highlights the in-
teraction between policy and institutional failures:
Do rules degenerate into an empty ritual which respects the letter of the
law but not the spirit of justice? Since the answer may not be a simple
yes or no, a more subtle way of posing the question might be: How empty
is empty formalism? [128]
This work hopes to answer the subtler question by understanding the tactics evident in
online service provider's privacy policies, the immediate implications of these tactics,
and how the failures of institutions charged with regulating online privacy perpetuate
empty formalisms.
A qualitative analysis of a ten online service provider privacy policy samples pro-
vides evidence of proximate empty formalism. The deficiencies identified are evident
in the technical components of the policies, but are arguably technology agnostic and
need be addressed by policies at the institutional level. Nominally, privacy policies
are compliant with the black letter of the imprecise norms of the US Safe Harbor.
Despite this compliance, proximate information asymmetries in privacy policies, such
as those related to tacit data collection, obscure privacy hazards from the casual user.
The general failure of the regulatory institution, here the US Safe Harbor, is that it
provides only vague normative guidance. In particular, the US Safe Harbor does not
establish processes for developing and assessing evolving privacy standards necessary
to proactively identify new privacy hazards. Both the failed policy outcomes (policy
failures) and the abstract privacy norms set out in the US Safe Harbor can be (and
4are argued in this thesis to be) empty formalisms
The institutional design decisions contributing to the US Safe Harbor are products
of a recent compromise in the ongoing conflict over privacy regulatory regimes between
the US and the EU. In October of 1998 the EU Data Protection Directive came into
effect. The nominal objective is to establish privacy as a fundamental human right
for EU citizens by harmonizing EU states' privacy regulations based on the Fair
Information Practices (FIPs)5 . The EU ruled that the US privacy regulatory regime
lacked both the comprehensive laws and centralized enforcement regime necessary to
adequately protect EU citizens' data handled by US-based online service providers.
The resulting compliance externality threatened the suspension of trans-Atlantic data
flows worth approximately $120 bn [64].
The US developed the US Safe Harbor as a compromise. The US Safe Harbor is
a hybrid privacy regulatory regime that articulates a comprehensive privacy regime
3 The detailed analysis supporting black letter compliance is presented in Appendix C.
4 For clarity, the individual instances and categories of empty formalisms in online service
provider's privacy policies will be referred to as policy failures; empty formalism at the institu-
tional level will be referred to as institutional failures.
5The FIPs are the product of the OECD, COE, and the Younger Committee, and the US Depart-
ment of Commerce attempting to identify a common, comprehensive set of privacy principles. See
Chapter 2 for histories of the FIPs in the US and EU; Section 2.1 articulates the six fundamental
principles based on Bennett's summary in [17]
based on the FIPs, but that adopts a market-based (decentralized), self-regulatory
enforcement mechanism. Initial reactions from the legal and political science litera-
ture indicate the EU Data Protection Directive is a failed attempt at policy conver-
gence [19, 77] and that the US Safe Harbor Agreement is an empty formalism that
actually exacerbates and prolongs the underlying normative conflict [103]6. With re-
spect to providing constructive guidance for the development of privacy standards for
online service providers, the deficiencies identified here highlight a lack of standards
guidance in the US Safe Harbor.
The privacy deficiencies presented here in online service provider privacy policies
as evidence of the US Safe Harbor as an empty formalism with respect to providing
constructive guidance for the development online service provider privacy policies
and regulatory enforcement. More precisely, the policy analysis demonstrates how
portions of online service provider privacy policies are negative outcomes that satisfice
to the overly abstract privacy norms articulated by the US Safe Harbor Agreement
and obscure relevant privacy implications. Black letter compliance with vague data
purposes also blurs the threshold of policy compliance. Coupled with the absence
of regulatory guidance on the precision of data purposes, the institutional failure is
further aggravated by undermining self-regulatory mechanisms based on providing
evidence of harms based on clear-cut privacy violations.
Tracing policy deficiencies to the contributing institutional factors highlights insti-
tutional design failures, but also highlights areas of improvement at the institutional
and technical level. Although the deficiencies identified here can be resolved with a
reactive regulatory decisions 7 and complementary technical changes. Such incremen-
talist approaches are quick fixes that, like the US Safe Harbor, provide a false sense
of resolution (empty formalism) that obscures solutions to emerging problems. Albeit
critical of the US Safe Harbor, this thesis is not a wholesale condemnation of hybrid
self-regulatory frameworks. Rather, Chapter 5 proposes approaches supporting in-
stitutional and technical design features8 that can facilitate the continuous feedback
necessary for the concurrent design of privacy policies and online service features that
support these policies.
The proposed methods are based on a synthesis of Sch6n's notion of genera-
tive metaphor [106] and Ant6n's Goal Based Requirements Analysis Methodology
(GBRAM) to privacy policies [6, 9, 10]. Sch6n's generative metaphor is applied to
(re)frame privacy problems. As currently framed, largely technical descriptions satis-
fice to abstract norms and create information asymmetries. The reframing process is
expected to give insights into metaphors meaningful to both designers and lay users.
The result is a meaningful policy with fewer knowledge barriers. The reframing pro-
cess also surfaces insights previously occluded by one-sided metaphors such as these
6 Reidenberg [103] is the only author to directly indicate the US Safe Harbor agreement is an empty
formalism. Others [19, 71, 77, 101] imply it is an empty formalism but do not say so explicitly.
70ne-off, reactive, and chaotic are all adjectives used to describe the US privacy regulatory
regime; see Section 2.3 for a historical overview.
8Institutional design decisions, as implied, apply to the design of institutions. Technical design
decisions apply to the design of privacy tools available to users by online service provider or tools
provided by third parties that supplement engaging online services.
focusing on "service-and-utility" or "privacy versus surveillance." These insights also
contribute to the development of supporting tools.
Anton's GBRAM is a requirements analysis methodology based on grounded the-
ory that is used to surface requirements from organizational artifacts (such as privacy
policies). The product of GBRAM is structured natural language representations
that facilitate comparison and contrast of system goals. Structured natural language
representation avoids overly technical requirements specifications by preserving the
vernacular of organizational artifacts, allowing non-technical actors to participate
in effective identification of redundancies and conflicts in system goals. This thesis
proposes a process for using GBRAM to surface hidden, common goals amongst con-
flicting actors based on the negotiation and identification of conflicting metaphors.
Sch6n's generative metaphor is applied to reframe these into metaphors that high-
light commonalities, overcome information asymmetries, and provides insights into
the design of privacy tools.
The proposed institutional design decisions intend to incentivize technical design
processes to use feedback about context-based differences in privacy preferences. Such
feedback can provide valuable feedback for surfacing emergent privacy risks. Coupled
with third party monitoring of privacy compliance, it is argued that such sociotechni-
cal relationships can more efficaciously surface new privacy risks rather than relying
on policies and tools that satisfice to abstract static norms. This proposal does not
choose winners or losers by suggesting a particular configuration of actors and specific
technical approaches. Rather, this work identifies and frames the design choices that
affect the mutual advantages possible among regulators, online service providers, and
ultimately, end users.
1.1 Privacy Policy Failures
Ideally, users rely on an understanding of the online service provider's privacy policy
to decide whether the online service provider's data purposes are acceptable rela-
tive to the user's personal privacy preferences. Information asymmetries arise from
vague and abstract articulations of practices that do not provide precise informa-
tion on how all information collected is used. As a decision making tool, the policy
fragments10 addressing tacit data collection exacerbate information asymmetry be-
9Economic privacy policy analysis couches policy analysis in a cost-benefit analysis, viewing
policies as tools for deciding whether an online service's privacy practices are compatible with a user's
privacy preferences and utility gained by sharing information [1, 2, 3, 16, 20, 29, 62, 67]. This thesis
follows these analyses by conceiving policies as decision making tools, but focuses on overcoming
knowledge barriers (formally information asymmetries) to efficaciously convey implications rather
than focusing on the cost-benefit trade-offs of commoditized information.
10A policy fragment is the set of statements that address the same policy concern. In this case,
the policy fragment is the set of all statements salient to describing tacit data collection methods.
A policy fragment may be contiguous or non-contiguous. As may be implied, contiguous fragments
comprise a sequence of adjacent statements that address a particular concern. A non-contiguous
fragment indicates the statements describing a concern are not adjacent and may be scattered
throughout the policy document or across multiple policy documents.
cause they only provide nominal technical information about methods and technical
data. The average user does not have the technical expertise to translate techni-
cal policy fragments into meaningful implications or to map the processes described
to meaningful experiences that can be used to make decisions relative to individual
privacy preferences. Following the framing as an experience good, the process neces-
sary for a technically proficient reader to surface privacy implications and persistent
privacy deficiencies is an extensive search process. In terms of metaphor, this is es-
pecially evident when comparing the intuitions embodied in descriptions of e-mail
correspondence, instant message-style chat tools, and bulletin-board posting policies
with unintuitive technical discussions covering tacit data collection such as the use of
web beacons, client-side scripting, and cookies. Existing analyses of privacy policies
indicate they are all generally at the same reading level [8]. The analysis in Chapter 4
confirms, modulo online service provider-specific domain, privacy policies convey es-
sentially the same normative content. More interestingly, the analysis presented here
identifies factors that contribute to two pervasive problems: mixed context and the
aggregate image. Efficacious resolution of these problems will require both proximate
policy redesign and institutional redesign to avoid one-off, incrementalist solutions
that only address technical issues. In general, as noted above, although the two prob-
lems identified here are surfaced via an analysis of current technical infrastructure,
they are arguable technology agnostic, sociotechnical privacy problems whose social
and market components facilitate persistence across evolving online technologies.
Mixed context is the first problem. Mixed context occurs when users are con-
fronted with a superficially seamless environment that is actually comprised of objects
from multiple sources and is similarly governed by a dynamic set of distinct, possibly
conflicting privacy policies. This can be ascertained from privacy policies, but requires
close inspection and an understanding of the underlying technical components11 . The
technical knowledge necessary for this analysis contributes to the information asym-
metry. The privacy deficiency is the tractability of any user making privacy decisions
in the face of mixed context. Pragmatic resolutions requires coordination amongst
online service providers, advertisers, advertising networks, civil society organizations,
12and online application developers
The aggregate image problem is the second pervasive privacy deficiency. The no-
tion of aggregate image relates to whether a collection of information is considered
personally identifying. Privacy policies comply with black letter requirements in that
they acknowledge data about visitors is collected automatically, but do not meaning-
fully articulate the implications of how that information is (or may be) (re)combined.
Although individual items such as age and interests may be innocuous when taken
individually, when combined they may constitute a very accurate image of the in-
dividual user. Again, the information asymmetry is the unraveling of technological
methods to surface the problem. The deficiency is the lack of meaningful articulation
of the hazards of tacit data sharing and the implications of recombination. Although
iiOnce again, following the experience good framing, this is an extensive search process.
12 Section 5.4.1 describes the application of the proposed analysis framework (based on Sch6n and
Anton, Section 5.2) to the mixed context problem.
the debate over whether this image is personally identifying is not novel'3 , it is inde-
pendent of the underlying technology and arguably a persistent issue14 that must be
addressed by policy rather than by incremental, technology specific interventions.
Given the failings of the privacy policies surveyed here, this thesis recommends the
concurrent design of privacy policies and online environments that facilitate explicit,
bi-directional feedback from user to online service provider and from online service
provider to the user. The former recommends online service providers incorporating
tools into user workflows that allow feedback regarding the types of data collection
applied in these environments. The latter is a signal from the online service provider
to the user, based in efficacious metaphor, that conveys to the user the implications
of engaging a particular environment. Together, these provide the continual feedback
necessary to concurrently design efficacious environments whose policies' 5 are based
on empirically derived articulations of users' privacy preferences. From a design per-
spective, this is a functionally complete solution; pragmatically, the analysis, design,
and allocation of implementation "burden" requires coordination between more than
just users and online service providers.
1.2 Institutional Failures
The policy failures described above are partially born of institutional failures. The
discussion of policy failures has implicitly implicated institutional failures, but has
thus far only considered users and online service providers. One failed approach is
to place the burden of resolving privacy dilemmas on a single category of actor-in
this case online service providers' 6 . One-sided burden gives rise to incrementalist,
adversarial' solutions that, rather than surfacing constructive reframings, occlude
possible compromises and common metaphors. The complete set of actors includes
users, online service providers, advertisers, advertising networks, regulators, and civil
society organizations. Historically, regulators architect the institutions charged with
developing and policing privacy laws and regulations. Here, the EU Data Protection
Directive and the US Safe Harbor are presented as institutional arrangements that
"Recently, the FTC has addressed issues related to tacit data collection and identity [53, 54].
Earlier incarnations of this debate have addressed the issue in terms of whether there is sufficient
information for an individual to be identified, such as Kobsa's discussion in [72].
'
4 For instance, the same problems with conventional web browser based cookies have been iden-
tified in Flash based cookies [21]. The information collection problem will migrate to mobiles as
advertisers pursue mobile-based technologies that synthesize accurate geo-location with explicit and
inferred user preferences. As another instance, IPv6 will allow every device to have a permanent,
unique identifier (IP). This will allow more effective mapping of behavior to individual, strengthening
the argument that IP may be personally identifying.
"In particular, the empirical data on the functional categories of information that is and is not
private in a given context is critical; see Section 3.2 for a discussion of contextual integrity.
16 This is common to the larger problem of Internet governance conflicts, such as the dispute
between Yahoo! and France. See [139, 73] for extensive discussion.
"The notion of adversarial relations amongst actors is in the sense of Jasanoff's deconstruction
and reconstruction of technical knowledge [66]. This is revisited in Section 2.4 when reviewing
arguments related to the "onerous" burden associated with comprehensive privacy paradigms
highlight the role of regulatory bodies, such as the European Data Authorities and
US Department of Commerce, that intend to enforce privacy rights and (nominally)
audit online service providers to ensure compliance with applicable law. In both
institutional arrangements, failures can be traced to particularistic regulatory design
by one category of actors with little input from others.
Conceptually, these problems are rooted in the institutional design process. As
per Heisenberg [64], the actors involved in the development of the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive were the EU representatives and state enforcement agencies: businesses
were noticeably absent. In the US Safe Harbor development, the opposite was the
case: the design of the US Safe Harbor was almost exclusively influenced by the Clin-
ton administration's Department of Commerce, relying on US industry for expert
guidance. Although both institutions base their normative regulatory tenets on the
FIPs, the differences in implementation are characterized in terms of membership,
flexibility, and enforcement mechanisms18 . Succinctly, the EU Data Protection Di-
rective membership is exclusive, flexibility is present but entails lengthy bureaucratic
processes, and enforcement is, at least on paper, centralized in state authorities. In
contrast, US Safe Harbor membership is inclusive, flexibility is at the discretion of
online service provider participants, and enforcement is distributed (decentralized)
and "self-regulated."
The EU Data Protection Directive is presented as the impetus of the US Safe
Harbor and as a contrast to the US privacy regulatory regime. While this work
highlights criticisms and failures in the EU Data Protection Directive, it focuses on
tracing policy failures to institutional failures in the US Safe Harbor Agreement.
With regards to the US Safe Harbor, the combination of online service provider
centered flexibility and enforcement places too much discretion in the hands of online
service providers. Under the EU Data Protection Directive, this is resolved in part
by monitoring and in part through consultation with state-based data authorities;
although good for enforcement, it is argued that this further exacerbates the two-actor
problem. As a compromise, the US Safe Harbor attempts to preserve the normatively
liberal privacy regulatory regime by implementing enforcement using reactive, self-
regulatory mechanisms that handle privacy violations as they occur. These trade-offs
in the institutional design space foreshadow their implications for the design of online
service provider privacy tools.
As implied earlier, it has been argued that the US Safe Harbor agreement may be
abused as an empty formalism. Both Reidenberg [103] and Heisenberg [64] indicate
that the US Safe Harbor agreement is an empty formalism, but do not elaborate the
mechanisms that give rise to the empty formalism. For completeness, a comparison
of online service provider privacy policies with the FIPs articulated by the US Safe
Harbor agreement was performed (Appendix C). The analysis in Chapter 4 focuses on
the implications for continuously evolving privacy regulations and the commensurate
privacy features necessary to implement efficacious privacy policy architectures and
instruments. Online service providers' privacy policies are placed in the context of
18These parameters are based on Koremenos [74] overview of rational institutional design and are
discussed further in Section 5.1.
the letter, intent, and history of the EU Data Protection Directive and US Safe
Harbor agreement to better understand the implications of the US Safe Harbor as an
instance of a hybrid privacy regime. This thesis will show how information hiding and
all-or-nothing tactics identified in the sample contribute to information asymmetries,
privacy deficiencies, and ultimately undermine market-based self-regulation necessary
to keep pace with changing technologies. These deficiencies provide evidence that the
US Safe Harbor agreement, as applied to online service provider privacy policies,
is a failed application of unmodified self-regulatory enforcement to a comprehensive
privacy regime.
Although the US Safe Harbor agreement is flawed, this analysis is not intended to
stigmatize all hybrid combinations of self-regulatory enforcement and comprehensive
privacy regulation. Rather, the application of the US Safe Harbor agreement discussed
here is treated as a negative result that lends insight into how to design privacy regimes
in which market-based reputation can bind as an enforcement mechanism. The policy
failures (deficiencies) discussed in Chapter 4 can be couched as outcomes of these
institutional failures. This work proposes a framework that will foster continuous,
empirically informed analysis and design feedback amongst the full set of privacy
actors. Chapter 5 will argue this will foster more efficient allocation of resources and
more efficaciously identify emerging privacy conflicts and latent deficiencies. These
recommendations suggest governance structures that facilitate third party mediation
that can facilitate flexible and sustainable collaborations. Although domain-specific
collaborations are certainly necessary, the framework presented will illustrate how
GBRAM and generative metaphor can be incorporated into a cooperative governance
regime to identify domain-specific operationalizations that align regulatory, industry,
and consumer priorities based on shared concerns.
1.3 Roadmap
This analysis is grounded in the texts of online service provider privacy policies that
are the product of organizations that must cope with the complexities balancing
data sharing, advertising-based revenue, and reconciling these with national and in-
ternational privacy regulatory regimes. Although the data analysis is bottom-up,
the institutional context and attendant privacy theories will be presented top down.
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the development and evolution of privacy regula-
tions. This covers privacy practices as they have evolved in the US and the evolution
of the Fair Information Practices and the EU Data Protection Directive in the EU.
Chapter 4 presents the privacy policies evaluated, a qualitative analysis of their
efficacy as privacy decision making tools, and highlights deficiencies. The major asym-
metries this thesis focuses on are rooted in tacit data collection. Other asymmetries
include overly vague data categories and purposes. These asymmetries are evidence
of satisficing to the black letter of equally vague privacy principles, contribute to im-
precise articulations of exactly what constitutes personally identifiable information,
and limit clear distinctions between advertiser and online service provider privacy
policies and obligations. To highlight the role of policy framing, the implications of
privacy policy deficiencies are described and different framings of the sample poli-
cies, given different actors' interests, is presented. These include the distinctions and
implications of data sharing, data collection, and surveillance.
Chapter 5 builds on the evidence and implications of Chapter 4 to propose con-
comitant institutional and online service provider design requirements, methods, and
functional objectives that can resolve the kinds of privacy deficiencies identified in
the policy sample. Concrete instances based on mixed context and aggregate image
deficiencies will describe solutions to the immediate problem. The learnings devel-
oped in these instances will be used to propose research directions for developing
a feedback framework between regulatory institutions and online service provider's.
A number of the theoretical models described in Chapter 3 highlight Nissenbaum's
context-based notions of privacy [89] and Solove's family of related concepts to help
better develop privacy policies [110]. The feedback framework proposed here could
potentially overcome the problems of data collection indicated by Nissenbaum [89, pp.
153-155] and better understand how to translate Solove's family of privacy concepts
into requirements that can inform online service provider's design of more effective
privacy tools.
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Chapter 2
Regulatory Background
Almost without notice and in the name of efficiency our technological
progress has moved us toward the 'big brother' supervision predicted in
George Orwell's book 1984.
US Representative Ralph Regula, quoted in Legislating Privacy [102, p. 81]
Conflicts over privacy policy span regulatory paradigms, differences over im-
plementation, and differences over theoretical grounding. Differences in regulatory
paradigms1 set the stage for conflicts amongst regulatory institutions-the EU-US
privacy paradigm conflict shaped the EU Data Protection Directive and the US Safe
Harbor agreement as institutions. Although both institutions are nominally based
on the FIPs as privacy norms, neither provide sufficient guidance in implementing
privacy standards. Section 2.4 compares and contrasts critiques of these norm-based
institutions. Many of the critiques focus on the level of abstraction and the absence
of concrete guidance or standards.
Reidenberg's discussion of governance paradigms narrows the distinction amongst
western democracies into two groups: normatively liberal and socially protective.
One of the key distinctions amongst ostensibly similar western democracies 2 is how
much they trust government institutions and the culture and social roots of these
beliefs. Reidenberg argues each of these governance paradigms "reflect the coun-
try's choices regarding the roles of the state, market, and individual in the demo-
cratic structure" [103]. US governance is normatively liberal: private information is
1Differences in privacy paradigms and the resultant implementations is most extensively covered
by Bennett [17, 18, 19].
2For completeness, one should note that Westin also linked privacy to governance. Westin iden-
tified privacy as a key element distinguishing totalitarian regimes from democratic regimes [130].
Westin argues that privacy is key to the ability of individuals, organizations, and even some aspects
of government to make autonomous decisions without intermediate processes being interrupted or
derailed. In many ways, privacy protects each of these decision processes from the heckler's veto,
ideally allowing an honest exchange of ideas absent the burden of political ramifications. Along
those lines, Westin argues that totalitarian governments impose control by creating an environment
devoid of many of the aspects of privacy that allow individuals and groups to make their own deci-
sions without fear of government or political retribution. In contrast, democracies provide various
forms of privacy protections that allow individuals and organizations to make decisions.
an alienable commodity and policies dictating how this commodity is handled are
market-dominated in an ad hoc, often sectoral, manner. In contrast, most European
nations' governance is socially protective: individual privacy is an inalienable right,
protected by comprehensive policies that are uniformly applied to all uses of per-
sonal information in the public and private sphere. Reidenberg's analysis presents
nations' privacy policies as natural products of the governance paradigm. Moreover,
as products of their respective governance paradigm, each policy reinforces the funda-
mentals of that paradigm. Viewing privacy through these governance "lenses" results
in incompatible and conflicting interpretations of the FIPs.
Under the traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty, terrestrially defined bor-
ders insulate these two governance paradigms from one another. As argued by Ko-
brin [71, 70] and others [77, 101], a ubiquitous cyberspace facilitates near frictionless
international data flows that wear at terrestrial barriers. In turn, efforts at informa-
tion policy convergence by powerful actors (both nations and multinational organi-
zations) wear at traditional notions of sovereignty. Reidenberg argues that the EU
Data Protection Directive and US Safe Harbor agreements bring these two governance
paradigms in direct conflict. The effect is the imposition of socially protective privacy
norms onto US institutions that have been inculcated in a market-driven, liberally
normative regulatory environment. From the US perspective, this information is a
commodity that has been freely exchanged for services; from the EU perspective, it
is the lawfully protected property of it's citizens and comes with strict limitations on
use.
2.1 Fair Information Practices
Despite differences in regulatory paradigms, the FIPs evolved in the emerging pri-
vacy climate of the 1960's and 1970's as a response to the increasing use of mainframe
computers by governments [17, 130, 131]. The general notion of FIPs has been re-
ferred to as "principles for privacy safeguards," "principles for handling personal
information," "principles of fair information practice," and "data protection prin-
ciples" [17]. Bennett[17] and Reidenberg [103] summarize the FIPs; Bennett's six
general principles are presented, noting finer-grained distinctions from Reidenberg
where appropriate.
Principle of Openness The principle of openness requires the existence of a per-
sonal data repository be either publicly known or known to those about whom
the data is stored. Stated as a negative rule, an organization should not hide
the existence of a data repository. The openness principle ensures individuals
are cognizant of the existence of repositories and can exercise the rights imbued
by subsequent principles.
Principle of Individual Access and Correction Individuals should be able to
access and correct personal files. This typically means that they have the ability
to correct "any portion of the data that is not accurate, timely, or complete" [17].
This right is only available to the individual to whom the data corresponds.
Principle of Collection Limitation The collection of data is limited to "lawful
and fair means" [92] and should be collected only with the knowledge and
consent of the data subject. In Bennett's terms, this is intended to avoid "fishing
expeditions." Data should only be collected for a specific function or purpose.
Bennett notes that collection cannot be separated from use and disclosure.
Principle of Use Limitation Once collected, there are limits to the uses to which
personal information may be put. Bennett highlights the notion of relevance:
information may only be used for the purposes specified when it was originally
collected. Restated as a negative rule, data collected for one purpose may not be
used for another without the consent of the data subject. Implicit in Bennett's
articulation, Reidenberg makes explicit that use limitation may also indicate
that information may only be retained for as long as necessary.
Principle of Disclosure Limitation Also tied to the notion of relevance is disclo-
sure limitation: data may not be shared with another organization without the
permission of the data subject or without express legal authority. Reidenberg
refers to this as the finality principle.
Security Principle Security is intended to introduce safeguards that reinforce ear-
lier principles. The security principle requires safeguards against inadvertent or
intentional destruction of data. The security principle also safeguards against
unauthorized use, modification, or access of personal data. It is important to
note that in this role security supports privacy principles; security and privacy
are not interchangeable.
Influential sources of the FIPs were fair labor practices in the US [17], Britain's
Younger Committee (early 1970's), Westin and Baker's recommendations to the Na-
tional Academies in [132] (1972), and nascent articulations in the US 1970 Fair Credit
Reporting Act [117] and the 1974 Privacy Act [118]. The two most influential interna-
tional articulations of the early FIPs are the Council of Europe's (COE's) Convention
for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal
Data (COE Convention) in 1981 [36] and the Organization of Economic Co-operation
and Development's (OECD's) Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data (OECD Guidelines) in [91]3. In the late
1960's the COE began discussions to determine if the introduction of advanced tech-
nologies, in particular the computer, would pose a threat to the privacy protections
in the European Human Rights Convention [37]. The COE Convention was the
culmination of studies comprised of evaluating electronic data in the private sector
(1971-1973) and the public sector (1973-1974). During that period it was also argued
that a stronger normative instrument, based in international law, was necessary to
protect and disseminate European notions of privacy as a fundamental human right.
The full Convention was adopted by the COE Parliamentary Assembly in February
3These have been cited frequently in the literature ([77, 17]); the texts of these are drawn from
[105]
of 1980 and by the Committee of Ministers in September of 1980. The convention
ultimately received 18 nation's commitment to enact privacy laws
The OECD Guidelines were a response to an increasing volume of transnational
data flows that were occurring both within and outside of the European reach of the
COE Convention. The OECD comprises not only the EEC, but also Japan, Southeast
Asia, Australia, and North American countries, giving it greater international reach
than the COE Convention. The OECD Guidelines is a non-binding international
agreement addressing threats to privacy and individual liberties independent of pro-
cessing mechanism. Although the FIPs objectives are the same, this is different than
the COE Convention's focus on automatic processing and binding mechanisms for
cooperation amongst those that ratify the COE Convention [92]. The OECD Guide-
lines generally follow the FIPs above, recommending principles regarding collection
limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards,
openness, individual participation, and accountability.
The evolution and further articulation of the FIPs by the COE and OECD are ev-
idence of parallel efforts to harmonize privacy regulation across borders. This history
of harmonization is further realized in the EU Data Protection Directive, where the
FIPs are leveraged as the foundations for comprehensive, socially protective regulation
that applies uniformly to public and private organizations. These general principles
are widely accepted and are the nominal basis of both the EU Data Protection Direc-
tive and the US Safe Harbor Agreement. As broad statements, the DPD-FIPs and
SH-FIPs are conceptually similar in substance and can be mapped back to Bennett's
FIPs above. Political contention arises over interpretation of the FIPs and the scope
of enforcement mechanisms applied by a particular regulatory paradigm.
2.2 Privacy in the EU
In October 1998, the EU Data Protection Directive came into effect. As a socially
normative regulation, the objective is to establish privacy as a fundamental human
right for European Union citizens. A second objective is to improve economic ef-
ficiency among member states by harmonizing data protection regulations. Both
objectives come with enforcement mechanisms that require non-EU states meet a
standard of adequacy, often requiring the development of a comprehensive privacy
regime comparable to those being developed by EU member states. The US did not
meet this adequacy requirement-the result was an externality that threatened to
suspend EU-US data flows worth $120 billion [64].
The EU privacy regulatory environment is characteristically socially protective.
The EU views privacy as an unalienable human right that requires government in-
tervention to achieve efficacious protections. Although there are some distinctions
amongst EU states, the EU Data Protection Directive imposes a set of comprehen-
sive privacy regulations uniformly on both public and private data controllers. The
socially protective privacy regime may be described as proactive, providing broad,
blanket protections and relying on derogations of these regulations to accommodate
pragmatic exceptions. The socially protective paradigm is embraced by EU states
and privacy advocates as a means to ensure efficacious enforcement of privacy, but
opponents argue it places an "onerous" burden on businesses and can potentially stifle
innovation.
2.2.1 Development of the EU Data Protection Directive
Both the framers of the EU Data Protection Directive and the US Safe Harbor Agree-
ment avoided conflicts among substantially different interests by inviting only one set
(category) of interests to the drafting table. In the case of the EU Data Protection Di-
rective, the first (and critical) draft of the EU Data Protection Directive was written
largely by the data protection authorities of member states. Heisenberg notes that
"80% of a piece of EU legislation is contained in the Commission's first draft" [64]'.
Business interests did not become aware of the full extent of the EU Data Protection
Directive until after they were given an opportunity to review the full draft. Despite
arguments that obligations to notify the supervisory authorities of changes in data
usage policies and issues of prior checking 5 were onerous and costly, very few business
interests were reflected in subsequent changes. The majority of second draft changes
were minor clarifications that did not change the essential substance of the EU Data
Protection Directive.
At the time of drafting, the Chair of the Council of Europe's Data Protection
Experts Committee and Chairman of the Commission's drafting group was Spiros
Simitis, the German state of Hesse's data protection commissioner. Simitis is crediting
with ensuring the focus of the document on privacy as a fundamental human right:
Contrary to most other documents and nearly for the first time in the
history of the Community, the Commission in its draft said that the need
for the Directive is based on the need to protect human rights within
the Community. This is why, when we speak of data protection within
the European Union, we speak of the necessity to respect the fundamental
rights of the citizens. Therefore, data protection may be a subject onwhich
you can have different answers to the various problems, but it is not a
subject you can bargain about. [27, p. 42]
Simits' statement highlights the socially protective privacy paradigm in Europe. The
last point is especially salient to this thesis: the means of protecting privacy may
vary across states and cultures, but privacy may not be bargained away completely.
Two objectives were achieved in preserving the status of data protection as a human
4Heisenberg attributes this to Hull [65].
5See Appendix A for a more detailed mapping of notification and prior checking. Regan also
discusses this in terms of control of information and the granularity of opt-in and opt-out [101].
6 The notion of bargaining about privacy is rooted in treating privacy as a good that can be
exchanged. Law and economics works such as Posner [100] espouse this approach to privacy, among
other legal issues. The notion of an exchange of privacy for services is a fundamental difference
between the US and European perspective, in particular Europe's view that privacy is an inalien-
able, fundamental human right. The contrast will be revisited in the comparison of the EU Data
Protection Directive and the US Safe Harbor Agreement in Section 2.4.
right: (1) privacy automatically trumps (no bargaining) other rights except similarly
fundamental rights such as freedom of press and (2) it ensured the EU Data Protection
Directive would raise the overall privacy protections across member states, not impose
a lowest common denominator.
The result was a privacy regulatory structure that was ostensibly strong on en-
forcement, but was very unpopular among businesses and other information stew-
ards [64]. In the EU, businesses and organizations are accustomed to more invasive,
controlling EU regulations. Businesses in other regulatory environments (in partic-
ular the US) are not accustomed to substantive government intervention in business
practices. An effect of this one-sided regulation building is that it missed the opportu-
nity to leverage strong support of privacy as a fundamental right while also finding a
compromise with business interests. The strong enforcement and auditing features of
the EU Data Protection Directive that resulted from the influence of data authorities
is lauded by privacy-proponents, but creates conflicts when proposed as a model for
normatively liberal privacy regimes.
2.2.2 The EU Data Protection Directive
The EU Data Protection Directive intends to buttress privacy as a fundamental hu-
man right and further normalize the privacy regulations as a means to improve the
efficiency of the EU Internal Market. Privacy as an inalienable human right is not
new to the EU; it originally derives from the COE Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [35] and is reflected in the Charter of the
Fundamental Rights of the European Union [45]. Constructing privacy as a funda-
mental human right also suggests that privacy requires government intervention to
be efficacious, hence a socially protective paradigm. Further, the EU population is,
historically more trusting of socially protective government institutions [130]. As the
guardian of individuals' privacy rights, EU regulations apply uniformly to the public
and private sector institutions.
The EU Data Protection Directive is characteristic of general EU regulations.
The EU Data Protection Directive is structured as a set of guidelines for designing
new national laws or redesigning and/or refactoring member-states's existing laws.
As guidelines from a supranational governance organization, the EU Data Protection
Directive also intends to harmonize member states' legal structures as a means to
lowering regulatory barriers and further integration of the EU Internal Market. The
role of the Internal Market is to facilitate fluid, ongoing economic relations amongst
the member states. The harmonization effort was intended to simplify data trans-
fers amongst economically dependent member states by providing a common privacy
platform.
The EU Data Protection Directive is characteristically proactive. As a fundamen-
tal right, individuals must have the ability to control how their personal information is
used. Under this assumption, the rights of the individual are given primacy. The EU
Data Protection Directive reifies this by requiring national laws that, in turn, require
organizations respect individuals' privacy by giving open notice of data collection,
use, disclosure, and by ensuring proper tools necessary for access and correction are
available. The enforcement effort introduces supervisory authorities that, on paper,
have sufficient capabilities to monitor and enforce the EU Data Protection Directive's
objectives. In effect, the EU Data Protection Directive may be viewed as high-level
guidelines for implementing the FIPs described above. The following section describes
the EU Data Protection Directive in terms of substantive guidelines for implement-
ing Bennett's FIPs and as guidelines for reifying enforcement mechanisms that ensure
proactive application.
2.2.3 Highlights of the EU Data Protection Directive
A generalized summary of the substantive privacy objectives of the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive are to ensure that information stewards:
" Collect only the information necessary for the stated purpose
" Only use information for the stated purpose
" Provide mechanisms for reviewing, updating, and removing personally identify-
ing information from a system
" Entitle users to know how information was collected and from whom
Bennett [19] effectively maps the substantive Articles and subpoints describing
the EU Data Protection Directive's privacy concepts to the FIPs. Appendix A pro-
vides a finer-grained mapping of the EU Data Protection Directive to the FIPs that
is compatible with Bennett's mapping; a basic mapping, highlights, and deviations
are presented here. In particular, the EU Data Protection Directive addresses open-
ness (Articles 10, 11, 18, 19, and 21), access and correction (Article 12, 14, and
implicit accuracy requirements in Article 6[d]), collection limitation (Article 6, 7, and
8; exceptions in Articles 8, 9, and 13), use limitation (Articles 6[b,c,e] and 7[b-f];
exceptions in Article 8, 9, and 13), disclosure limitation (Articles 6[b], 7[a], 10[c], 11,
and 14[b]), and security (Articles 16 and 17). The finality principle is not applied
absolutely. Exceptions are made for processing that is in the interest of the data
subject, required by law (Article 7), or is part of a government function related to
safety, security, national defense, or the prosecution of a crime (Article 13). Notions
of accountability are loosely covered under Article 16, which addresses confidential-
ity of processes. This indicates that information may only be processed as per the
instruction of the controller; this is interpreted as applying to both employees and
third parties employed by the controller. The EU Data Protection Directive also ad-
dresses knowledge and consent (Article 7), but does not differentiate between opt-in
and opt-out policy mechanisms [101].
2.2.3.1 Privacy Regulation and Enforcement
Ensuring a uniform enforcement of the espoused privacy principles is a key political
element of the EU Data Protection Directive. The EU Data Protection Directive
requires member states each have national laws compatible with and equivalent to
the data protection principles set out in the EU Data Protection Directive. The
enforcement mechanism itself is described in Article 28; Articles 29 and 30 describe
the role of the working group in maintaining the EU Data Protection Directive and
coordinating with authorities
Under Article 28, each member state must have a supervisory authority responsi-
ble for monitoring data controllers (organizations acting as information stewards) and
enforcing the EU Data Protection Directive. The supervisory authority is expected
to be an independent policing organization capable of performing investigations, ini-
tiating interventions before processing starts, invoking legal proceedings, and hearing
complaints against data controllers [19]. Bennett notes that this substantially extends
the powers of pre-existing supervisory authorities. The Data Protection Directive's
Working Group (Articles 29 and 30) advises these authorities, but does not have the
power to change the EU Data Protection Directive. Rather, recommendations go to
what Bennett refers to as a "mysterious body" referred to as "The Committee." The
Committee comprises member state representatives. The Committee has the power
to make decisions and regulations within the scope of the directive. The Committee
also determines which countries meet the "adequacy of protection" requirements laid
out in Article 25 and derogated in Article 26.
2.2.3.2 Transfer and Derogations
Articles 25 and 26 are largely responsible for the externality that the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive imposes on non-European Economic Area countries. Article 25 estab-
lish that private data may only be transferred to third countries deemed adequate by
The Committee. Article 26 establishes derogations from the adequacy requirements
intended to accommodate transfers acceptable to the data subject.
Article 25 requires that a third country ensure the adequacy of their privacy
standards. This is distinct from assessing adequacy itself, which may be performed
by an individual country, or as per Article 31, by The Committee. Bennett [19]
makes an important note that "these rules and measures must be complied with,
obviously meaning that symbolic value statements are insufficient." It may be that
self-regulation (viz. the US) may read very similar to "symbolic value statements"
under some interpretations.
Under Article 25, if a member state recognizes a third country as not having
adequate privacy protections, it notifies other member states and the Commission.
Further, member states are thus required to prevent data transfer to the inadequate
country. Finally, Article 25[5] does indicate the Commission should, "at the appro-
priate time," negotiate some form of agreement that would remedy the adequacy
problem and allow data transfers to resume. In this case, that negotiation produced
the US Safe Harbor agreement.
Article 26 makes it possible for EU data subjects to waive the right to the EU
Data Protection Directive protections and consent to data transfers to countries that
have not met the EU Data Protection Directive's adequacy standards. Article 26
takes the form of a list of exceptions for which derogation is valid: among these are
unambiguous consent, fulfilling a contract, legal obligation on the part of the data
controller, or acting in the vital interest of the data subject. While EU member states
may make these arrangements of their own volition, they must do so on a case by case
basis with data controllers and must report these authorizations to the Commission
for review.
The European Commission (EC) originally found the sectoral, self-regulatory pri-
vacy paradigm of the US inadequate. One factor was that the fragmented sectoral
privacy regulations did not meet the more comprehensive expectations of the EU
adequacy standards. In terms of the enforcement objectives of the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive, a self-regulatory scheme is substantially different from the supervisory
authority's powers of monitoring and enforcement. Article 25[5] and the desire to pre-
serve essential trans-Atlantic data flows gave rise to the negotiations that ultimately
resulted in the US Safe Harbor agreement.
2.3 Privacy in the US
Privacy is not a first-class notion in the US Constitution or the Bill of Rights; the
word privacy does not appear in either document. In the US's normatively liberal
regulatory environment, privacy is assumed to behave like an experience good. Pri-
vacy is expected to emerge as a natural product of extant norms expressed through
self-regulated market activities. Under the self-regulatory approach, it is only when
market forces fail and individuals experience substantive, identifiable harms that the
government steps in with sector-specific regulations. In the case of privacy, HIPAA,
the Bork Bill, and the Privacy Act of 1974 are examples of sectoral privacy regulation.
In contrast to the EU's perspective on privacy as a fundamental human right, the US
views privacy as a good that may be exchanged7 to increase utility and that privacy
"protections" are available to citizens through their choices regarding when to engage
in these market exchanges.
The evolution of privacy thinking in the US is played out in the evolution of 4th
Amendment precedent regarding the bounds of privacy as it relates to police searches
(Section 2.3.1). 4 th amendment precedent illustrates the fundamental mistrust of
government institutions characteristic of the American model of democracy'. The
following discussion is not to establish rigid boundaries regarding what is and is
not private based on the scope of the cases, precedent, and regulations presented.
Rather, this discussion highlights the dynamics of the regulatory environment in
which privacy has evolved as a legal concept in US jurisprudence and in subsequent
legislation. These dynamics give insights into US legal and political responses to new
technologies in their legal and social context.
7Exchange is the less negatively-laden form of Simitis' "bargain[ing) away" of privacy rights
discussed earlier.
8Westin provides an interesting distinction amongst the governance patterns of ostensibly similar
western democracies in Chapter 2, Privacy in the Modern Democratic State, of [130]. Bennett
contends that states tend to reuse regulatory instruments whose requirements, implications, and
outcomes are familiar from repeated use [17]. It is arguable that the EU Data Protection Directive
and US Safe Harbor are both instances of this tendency.
2.3.1 4 th Amendment Privacy Precedent
Privacy is considered a tacit component of the lt, 2 "d, 4th, and 14 th Amendments;
most of the seminal work on protecting privacy is found in 4th Amendment adju-
dications and precedent. The basis of American privacy "theory"9 is Warren and
Brandeis notion of "the right to be left alone" [129]. Warren and Brandeis argue that
as societies, cultures, knowledge, and values change, so must the common law in its
"eternal youth."" Until 1967, police search was dictated by the trespass doctrine,
which defined 4th Amendment privacy violations in terms a physical search of an
individual's residence or property without probable cause".
In Olmstead v. United States1 2 , the Supreme Court ruled that telephone conver-
sations were not private and thus not subject to protection under the 4 th amendment.
Although Brandeis articulated The Right to Privacy in 1890, in 1928 this notion re-
mained the minority dissent in Olmstead. It is important to note the social context
of the telephone in 1928: telephones were still fairly novel, they were not as integral
a mediating technology of everyday activity as they were 30 years later (and even
less so than now), and party-lines were still the norm in many areas. In this sense,
society had not yet imbued telephone conversations with the privacy characteristics
of an in-person conversation behind closed doors. It was not until Katz v. United
States" in 1967 that Olmstead and the trespass doctrine were overturned.
Katz also established the Katz test for privacy relative to 4th Amendment searches.
The Katz test is satisfied if (1) an individual has an expectation of privacy in a
given context and (2) society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. The Katz
test serves as a legal instrument for identifying an articulable harm, identifying the
context in which that harm occurred, and determining the reasonable expectations
individuals have regarding privacy in that context. The Katz test, coupled with the
concomitant ruling that telephone conversations are private, may be perceived as an
exemplar of the ad hoc privacy regime in the US. Although the Katz test provides
an established process, it is important to note that it is not applied on a continuous
or proactive basis; rather, it is only applied reactively when substantial harm calls
attention to a particular context and regulation (or lack thereof). The evolution
of privacy precedent with regard to the telephone was repeated as e-mail became a
9 Solove [110] argues that Warren and Brandeis [129] were not articulating a theory, but instead
were identifying the problems characteristic of treating privacy within the American legal system
and some nascent solutions. Their fundamental conceptualization, "the right to be left alone" was
appropriated as a theoretical construct after the fact.
'
0 This type of change can be considered a form of adaptation and self-correction. In Olmstead
Brandeis explicitly notes the need to incorporate flexibility that can accommodate new technologies.
A more general view of rules from legal theory implies flexibility, and adaptation can be identified in
Hart's discussion of primary and secondary rules (Chapter 5 of [63]). Primary rules are those that
enjoin behaviors; secondary rules confer powers to create or modify primary rules. In particular, an
entire class of secondary rules, rules of change, specify how primary rules may be added, removed,
or modified at the pace of change of group behavior.
"The common law roots of the trespass doctrine go all the way back to English Common Law
and Semayne's Case in 1604. This is also considered the root of "A man's home is his castle."
12277 U.S. 438 (1928)
13389 U.S. 347 (1967)
common, well-understood means of communication. Recent debates focus on privacy
in the cloud, behavioral advertising, and notions of what is and is not personally
identifiable (or identifying) information [51].
In the spirit of Brandeis' youthful common law, the increasingly mutable character
of Internet technologies creates almost limitless contexts in which "reasonable expec-
tations" may be formed. Reasonable expectation is informed by the ubiquity of the
technology's application, how well the implications of that application are understood
by the general populace, and how these latter affect expectations of privacy. Linking
this to the notion of privacy as an experience good, the expectation of privacy may be
viewed as an outcome of sufficient exposure to a situation that leads individuals to as-
sume or imbue a particular context with some degree of privacy. The evolution of the
expectation of privacy for telephone conversations seems to have taken this right as
the telephone became ubiquitous and took on the characteristics of person-to-person
conversations rather than public (party-line) conversations.
A final case in 4 th Amendment privacy precedent, Kyllo v. United States14, high-
lights the impact of new technologies. Kyllo reaffirmed that, as per Justice Scalia's
opinion, "in the home, all details are intimate details"". Justice Scalia's discussion
of inference is especially compelling:
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical "intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area," 16 constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in
question is not in general public use [emphasis added].
The above establishes that inference is in fact a search when it figuratively (as opposed
to physically) reaches into the home. The emphasis above reiterates the notion of
reasonable expectations, especially the aspect of only addressing the privacy concerns
related to a technology after it has proven to be a common, well-understood tool. In
this case, a sense-enhancing technology was used to infer information about the activ-
ities within the home, a violation of reasonable expectations. The types of inferences
used by online service providers to customize their products and service offerings are
common amongst professionals in the area, but may not be well-understood by the
general populace in terms of what they are capable of or how extensively they de-
ployed. It is on the basis of common understanding, or what is typically referred to
as "informed consent," that later arguments regarding the collection of non-PII and
its implications will be built17 .
14533 U.S. 27 (2001)
151d. 14.
16Silverman, 365 U.S., at 512
171t may be argued that automated data collection mechanisms employed by online service
providers are a form of sense-enhancing technology that is not well-understood by the general popu-
lace. This also draws on the notion that privacy is not an experience good. Absent this understand-
ing of the mechanisms, the implications of allowing automatic data collection and processing is not
clearly articulated (Chapter 4). Taking these arguments as given, it is difficult to argue the average
user can give "informed consent" regarding the automatic collection of non-PH and its implications
for his/her privacy.
2.3.2 Highlights of the US Safe Harbor
After substantial negotiation, the US Safe Harbor agreement emerged as a US-specific
derogation of the EU Data Protection Directive and its adequacy standards. The US
Safe Harbor agreement is literally an agreement between the US and the EU; it is
neither a treaty nor a modification of the EU Data Protection Directive. Rather, the
US Safe Harbor agreement is the culmination of negotiations between the EU Com-
mission and the US Department of Commerce to ensure the continued flow of data
from Europe to the US. The nature of the agreement establishes adequacy standards
that Safe Harbor participants are expected to implement. The prescriptive articula-
tion of the US Safe Harbor is laid out as a set of basic privacy principles and FAQs
that further explain implementation details and requirements.
2.3.2.1 Development of the US Safe Harbor
Shortly after the EU Data Protection Directive came into effect, the EU Commis-
sion requested the US create a regulatory body to monitory privacy violations and
respond to consumer complaints [64]. The Clinton administration rejected this sug-
gestion. Instead, the Clinton administration began its own investigations into Internet
regulation, relying largely on industry experts to contribute to policies regarding pri-
vacy and the information economy in general. The Clinton administration's priorities
focused on economic development. In particular, it focused on the role of the Internet
in e-commerce, how regulation may stifle innovation, and, subsequently, how these
may affect the growth of the then nascent information economy.
An early articulation of the Clinton administration's position was presented by Ira
Magaziner in [114], A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce18 . Magaziner (on
behalf of the White House) presented five principles critical to electronic commerce.
The leading principle is that "the private sector should lead," followed by support-
ing principles indicating "governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce" and that "governments should recognize the unique qualities of the In-
ternet" [114]. As a reaction to the EU Data Protection Directive, the notion that
the private sector should lead is almost the opposite of the regulatory function of the
EU Data Protection Directive's notice to supervisory authorities and requirements
for prior checking19 . The reasoning behind these arguments is that the key to the
online environment is unfettered innovation; in the normatively liberal US, unfettered
translates to self-regulation with the government stepping in only in cases of gross
violation of individual rights.
During the two years following the EU Data Protection Directive coming into effect
(one year before member states were to begin acting on adequacy requirements),
there was little formal progress toward resolving the conflict between the US and
Europe. The slow adoption by EU member states was one contributor, interpreted
as the possibility that enforcing the adequacy requirements may not be as strict
18Magaziner elaborates his position and the influences on this report in an interview in [79].
19See the discussion in Section 2.2.3 and the details of the EU Data Protection Directive in
Appendix A.
as implied by European advocates and the black letter of the EU Data Protection
Directive itself. US opponents of the EU Data Protection Directive believed the
threat to trans-Atlantic trade would also soften the EU position. Although this
was not sufficient leverage to completely ignore the EU Data Protection Directive,
the trade volume coupled with arguments for self-regulation was sufficient to craft
a US-solution rather than capitulating to the EU. The architect of the hybrid US
Safe Harbor Agreement was Ambassador David Aaron, appointed Undersecretary of
Commerce for International Trade in November of 1997.
Until Aaron's arrival, the US position was that the information economy required
the flexibility of self-regulatory privacy. The difficulty with this argument was that
the US did not have a self-regulatory solution. Magaziner articulated the position in
a statement before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications:
,.the self regulatory solutions that we are looking towards, we think,
ought to be acceptable to [the EU]. And that we will not permit a break-
down of dataflows. We think that we can prevail in that discussion. But
only if we have the self regulatory regimes up and going. Because the
latest comments they have been making to us is [sic], "Magaziner, you've
been talking about self regulation for a year. Fine. Where is it?" And at
some point you can't fight something with nothing. [80]
Aaron's background in tax law and the notion of "safe harbors" was the inspiration
for the US Safe Harbor Agreement, which for the time being has resolved the conflict
and provided the an early test of hybrid self-regulatory mechanisms [48, 47].
The first formal meetings were between Ambassador Aaron and European Com-
mission negotiators John Mogg (DG of the Internal Market and Financial Services
Directorate General) and Susan Binns (Director in charge of data privacy). Heisen-
berg indicates that, unlike previous junior negotiators, Mogg and Binns did not apply
the black letter, but took a more interpretive approach and wanted a pragmatic solu-
tion [64]. Aaron recollected the first articulation of the idea behind the Safe Harbor
during the negotiations:
Nobody knew how we were going to do this, and we were just sitting in
John Mogg's office one day, and I had always been struck by the idea of
"Safe Harbor." ... [A]s we were discussing this issue, I thought ... well if
we couldn't get the country to be considered "adequate," maybe what we
could get considered adequate are the companies. And that if we could set
up some kind of a regime that could have adequacy finding for a system,
not for a whole country's law and regimes, and so the word just popped
into my head, as describing Safe Harbor. [48]
Farrell reports that this piqued the interest of the European Commission negotiators
and that the primary contribution of the Safe Harbor was that it opened the door to
substantive negotiations that moved beyond deadlock over normative differences [48].
Coupled with a visit by member state representatives to hear from representatives of
self regulation organizations and US enforcement officials, the idea of self regulatory,
hybrid system gained support from the remaining skeptics.
Once past the negotiations with the EU, drafts of the US Safe Harbor Agreement
were distributed to industry groups. Comments from privacy advocates responded
that the solicitation of comments was one-sided, most clearly indicated by the saluta-
tion "Dear Industry Representative." Heisenberg notes that the comments of privacy
consumer groups were near identical to those of European businesses in response to
being left out of EU Data Protection Directive drafting process. Although not quite
regulatory capture, industry clearly had a substantive influence on the direction of
negotiations and the drafts of the US Safe Harbor Agreement.
Upon reviewing the draft of the US Safe Harbor Agreement, the Article 29 Work-
ing Party had reservations [15]. The European Parliament rejected the US Safe
Harbor Agreement on grounds that the European Commission had not taken the rec-
ommendations of the Article 29 Working Party, as the technical experts, into account
and that the Commission may have overstepped its bounds in the negotiation of the
agreement. Modulo the accusation of overstepping legal bounds in negotiation, the
European Parliament does not have the power to determine adequacy20 . Despite the
admonitions of both the Article 29 Working Party and the European Parliament,
the Commission announced the Safe Harbor met the EU's adequacy requirement and
that it would go into effect on November 1, 2000.
2.3.2.2 Safe Harbor Principles
The key elements of the US Safe Harbor agreement are the Safe Harbor privacy
principles and the means of enforcement. The term enforcement is overloaded. En-
forcement as a US Safe Harbor privacy principle will be referred to as an enforcement
principle. The means by which the seven US Safe Harbor principles will be enforced
will be referred to as regulatory enforcement.
The Safe Harbor agreement, as described by the Department of Commerce, is
based on seven principles [125]. These principles reflect many of the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive principles and their FIPs counterparts. The first Safe Harbor principle
is notice; organizations are required to give notice to users with regard to what in-
formation they collect, the purposes of that data collection, contacts for complaints,
and information regarding how information is shared with third parties. The second
principle is choice; organizations must (1) give individuals the opportunity to opt out
of disclosure of their information to third parties, (2) obtain consent for secondary
information uses outside of the original purpose, and (3) obtain consent (opt in) for
the use of sensitive information along the lines of criteria (1) and (2). The third
principle is onward transfer; organizations may only share information with other
Safe Harbor participants or those with whom they have a written agreement that
the third party will provide an equivalent level of protection. The fourth principle
is access; this is akin to the access and correction principles in the EU Data Pro-
tection Directive and in the FIPs. Access ensures that users can correct, update, or
delete inaccurate information. The exception is when the effort necessary to provide
access is disproportionate to the supposed risk to the data subject's privacy. The
2 0Recall modus vivendi in Section A.2 and Footnote 2.
fifth principle is security; this requires an organization take reasonable information
security precautions to avoid unauthorized access and to ensure the integrity of the
data (in terms of content). The sixth principle is data integrity; this ensures the data
subject's information is relevant and reliable for the intended use. The seventh prin-
ciple is the enforcement principle. The enforcement principle has three components.
First, the organization must provide mechanisms for recourse by which disputes can
be reconciled and applicable damages awarded. Second, there must be mechanisms
to ensure companies are implementing the espoused privacy policies. Third, there
must be sufficient, proportionate sanctions that can be applied if organizations do
not comply with the Safe Harbor Principles.
The third part of the enforcement principle alludes to overall regulatory enforce-
ment. In the US, there is no equivalent to an EU supervisory authority that monitors
and enforces privacy policy. Rather, sector-specific privacy functions are distributed
amongst the bodies that regulate those sectors. The Safe Harbor is self-regulatory.
To join, an organization must either develop its own self-regulatory privacy policy
that adheres to the Safe Harbor principles or join a self-regulatory program such as
TRUSTe [115].
2.4 Comparison and Contrast
These two implementations are similar in that they provide an articulation of the
FIPs, but differ substantially in how they propose to impose the FIPs. The following
general critiques summarize the problems with the EU Data Protection Directive
and US Safe Harbor in their role of providing guidance to the development of online
privacy policy standards.
The difficulty with the overly broad scope of rules is largely a problem of en-
forcement. Kuner uses the instance of 'equipment' used by data controllers that are
located outside the EU. Another instance is the broadly scoped definition of per-
sonal information. The problem is that there is a dearth of guidance regarding how
to create standards defining what constitutes personal information. The problem is
further confounded when abstract definitions are placed in context. Development of
standards is a solution, but leads to political and economic questions regarding who
should create these standards and, in turn, how these standards should be enforced.
Another criticism of the EU Data Protection Directive is that the requirements are
burdensome or "onerous." Criticisms of the notification mechanisms are one instance
of burdensome requirement. The immediate implication is the additional effort to
give notice of each operation an organization is using or intends to use. The notion
of burdensome requirements is also invoked in arguments regarding innovation. Busi-
nesses [25, 58] and the US government (the FTC under the Clinton administration)
argued that comprehensive policies create "onerous" burdens that threatened to stifle
innovation [23]. For example, combining notice (Articles 18 and 19) with prior check-
ing (Article 20) before an organization uses a particular operation, a data controller
may be required to wait for government approval to deploy a new service.
The failure to keep pace with technology is not unique to privacy. Historically,
regulations have needed revision as either the technology changes or novel uses of the
technology emerge. The rate of development of Internet technologies in particular
have put the pace of change on "fast forward." A contributing factor is that Internet
technologies are generative [138, 140]-these technologies act as a platform that gives
rise to emergent, previously unforeseen uses, is designed for novel (re)combination,
and supports multiple, potentially competing evolutionary paths to an objective. For
instance, behavioral advertising is a recent instance of innovation that has defied
conventional categorization under the current conception of personally identifiable
information. Kuner indicates that the EU Data Protection Directive was designed
in the era of mainframes; this environment is substantially different from today's
generative Internet.
Regarding keeping pace with technology, industry has a legitimate claim to exper-
tise. Industry leverages claims of expertise and the pace of technological development
to argue for more dynamic regulatory regimes, such as those based on self-regulation.
The general claim is that such regimes are necessary to keep pace with a dynamic
Internet landscape; a particular instance is the ongoing development of behavioral
advertising. As an explicit instance of an online service provider's articulated sup-
port for self-regulation, Google has indicated that legislative processes are too slow
and that the outcomes are often outdated when they do arise [38].
The result of the US Safe Harbor is a policy instrument that has been charac-
terized as a hybrid privacy arrangement [47, 48, 49] that synthesizes comprehensive
character of the FIPs with a self-regulatory enforcement mechanism. The expecta-
tion, as articulated in Section 2.3.2 and Appendices B and C, is that private actors
can self-regulate, backed by government sanctions when privacy violations are demon-
strated (reactively). As evidenced by the policy sample and discussion above, the user
has access to conventional PII, but there is little guidance regarding how to emergent
privacy violations should be handled. The interest-based construction of the US Safe
Harbor has placed a great deal of discretion in the hands of private actors regard-
ing emerging privacy threats that lie outside the conventional bounds of P11-based
protections. In particular, the US Safe Harbor does not provide guidance for how to
ensure users have sufficient (meaningful) information to evaluate novel applications of
previously "innocuous" information, such as the construction of an aggregate image.
The argument here is not that the architects of governance instruments should
anticipate all possible contingencies. The inability to foresee all possible scenarios
is a well know difficulty in the construction of governance systems [63]. The failing
is that the US Safe Harbor captures the privacy problems associated with PII-based
privacy violations, but relegates unforeseen deficiencies such as the aggregate image
and mixed context problems to self-regulatory mechanisms. As discussed here, these
are not experience goods, with clear implications to the lay user, thus self-regulatory
enforcement mechanisms, based in bringing evidence of these harms to the FTC,
does not bind. The privacy policies provide sufficient evidence of the aggregate im-
age in their appeal to customization under the "service-and-improvement" framing.
Absent more precise guidelines for data categories and data purposes (again, this is
relegated to self-regulation), it is not possible to determine precisely what is in an
aggregate image is in order to argue whether it is harmful as a means of engaging
in the self-help processes assumed by the self-regulatory mechanism. Thus, the in-
stitutional deficiency is the unmodified coupling of self-regulatory mechanisms with
comprehensive policies in a technological context that, absent well-framed metaphors,
is not necessarily well-understood by the lay user. The result is that the perception of
comprehensive policy and the difficult to demonstrate privacy harms created by the
SH-FIPs contribute to obscuring the privacy deficiencies of FIPs "compliant" online
service provider privacy policies.
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Chapter 3
Privacy Theory
When a conception of privacy is too narrow, it ignores important privacy
problems, often resulting in the law's failure to address them. On the other
hand, privacy conceptions that are too broad fail to provide much
guidance; they are often empty of meaning and have little to contribute to
the resolution of concrete problems.
Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy [110, p. 39]
Despite substantial efforts across social science, law, and computer science, a sin-
gle theory of privacy has not obtained. Solove indicates that "[t]he most prevalent
problem with the conceptions [of privacy] is that they are either too narrow because
they fail to include the aspects of life we typically view as private or too broad be-
cause they fail to exclude matters that we do not deem private" [110, p. 13]. Abstract
definitions may be covering, but are not specific enough to give insights into concrete
applications. To apply abstract definitions, substantive understanding of the context
and subsequent efforts in framing are necessary for efficacious application. Moving
top-down, a common problem with privacy theory is the tractability of operationaliza-
tion. On the other end of the spectrum, bottom-up privacy conceptions are narrowly
tailored to the issue (or narrow operationalizations of) and give little insight into
conceptually adjacent privacy problems.
Privacy rules, legislation, and policy are similarly susceptible to the problems of
overly broad or narrow prescriptions. Bennet's articulation of the FIPs, the DPD-
FIPs, and the SH-FIPs are broad, normative statements that leave a great deal of
interpretation to those implementing the FIPs. In both the US and Europe, despite
each having a common set of FIPs, implementation and enforcement differs within
each, leading to differing mechanisms for developing standards, guarantees, and pro-
tections. To provide insights into balancing these problems and to highlight the
technical and policy strategies that may provide robust, sustainable solutions, this
work will draw from two relatively new frameworks for reasoning about privacy in
context: Nissenbaum's notion of contextual integrity [89] and Solove's family of pri-
vacy concepts [110]. In contrast to a grand theory that attempts to capture as many
divergent instances of privacy as possible, these frameworks provide a conceptual vo-
cabulary for characterizing the dimensions of problem frames that can be applied to
understand normatively divergent instances of privacy. In other words, these theo-
ries provide a robust, pragmatically rooted conceptual framework for articulating the
bounds of a private context, what contributes to a privacy violation, what constitutes
the violation itself, and the types of outcomes. This vocabulary reinforces the dis-
tinction between the knowledge barriers (information asymmetries) that contribute
to privacy deficiencies.
To reinforce the contrast between conventional theories, Westin's "modern" defi-
nition of privacy is briefly presented. Nissenbaum's contextual integrity is presented
as a framework for bounding privacy contexts. Solove's typology' is then presented
as a family of concepts for reasoning about context specific privacy. Together these
provide a distinct terminology for discussing the context specific roots of knowledge
barriers, privacy objectives, privacy deficiencies, and implications. Following these
theoretical frameworks, Sch6n's notion of generative metaphor is presented as a tool
for reasoning about first whether a policy provides meaningful conceptions in its role
as a decision tool and second as a means to better surface (or elicit) the kinds of
requirements necessary to develop context-specific privacy tools.
3.1 Westin
Westin provides the modern articulation of privacy:
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others [130].
Westin's definition provides a very broad categorization of privacy that covers indi-
viduals, groups, and institutions. Of particular interest is that Westin identifies group
and institutional actors as having a claim to privacy-in the context of online service
providers, an organization's privacy translates to trade secrets that protect the details
of innovative secondary uses of private information and competitive advantage.
In [130] Westin addresses both individual aspects and categorizations of privacy
and the implications of privacy for a society2 . Of particular interest to this discussion
is the idea that groups and institutions have a right to privacy. Privacy on the part
of an institution facilitates efficient discussion of ideas and concepts without the fear
of outside interference in these decision processes. Here, the objective is to allow a
group to explore a range of popular and unpopular ideas that may ultimately lead to
an efficient, efficacious, and socially acceptable outcome.
'Solove's characterizes what is referred to here as a typology as a taxonomy. The family of con-
cepts presented by Solove is more appropriately a typology because the categories are not discretely
delineated as in a true taxonomy.
2Although not directly applicable to this thesis, Westin identifies privacy as a distinct element of
democracy [130]. Privacy facilitates the free discussion of topics that may not be popular amongst
the ruling party. It is this freedom to form private groups that is a key distinction between democratic
governments and totalitarian regimes that seek to control the ideas and information shared amongst
individuals.
The key distinction is that the decision process, intermediary steps, alliances,
and good-faith compromises amongst nominal adversaries are allowed to evolve un-
hindered. In this scenario, the determination of "when, how, and to what extent"
described above protects negotiations and ensures that strategic exchanges, decisions,
and compromises remain in their proper institutional context. This is different from
the traditional application of the sunlight principle3 , which, in its strongest form,
expects complete transparency in all decision processes. Rather, in this work, the
sunlight principle is to be applied to the disclosure of outcomes and implications, not
to the technical development processes or as a precautionary principle. Framed in
this way, the trade-offs between the economic efficiency of online service providers
and individual privacy become a trade-off between the (private) processes that allows
organizations to develop competitive services and individual privacy. Stated this way,
the process highlights the quantity and kind of information shared amongst privacy-
related actors, not the typical dichotomy of whether or not information should be
shared or not.
3.2 Contextual Integrity
Nissenbaum claims that the conventional framework for reasoning about privacy
"fail[s] to clarify the sources of their controversial nature" [89, p. 119]. Rather,
contextual integrity is presented as a justificatory framework for privacy policy and
law that draws on moral, political, and social values to highlight the root of the prob-
lem. Nissenbaum's criticisms of conventional privacy are based in failures of court
cases to set applicable precedent 4 for future cases and that many disputes are charac-
terized more by adversarial encounters between specific interests than by addressing
the root of the problem or the social value of privacy . Contextual integrity is not
presented as a privacy theory of the same breadth as Westin's, but rather as a frame-
work for pragmatically reasoning about the root of privacy problems in a way that
establishes applicable precedent. Nissenbaum also criticizes the typical dichotomies
used to describe privacy policy issues: sensitive and non-sensitive, private and public,
government and private. Following the focus on identifying the root of privacy con-
flicts, Nissenbaum's discussion focuses on a more textured depiction of individuals'
activities as they move "into, and out of, a plurality of distinct realms" [89, p. 137].
Context has thus far been used rather loosely and often synonymously with the
3
'Sunlight is the best disinfectant; electric light the best policeman,' U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis [24].
4This is also a problem in the larger class of Internet Jurisdiction cases. For instance, the case
of Yahoo! and France in 1998 was a conflict over the content of online auctions [73, 139]. Recently,
similar conflicts over what is an is not to be considered a counterfeit luxury good have created
disparate rulings on each side of the Atlantic [26, 28, 55, 61, 81, 82, 83, 95, 96, 97, 111, 1131.
5Both Nissenbaum and this thesis draw on Regan's analysis of interest-driven legislation of pri-
vacy [102]. Nissenbaum cites Regan regarding the devolution of debates over privacy into adversarial
confrontations between interest groups intent on promoting their interests over their opponents' [89,
p. 122].
notion of an environment6 . Privacy norms are socially constructed, and, as such,
are embedded in socially constructed contexts that may persist across multiple built
environments. Privacy norms are rooted in the details of these contexts (or situa-
tions). Contexts may thus be defined in terms of distinct sets of norms that comprise
notions of "roles, expectations, actions, and practices" [89, p. 137]. The objective of
contextual integrity is to provide a cohesive perspective on how these contribute to
meeting individuals' privacy expectations within a given social context.
The notion of contextual integrity gives insight into how to accurately and con-
sistently surface individual privacy preferences. In one sense, this is the dual of
behavioral profiling leveraged for targeted advertising. In both cases, preferences are
inferred based on contextual indicators. It will be later argued that one approach to
improving context-based privacy will be the applications of technologies and meth-
ods used to infer interests in advertisements to provide feedback tools for eliciting
actual (as opposed to imposed or espoused) privacy preferences. Contextual integrity
"ties adequate protection for privacy to norms of specific contexts, demanding that
information gathering and dissemination be appropriate to that context and obey the
governing norms of distribution within it" [89, p. 119]. This definition builds on two
type of norms: norms of appropriateness and norms of flow or distribution.
Norms of appropriateness dictate what information is fitting to reveal in a par-
ticular environment. Contexts differ along the dimensions of explicitness and com-
pleteness. In terms of explicitness, a context may have very low barriers, finding
individuals sharing detailed, intimate information. An example of one-way sharing
of such information is the patient-psychiatrist relationship. An example of a two-way
sharing is between extremely close friends or between long-time romantic partners.
Norms of distribution (or flow) dictate what information can be transferred to
others while respecting the contextual norms under which it was shared. Following
the earlier examples, either a spouse or a psychiatrist sharing intimate details with
others outside the original context would violate contextual integrity and may be
perceived as a breach of privacy. In the case of the spouse, the binding norm violated
would be that of personal trust. In the case of the psychiatrist, the binding norm
violated would be that of a professional patient-physician relationship, a formal proxy
for trust.
Although this is an elegant and insightful way of describing privacy, Nissenbaum
admits it is very difficult to operationalize. The difficulty lies in the conceptual and
empirical research necessary to understand a context sufficiently well to concretely
define norms of appropriateness and norms of distribution. Such an effort would,
ideally, yield well-formed rules describing appropriateness and distribution. Although
this effort is difficult using conventional data collection methods, the (built) online
environments that create a particular online context may be instrumented to help
collect this information in real time, as it occurs.
'In this discussion, the term environment is technically laden with the connotation of "built
environment" or an "engineered environment" in contrast to the more purely socially constructed
environments implied by Nissenbaum's context.
3.3 Solove's Privacy Framework
In [110], Solove critiques the existing approaches to privacy theory and their applica-
tion in law and policy. As per this chapter's epigraph, too narrow a theory does not
capture all the issues that fall under an intuitive domain of privacy and too broad a
theory (or principle in the case of the FIPs) provides too little guidance, often giving
insights into the abstract but little substantive direction for concrete policy making.
Solove draws on Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances[110, pp. 42-46]7 and
pragmatist philosophy[110, pp. 46-51]8 to approach a typology of privacy concepts
from the bottom-up. The argument is that this approach to theory building can help
identify the middle ground between overly-narrow, under-inclusive privacy theory and
the overly-broad theories that are empty of substantive meaning.
Solove's typology provides a terminology for describing the implications of the
privacy policies described in Chapter 4. As an empirical typology of privacy concepts
built around concrete situations, Solove has identified characteristic activities that
contribute to defining instances of privacy contexts as a configuration of concepts from
the consistency of this typology. The model identifies the lifecycle of a data subject's
information, identifying four categories of potentially harmful activities: information
collection, information processing, information dissemination, and invasion. The four
categories are further decomposed into subcategories that refine these activities and
identify implications of these activities. Details of this typology can be found in
[110, pp. 101-170] with descriptions of the concrete situations that exemplify and
contribute to this typology. The following summarizes and defines the terminology
used in the remainder of this thesis.
3.3.1 Information Collection
Solove decomposes information collection into interrogation and surveillance. The cat-
egories are similar to collection limitation principles in the FIPs. Applied as guides to
contextually informed policies, they contribute to understanding precisely what infor-
mation is collected in a given situation or scenario (context). Surveillance is defined
as "the watching, listening to, or recording of individual's activities" [110, p. 104]. In-
terrogation "consists of various forms of questioning or probing for information" [110,
p. 104].
3.3.2 Information Processing
The subcategories of information processing describe the activities and outcomes of
how information is manipulated and used by a data controller. The first subcategory
is aggregation, which deals with how different pieces of information about a person are
combined, potentially resulting in additional information. This is different from the
statistical aggregation commonly described in online service provider privacy policies.
'Solove directly references Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations [134], but also refers the
reader to [60, 98] for a better understanding Wittgenstein's family resemblances.
8 Solove draws primarily from the work of John Dewey and William James.
Based on the sample, aggregation denotes a statistic describing a particular category
of information, such as how many (or what proportion of) individuals within a certain
age range viewed a given category of products. Solove's aggregation describes the
combination of heterogeneous data that may provide more complete information,
and thus a more complete picture of an individual. This has implications for other
categories of processing, such as identification as well as distortion (under information
dissemination) and invasions of privacy9 .
Identification is broadly defined as linking information to particular individuals.
The definition of what is personally identifying is another critical element of the pri-
vacy debate. The notion of what is personal identifying information (PII) and what is
non-PII has been contended from a number of perspectives. An individual's identity
may be derived from their community (online and/or terrestrial), ethnicity, religion,
political beliefs, nationality, physical attributes, interests, or some combination of
these and/or other categories of information. Operationalizations, or more accu-
rately the lack of precise operationalizations, of identity are a critical component of
characterizing information as PII and the subsequent restrictions on how information
is used and how it must be protected.
One problem with information processing and identity is the threshold at which
individually innocuous categories of data, in aggregate, identify an individual. Name,
social security number, telephone, etc. are individual categories that can be directly
linked to individuals and are considered personally identifying. The collection of
categorical information such as age range, neighborhood, and specific interests, do
not, individually, identify a person but collectively may describe an individual quite
accurately. Whether the processing that aggregates this data creates an "identifying"
image of the individual and whether the further processing to link this image to a
unique identifier constitutes the collection and maintenance of PII is currently being
debated [51].
Insecurity addresses how well information is protected from illegitimate access
through intentional or unintentional means. Information leaks that occur when infor-
mation is poorly protected often lead to other violations related to identity (theft),
aggregation, and distortion. (In)security is often considered a gateway to many cat-
egories of privacy violation and it has received substantial attention in the form of
security principles in the FIPs. Security violations are the focus of many of the FTC
court actions related to privacy; almost all of these are actions against organiza-
tions for either misrepresenting their information security practices or neglecting to
correct well-known vulnerabilities10 . The focus on the security of information also
9 1t is this kind of overlap that makes this classification scheme a typology rather than a taxonomy.
10The majority of FTC cases cited by [51] deal with the misrepresentation of technical security
protections and negligence regarding well-known vulnerabilities. The only FTC case published as
of this thesis dealing with tacit data collection is [52]. This case deals with Sears deploying a
stand alone application that runs on a users' computer and that collects information about users
online behavior. It is arguable that this was provable only because the complete client executable
was available and analyzable, allowing regulators to determine precisely how and what information
was collected. Moreover, because it resided on the user's computer, it is more easily argued as an
invasion.
contributes to the conflation of security and privacy, leading to the frequent mis-
conception that strong security implies strong privacy protections. This conflation
mistakenly portrays technical security (via constructions of privacy that focus on the
control of information and technical security as the guardian of information control
mechanisms) as a necessary and sufficient condition for privacy. Rather, focusing
on security ignores other mechanisms by which organizations may legitimately share
information (or engage in information dissemination).
Secondary use addresses the situation when information is collected for one pur-
pose and subsequently used for other purposes without the consent of the data sub-
ject. Secondary use is evident in the FIPs under use limitations and was also stated
in the HEW Report, which indicates that "[t]here must be a way for an individual
to prevent information about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without his consent."" Secondary use is not necessarily
a violation of privacy, may have beneficial outcomes, and may require balancing so-
cietal outcomes against individual rights. For instance, secondary uses that enhance
the service provided to an individual may in fact provide greater (albeit perhaps un-
expected) utility to the user. The dual is that secondary use may be undesirable.
As such, secondary use is often confounded with opt-in and opt-out issues regarding
which is appropriate to a given situation. This coupling of secondary uses with the
spectrum of opt-in and opt-out highlights the source of business claims that strong
opt-in policies are onerous and stifle innovative secondary uses.
Another factor regarding secondary uses is that many individuals simply do not
know the range of potential secondary uses to which seemingly innocuous data may
be put. Schwartz highlights the possible information asymmetries that result from
users' lack of understanding of potential secondary uses:
[I]ndividuals are likely to know little or nothing about the circumstances
under which their personal data are captured, sold, or processed. This
widespread individual ignorance hinders development through the privacy
marketplace of appropriate norms about personal data use. The result of
this asymmetrical knowledge will be one-sided bargains that benefit data
processors. [108]
Although the privacy landscape has changed substantially since Schwartz made this
observation in 1999, the outcome remains the same even though both the EU Data
Protection Directive and the US Safe Harbor agreement both make nominal claims
requiring disclosure of data purposes via collection and use limitations. This is also
a form of exclusion, described below.
Exclusion is relates to the interplay between openness, access, and control prin-
ciples found in various articulations of the FIPs. Exclusion occurs when individuals
are denied information about how their information is being used. As such, exclu-
sion is not often considered a harm unto itself. Exclusion does facilitate other harms
when the user does not know they need additional information to make informed
decisions. The distinction between exclusion as a contributor to privacy violations,
"Referenced in [110, p. 130], originally in [126).
but not a violation itself, is conceptually homomorphic with the distinction between
knowledge barriers (information asymmetries) and privacy deficiencies discussed in
the Chapter 1.
Exclusion is also a function of notice. When an individual is not given notice
regarding how her information is used, they are effectively excluded from decisions
about information processing. Subsequently, they have less influence over the kinds
of secondary uses that may occur.
Exclusion also has a fiduciary element related to the understanding of secondary
uses described above. Fiduciary elements intend to introduce accountability, espe-
cially when one party to a relationship has a particular power over another party
(or parties). For instance, in Nissenbaum's doctor-patient relationship, because of
the implications of information uses and the decisions made based on both the in-
formation and secondary uses, physicians are required to acquire informed consent.
In the strong form of informed consent (opt-in), this may require disclosing future
or potential uses of the data. The notion of opt-out, which assumes consent unless
an individual explicitly expresses otherwise, does not support a fiduciary relation-
ship. Moreover, as will be seen, because opt-out is constructed by the online service
provider, it is often constructed in an all-or-nothing fashion that discourages opting
out because one loses substantial utility from the beneficial (innocent) secondary uses.
3.3.3 Information Dissemination
Information dissemination is concerned with the legitimate and illegitimate means of
spreading or revealing information about an individual. Solove identifies a number
of outcomes of information dissemination that recur in various bodies of privacy law.
Each is outlined below.
The distinction betWeen breach of confidentiality and disclosure is subtle. In both
cases, information that is harmful is disclosed outside of the intended context. In the
former, a breach of confidentiality is a form of betrayal by a trusted actor, regardless
of the information. In the latter, disclosure of information is the dissemination of
information relating to a private matter that might be "highly offensive to a reasonable
person" [110, p. 137]. In the case of disclosure, the focus is less on the perpetrator
of the illegitimate dissemination, but rather the nature of the information.
Disclosure relates to the dissemination of true information that, if exposed to the
public, may harm the data subject. Some may argue that this is contrary to free
speech and thus two fundamental human rights conflict. An efficiency argument is
that limiting disclosure inhibits the ability to determine an individual's credibility
and thus the ability to imbue the individual with trust. Richard Posner argues that
disclosure limitations protect the "power to conceal information about themselves that
others may use to their disadvantage."' 2 This articulation of disclosure limitations
illustrates the overlap with the related notion of exposure.
The notion of exposure captures the act of revealing physical or emotional at-
tributes of an individual that may be embarrassing or humiliating. Although related
12Referenced by Solove [110, p. 142]; originally in [100].
to disclosure in that it involves the dissemination of true information, the information
involved in exposure is a subset of that covered by disclosure and related directly to
an individual's body, health, or emotions. Issues relating to aggregation and expo-
sure may also be a result of distortion, where the implications of true facts result in
inaccurate or imprecise information linked to an individual that may elicit the same
feelings related to exposure, even though the data is not the "true information" as-
sociated with breach of confidentiality, disclosure, or exposure. One contributor to
aggregation and potential distortion is increased accessibility.
The trite response to issues related to increased accessibility is that information is
already publicly available. In other words, the nominal accessibility of the informa-
tion has not changed. The issue of increased accessibility speaks to the implications of
simple automatic access to a wide variety of information sources that may facilitate
aggregation. The issue of increased accessibility is also related to use limitations.
Information may be public and was collected for a specific purpose-secondary uses
emerge when multiple sources are combined to reveal additional information via ag-
gregation. As such, the issue of increased accessibility may be considered along with
security as a factor in privacy violations, but whose presence or absence does not
constitute a privacy violation in itself13 .
Appropriation was the first privacy tort recognized after Warren and Brandeis'
seminal paper. The tort of appropriation occurs when "the defendant must have
appropriated to his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or commercial
standing, public interest, or other values of the plaintiff's name or likeness." " A
clear instance of appropriation is identity theft, where the appropriation of another's
identity facilitates theft and may create subsequent harms through damage to the
victim's credit. Less obvious are Solove's implications regarding the role of appropri-
ation in safeguarding what society believes to be appropriate when constructing an
individual's identity. In the case of online service providers, as noted earlier in the
discussion of identity, an online service provider's built environment dictates how the
user may access or change the information about herself held by the online service
provider.
The concept of distortion has been referenced several times earlier in this discus-
sion as a negative outcome related to other forms of information dissemination. In
terms of these concepts, distortion is an outcome that results from information dis-
semination of true or false information that makes the individual "appear before the
public in an objectionable false light or false position, or in other words, otherwise
than as he is."" Distortion captures defamation, false light, and reputational torts.
1 3Although Solove does not make it explicit in his discussion of these factors, security and increased
accessibility are neither necessary or sufficient for pragmatic enforcement of privacy or for privacy
violations. In contrast, they are clearly related and contribute to factors that do result in privacy
violations, such as disclosure and the negative outcomes of aggregation. It is this distinction that
makes clear that although there are no clear ("bright white") boundaries, the conceptual theory is
bounded by the coherent combination of these related concepts.
14 Drawn from Solove [110, p. 155]; originally from the Restatement of Torts §652C & cmt. c
(1977).
15Referenced by Solove [110, p. 159]; originally in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §652E cmt.
b.
The key distinction between distortion and other forms of information dissemination
is the element of integrity intrinsic in its application. In the EU Data Protection
Directive, the notion of data integrity is a protection against distortion. In this
case, FIPs regarding openness, access, and change (paralleled by concepts protecting
against exclusion) ensure that information about a person is not distorted and thus
does not give rise to unexpected harms resulting from misinformation or false light.
3.3.4 Invasion
One way to view invasion is to envision how the effects of previously discussed concepts
encroach on the activities of the individuals affected. In this sense, unconsented-to
effects create disruptive, meddlesome, and disturbing incursions into the lives of the
data subject. Solove identifies two subcategories of invasion: intrusion and decisional
interference.
The protection against intrusion is most likened to Warren and Brandeis' "right
to be left alone" in that it protects individuals from uninvited interactions. One
of the torts is that of seclusion, which helps clarify the state that is being violated
when one intrudes "upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns" [129]. Intrusion is related to a number of the concepts above in that
they facilitate the intrusion: surveillance, interrogation, disclosure, aggregation, and
increasing access are a few facilitators and violations that combine to create an intru-
sion. Solove also points out that this is not purely a spatial (terrestrial) phenomena.
Rather, spam and other unsolicited communications intrude upon individuals' daily
activities, potentially violating forms of seclusion no matter where the individual is
terrestrially. The notion of a realm of exclusion is also introduced, moving away from
the dichotomy of either being secluded or not. Instead, it is more akin to the con-
texts identified by Nissenbaum. For instance, individuals in a restaurant may not be
secluded (per se) but may have reasonable expectations that they will not be stared
at (surveiled). The case of Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies gave rise
to this interpretation of exclusion:
[T]he concept of 'seclusion' is relative. The mere fact that a person can be
seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally
be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.' 6
These two cases highlight that seclusion and exclusion are more textured than the
simple dichotomy of whether one is alone or not.
Solove defines decisional interference as "interference with people's decisions re-
garding certain matters in their lives" [110, p. 166]. An initial evaluation indicates
this is a question of autonomy, not privacy. Westin argues that autonomy and pri-
vacy are linked: the ability for individuals or groups to reason about an issue without
fear of surveillance (and subsequent intervention) by the government or blackmail by
others is fundamental to preserving freedom. The sources of interference are rooted
in a number of the earlier concepts: risk of disclosure, avoiding engagement for fear
of harms of intrusion, and an indirect link with blackmail as a side effect.
1 6Drawn from Solove [110, p. 165]; originally from Sanders v. American Broadcasting Companies.
3.4 Generative Metaphor
The notion of generative metaphor is a useful tool for understanding how a particular
problem is framed, how that framing influences the design and implementations of so-
lutions, and the insights that can be gained from comparing different framings [106].
Sch6n describes metaphor as a means to recognize that a problem has been conceived
from a particular perspective and that other perspectives may shed light on previously
unacknowledged characteristics or generate new insights into the problem. Sch6n ar-
gues that the problems developing (social) policy are rooted in how the problem is
framed (by the metaphors used) rather than that means of the problem itself. Rather,
the framing of the problem shapes how users and designers perceive a situation and
subsequently the solutions that are applied. One framing of a problem may charac-
terize a service as suffering from "fragmentation" and prescribe "coordination" as the
remedy [106, p. 138]. Alternately, the service may be described as "autonomous,"
which does not imply a problem as opposed to the connotation of fragmented services
having once been elements of a more integrated whole. As such, the framing of the
problem shapes how it is perceived and the set of tools brought to bear in solving it.
A key difficulty Sch6n addresses is the difference between problem setting, which
is often characterized by how the problem is framed, versus the process of problem
solving. Simon's problem solver explores the problem-space to optimally satisfy some
objective function [109]. Sch6n argues that part of this process assumes that the
problem (and its framing) is given-the framing can be seen to shape the problem-
space and thus may introduce unintended and potentially unrecognized constraints.
In Sch6n's words
Each story constructs its view of social reality through a complementary
process of naming and framing. Things are selected for attention and
named in such a way as to fit the frame constructed for the situation.
This process highlights the "salient" features and relations between objects, simpli-
fying a potentially complex situation'7 .
A generative metaphor is one that creates "new perceptions, explanations, and
inventions;" in effect, a generative metaphor provides the designer with new insights
that were absent and/or conceptually occluded by alternate metaphors used in other
framings of the problem. In this thesis, the policy analysis provides evidence of
the metaphors used by online service providers to shape users' perception of their
privacy practices. To some degree, the discussion of Solove's privacy concepts has
already highlighted alternate metaphors for some of the privacy practices surveyed
here. The analysis surfaces implications of privacy policies that are occluded by
either the absence of meaningful metaphor and information asymmetries rooted in
the need for technical interpretation. Given these implications, policy implications
are reframed using metaphors drawn from Solove's privacy concepts, moving away
from the language of utility, services, and data sharing to a framing that focuses on
17As an aside, Sch6n also relates the problem setting process to a construct by Dewey referred to
as the "problematic situation," which he references at [106, p. 146] and refers the reader to [39].
the exchange of privacy information for services and implicit data collection (or in
less flattering terms, surveillance).
The process of problem setting then becomes what Sch6n calls "a kind of policy-
analytic literary criticism" [106, p. 149] that helps understand the framing and the
generative metaphors of which they are comprised. Starting with a new situation,
the frame setting process suggests cognizance of existing, conflicting framings of the
problem (frame conflicts) and the implications of each. Sch6n argues that frame
conflicts are often dilemmas because the ends are couched in frames that give rise
to incompatible meanings ascribed to the situation. A possible solution is frame
restructuring, the process of constructing a new problem-setting story by drawing
from the conflicting relations while preserving the integrity (coherence) of the new
story. Sch6n argues that this process "gives us access to many different combinations
of features and relations, countering our Procrustean tendency to notice only what
fits our ready-made category schemes" [106, p. 152].
Chapter 4
Privacy Policies and Deficiencies
In a society in which the typical citizen cannot figure out how to program a
VCR, how can we legitimately expect the American public to understand
the privacy implications of dynamic HTML, Web bugs, cookies, and log
files? The commercial models, however, are predicated on
"personalization" and "customization" using these technologies.
Joel Reidenberg in E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy [104]
Despite differences in structure and organization, privacy policies provide largely
the same precision of information regarding data collection, data purposes, and im-
plications. A content analysis shows these policies give little more information than
the guidelines provided in the US Safe Harbor agreement itself. A detailed compar-
ison of policies to the US Safe Harbor Agreement is provided in Appendix B and
confirms black letter compliance. Beyond black letter compliance, this chapter pro-
vides evidence that the privacy policy sample does not provide sufficient information
to either substantively differentiate online service providers in terms of privacy guar-
antees or to determine the implications of the data collected. Data categorizations
and purposes articulated by the sample build a "service-and-utility" framing of pri-
vacy policies. In some cases, meaningful metaphors are used to convey implications,
fulfilling the spirit of a privacy policy as a decision tool. In other cases, technical
language unfamiliar to the lay reader, coupled with a dearth of metaphors, create
information asymmetries that occlude making informed decisions. Have identified
these asymmetries, deficiencies can be more clearly articulated. As per the previous
chapter, information asymmetries and privacy deficiencies will be presented in terms
of contextual integrity and Solove's privacy typology.
One compelling aspect of this analysis is the lack of precision with which online
service providers describe data purposes and how this is reinforced by the "service-
and-utility" framing. Following the notion of a generative metaphor contributing to
design, lack of precision is also reflected in the limited range of opt-out mechanisms
and the framing of the implications of these opt-out mechanisms. In both cases, online
service providers satisfice to the black letter of broadly scoped FIPs but, in applica-
tion, the range of options is limited in both the precision of tools and explications of
the implications of the decisions that are available.
In terms of conventional personally identifying information (P11), the categories
of data are similar-notice that this data is collected and reassurances that this in-
formation is not shared, sold, or rented is common. Less clear are the data purposes
and precise implications of aggregate images inferred from non-PI. Despite different
structural formats, a common set of data categories were identified (Section 4.2.3.2).
Data collection practices are reported in terms of these common categories, the mech-
anisms used to collect data, and the visibility of these mechanisms to the average user
(Table 4.4 and Section 4.2.4).
4.1 Online Service Provider Categories
The privacy policy sample focuses on online service providers that collect users'
personal information and have a substantive user base. The sample includes the
privacy policies for Amazon.com [5], Facebook [46], Yahoo! [136], Twitter [116],
MySpace [86], LinkedIn [76], Google [56], Overstock.com [93], eBay [40], and Mi-
crosoft [84]. Online service providers are categorized as social networking, informa-
tion services, and sales. An online service provider may have elements of more than
one of these categories, but the primary function of the online service provider general
falls into one of these broad categories. For instance, eBay primarily falls into the
sales category, but has distinct social networking elements that contribute to its focus
on creating an online community within the markets it provides. Each online service
provider was also categorized as either a single service provider or platform service
provider based on the number of services and whether these services fell into the same
basic functional category. A service is considered single if the differentiated features
serve and support the same primary function. For instance, Amazon has social net-
working features, but its primary objective is to sell products. A service is considered
a platform if the online service provider provides a variety of differentiated services
supported by a common technical platform. Facebook is a platform because, although
its primary function is social networking the platform provides services and an API
for developing embedded applications that are as varied as the types of information
that can be published on Facebook. In addition, the platforms surveyed here all allow
developers to create online applications that have different privacy guarantees than
the hosting online service provider. Table 4.1 summarizes these categorizations.
4.2 Content Analysis
This analysis highlights the information that contributes to understanding an on-
line service providers' data purposes, what data purposes it allows, and attendant
implications. Despite structural and organizational differences (Section 4.2.1), pri-
vacy policies convey data collection methods (Section 4.2.2), types of data collected
(Section 4.2.3.2), data purposes and sharing practices (Section 4.2.4), and opt-out
mechanisms (Section 4.2.6).
Online Category Services
Service
Provider
Amazon Sales, social networking Single
Facebook Social networking Platform
Yahoo Information services, sales Platform
Twitter Social networking Single
MySpace Social networking Platform
LinkedIn Social networking Platform
Google Information services, social networking, sales Platform
Overstock Sales Single
eBay Sales, social networking Single
Microsoft Information services, social networking Platform
Table 4.1: Functional Categorization of Online Service Providers Each
category comprises the primary categorization and a subcategorization. The sub-
categorization indicates that elements of this category are used by the online service
provider in support of the functions comprising the primary category.
4.2.1 Structure
Information service providers, especially those that host a number of different ser-
vices and provide a developer platform, typically provide an umbrella privacy policy
and supplementary policies for each service. The umbrella policy provides general
guidelines for how information is used across the family of services provided by an or-
ganization, typically capturing data purposes such as database management, billing,
logistics, data analysis, etc. If a specific service functionality deviates from the as-
sertions made by the umbrella policy, these are described in a supplementary policy
that describes these differences and that serves as notice. Yahoo! is an instance of an
information service provider that publishes a primary privacy policy [136] and a list
of supplementary policies [137] that describe the differences in what data is collected,
the purposes to which this data is put, and with whom the data is shared.
4.2.2 Data Collection Methods
Data collection methods described in privacy policies can be partitioned into explicit,
user-generated information sharing and tacit (automatic) data collection. Any in-
formation explicitly shared or generated by a user via a web form, through either
free-form text entry or by selecting a discrete data element from a list, is consid-
ered explicit data sharing. The presence of some data entry method (typically a web
form) makes this an active form of interrogation. Information shared explicitly in-
cludes name, e-mail address, gender, date of birth, etc. Explicit information may be
required or voluntarily shared. Required data such as user name, e-mail, password,
and, if purchases are made, payment information and physical address comprise a
Online Supplementary Policies?
Service
Provider
Amazon No
Facebook No
Yahoo Yes
Twitter No
MySpace No
Linkedln No
Google Yes
Overstock No
eBay No
Microsoft Yes
Table 4.2: Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft all provide supplementary policies de-
scribing the various services they provide. In each case, the umbrella policy indi-
cates supplementary information can be found by visiting the service. Each of the
umbrella privacy policies links to a list of services.
subset of explicit data that is typically used by the online service provider to create
a user profile. Voluntarily shared information is typically information that supple-
ments a user's profile, such as personal description, descriptions of interests, or other
information that is considered to enhance the user's experience. Sharing of volun-
tary explicit information is often encouraged. The data purposes associated are often
covered by blanket statements in other portions of the policy1 .
Tacit data collection methods collect information from the user's browser; HTTP
session data automatically sent with each request, data encoded in cookies, data
transmitted via web beacons, and embedded executable scripts are all automatic data
collection tools. These data collection methods are passive relative to the user and
may be categorized as a form of surveillance. This information includes basic browser
information and comprises data elements used to construct clickstream information
that contributes to inferring behavioral trends. A simple instance of this information
referenced by nearly all privacy policies in the sample is IP address, browser type, op-
erating system, and other information that accompanies HTTP requests. Clickstream
information is collected by instrumenting the browser using programmable scripting
mechanisms such as Javascript or VBScript. Clickstream information is used to track
how users navigate the online service provider's web site, what portions of the page a
user's mouse hovers over (indicating interest), and the elements within an interactive
page the user viewed. Tacit information also includes search parameters included
in the HTTP request as well as information about the web site the user is coming
from and the web site to which the user is going, even if these are not pages within
iSection 4.2.3.2 describes blanket category statements relative to more precise data categoriza-
tions.
the organization's web site. Automatic information has a clear legitimate use for
debugging a web site, reproducing errors, and improving the efficiency and design of
a site. Automatic information also contains information that can be used to monitor
and record behavioral information as a means to construct an aggregate image of an
individual.
The choice to differentiate explicit information sharing and tacit data collection is
intentional. The implication is that explicit action is taken by the user to share this
data with the online service provider and potentially other members of a community.
As an explicit action, an individual can choose to withhold information. In contrast,
tacit data collection occurs automatically and users do not typically have a choice
regarding which individual datum are collected, stored, and processed by the online
service provider. Privacy preferences and opt-in/opt-out choices related to interests
(Section 4.2.6.1) provide a certain granularity of choice, but it is not at the granularity
of individual choices made when the user chooses to share (generate) information
through an explicit process.
Another key distinction between explicit information sharing and tacit collection
methods is how privacy policies categorize this information. In the case of explicit
information, the categories are framed in terms of familiar metaphors, such as what
data is personally identifiable, contact information, registration information, favorites,
etc. In the case of tacit information, the categories 2 map to the mechanism: HTTP
session data, cookies, and web beacons are the most commonly referenced. Although
the user is a participant in the processes that activates these mechanisms, they are
not as clearly linked to meaningful actions such as e-mail correspondence or group
chats. Rather, reporting the techniques used to collect abstract categories of technical
data satisfices to black letter notice that these data are collected. The absence of
explanatory metaphors occludes recognizing and reasoning about the implications and
consequences that are neither elaborated nor obvious to the casual (non-technical)
user.
Some privacy policies do make the distinction between explicit (visible) and tacit
(automatic) data collection. Others simply describe the mechanisms without mak-
ing any distinction between explicit and tacit clear. Table 4.3 indicates whether an
online service provider makes this distinction explicit. For instance, Facebook dis-
tinguishes between "personal information you knowingly choose to disclose that is
collected by us and Web Site use information collected by us as you interact with
our Web Site" [46]. eBay and Yahoo!, on the other hand, simply list largely op-
erational categories of information, such as registration information, transactional
information, information necessary for logistics, community discussions, interaction
information, authentication information, and information collected from other com-
panies. In contrast, Amazon explicitly categorizes data as "Information You Give
Us" and "Automatic Information" [5]. This level of explicit distinction is preferred
for overt clarity but does not address the fundamental information asymmetry.
For the most part, web sites describe the information processing involved with
2 Here categories map to the naming process in the naming and framing of Dewey's problematic
situations discussed in Section 3.4.
Online Service Provider Explicit Visibility Distinction
Amazon Explicit
Facebook Explicit
Yahoo Methods
Twitter Methods
MySpace Methods
Linkedln Categories
Google Categories
Overstock Categories
eflay Methods
Microsoft Methods
Table 4.3: Distinction Between Explicit Sharing and Tacit Collection
Explicit indicates the privacy policy, in one or two adjacent sentences, clearly dis-
tinguishes between categories of data roughly equivalent to explicit and automatic.
Categories indicates this distinction can be determined by inspection of the cate-
gories of data the online service provider discusses when giving notice of the data it
collects. Methods indicates that either the categories did not distinguish between
explicit and automatic and the distinction must be determined from an under-
standing of the methods described, such as web beacons, client-side scripting, and
cookies.
transferring information from the user to the online service provider in terms of data
collection. Overstock's privacy policy takes a different tone, describing information
as being provided by the user, using language referring to "details you have supplied
us with" and "you may supply us with ... " [93]. Linkedln takes a similar approach,
making it clear that users are sharing information and that users bear the impli-
cations of this data sharing. Linkedln is especially interesting because it not only
takes a different tone, but stresses that the social network is geared towards business
networking.
The purpose of the Linkedln website is to permit Users to voluntarily pro-
vide information about themselves for the purposes of developing, main-
taining and enhancing a network of professional contacts. You willingly
provide us certain personal information, which we collect in order to al-
low you to benefit from the Linkedln website. If you have any hesitation
about providing such information to us and/or having such information
displayed on the LinkedIn website or otherwise used in any manner per-
mitted in this Privacy Policy and the User Agreement, you should not
become a member of the LinkedIn community. [76, Emphasis added.]
This is arguably different than the descriptions of the immediate impacts of informa-
tion shared on Facebook, which has a substantially different culture geared towards
largely personal pursuits. Here, the differences in social network purposes are manifest
in the tone and implications used to frame the privacy policy.
4.2.3 Data Categories
The primary focus of most regulatory criteria for a privacy violation is the disclosure of
PII. As documents framed to provide legal protection3 , sample policies stress PII, its
use, handling, and storage. Non-PII is often described with the qualifier that it cannot
be used to personally identify the user, often presenting it as an "innocuous" category
of data used largely to improve service. This framing of non-PII, especially when
coupled with the implications of aggregate (in the sense of Solove) non-PII, obscures
the implications of detailed descriptions of individuals these aggregates create and
the commensurate level of security that should be afforded to these descriptions.
4.2.3.1 P11 and non-PII
The category of personally identifying information is rooted in forms of identification
that, individually, can be used to establish contact with an individual. Most of the
instances of PII given as exemplars also fit the characterization of either contact
information (name, telephone number, address) or unique information that is linked
to validating an individual's identity (driver's license, social security number, credit
card number). Both of these classes of P11 provide a gateway to accessing additional
details about an individual by either directly contacting the individual in person,
via some communications medium, or by accessing information associated with that
unique information. In terms of Warren and Brandeis' notion of privacy, the "right
to be left alone," protecting PII is an efficacious way to ensure actors outside of the
context in which PII is shared do not have undue access to the individual.
Of the policies in the sample, none give a formal, non-circular definition of PII;
the closest is a nominal effort by Google with an example-based entry in the glossary
linked to from its privacy policy. Google's definition is fairly characteristic of those
in the sample:
"Personal information" is information that you provide to us which per-
sonally identifies you, such as your name, email address or billing infor-
mation, or other data which can be reasonably linked to such information
by Google. [57]
While the examples are useful, they are not nearly covering (for instance, social
security number and driver license number are not included). This type of definition
is circular; personal information is defined as information that "personally identifies"
you, which does not give any more precision than the actual term. Following the
dearth of metaphors conveying meaningful implications thus far, the definition does
not describe why one category of information is "personally identifying" and why
others are not.
The notion of an aggregate image of a user has been used loosely based on Solove's
definition of aggregation. Solove's aggregation describes the combination of hetero-
geneous data that incorporates multiple sources of information, creating a more com-
3 Framing for legal protection is exemplified by differentiated privacy policies discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.4.3.
plete picture of an individual [110]. The aggregate image of an individual is the collec-
tion of individually "innocuous" instances of data (attributes) that together describe
characteristics and behaviors that distinguish an individual from others character-
ized by the same attribute categories. In contrast to conventional PII, the aggregate
image by itself may not directly link the owner of that image to the individual, but
may provide a rather detailed description of their characteristics, interests, and activ-
ities. Based on the sample, an aggregate image may be inferred from the synthesis of
explicitly shared information and tacitly shared data used to infer behavioral trends.
A problem with maintaining an aggregate image, even if it does not contain PII
that links directly to the individual, is re-identification. Sweeney reports that 87%
of the US population can be uniquely identified by an attribute triple comprised
of 5-digit zip code, gender, and date of birth [112]. This data was based on 1990
US Census data. The process of mapping "anonymous" data that does not include
conventional PII to a unique individual is re-identification. Given a second data set
that contains a subset of the attributes in the aggregate image, it is possible to match
corresponding attributes with statistical significance, such as with the Census data
above. The threat of re-identification could be categorized as a form of insecurity,
especially if the level of security is commensurate with the policies' claims that this
data is innocuous.
The aggregate image also suffers from exclusion, or what under the FIPs would
be classified as a violation of rights to access and correction. It is important to
note that the aggregate image constructed by either an online service provider or an
advertiser is based on the collection of tacit data and the categories these organizations
have assigned to particular events and gestures. The primary means for making any
change to an aggregate image is to opt-out of tacit data collection (if possible) or
to completely opt-out by disabling cookies and executable scripts. The only form
of access and correction (of tacit data) available in the sample was the ability to
remove recent items from the Amazon shopping history (described in Section 4.2.6
and shown in Table 4.8). If categorization and inferencing mechanisms do not work
as efficaciously as expected or the data set is tainted with unrelated data, the image
produced may be inaccurate and may target ads embarrassing or even offensive to
the user. Revealing embarrassing true information is the threat of exposure; the
possibility of exposing (embarrassing) false information is a distortion of the user's
image.
In both the exposure and distortion cases of information dissemination, the user
is forced to trust the information steward to ensure the accuracy of the aggregate
image. Vague categorizations limit validating the types of data that contribute to the
aggregate image. Moreover, some of these categories may be out of the control of the
user. For instance, Facebook indicates:
We may use information about you that we collect from other sources,
including but not limited to newspapers and Internet sources such as blogs,
instant messaging services, Facebook Platform developers and other users
of Facebook, to supplement your profile. [46]
In this quote, profile refers to the internal information maintained about an indi-
vidual that corresponds to an aggregate image. At least in the case of Facebook,
the aggregate image also relies on external data sources, such as newspapers and
the information about a user provided by their friends, which may not be the most
accurate, desirable, or flattering.
A key distinction between the aggregate image and PII is that an aggregate image
is not useful for targeting advertisements if the user with which it is associated can-
not be recognized. The aggregate image may be linked to some unique value, such as
stored in a cookie, in order to recognize the user's browser (and by proxy the user)
and apply information from the aggregate image to customization and advertising
processes when they return to the site. Most of the privacy policies in the sample
indicate cookies are used to identify the user, or the user's browser, when they return
to the site. As per the "service-and-utility" framing, this is nominally so the online
service provider can deliver the customized services that are of value to the user.
The privacy policies also indicate that cookies are not "personally identifying." This
appeals to the connotation of non-PII as a single datum that does not create a direct
link to the user. Thus, if "personally identifying" is framed as a description of an
individual (which in common usage is also used to identify someone), then cookies
linked to an aggregate image are in fact identifiers. The caveat is that the unique
value (stored in a cookie or otherwise associated with the aggregate image) is not
linked to PII. Rather, these unique values are used to recognize agents of the user
(typically browsers) so online service providers and advertisers can make use of prior
information, collected in potentially different contexts, to serve advertisements cus-
tomized based on highly descriptive information of an individuals' browsing habits
(and by proxy their interests and preferences).
For the remainder of this thesis, a profile, in contrast to the aggregate image,
is considered to comprise only the explicit, conventional PII typically referred to
in privacy policies (name, telephone number, address, etc.). The aggregate image
is intentionally identified as inferred because, as per the earlier distinction between
shared and collected data, the user does not have access to the information processing
that contributes to the construction of that image.
4.2.3.2 Data Categories from the Sample
Online service providers describe data categories in a number of ways, not necessarily
using the same categories. In the easy cases both explicit and tacit data categories
were nicely laid out in a section about the data a particular online service provider
collects. In more difficult cases, instances and examples of information were scattered
throughout policies organized around processes rather than organized around data
categories and purposes.
The following describes the categories of data surfaced in the content analysis. The
labels in parentheses following these categories indicate the data collection method
used. The label explicit indicates explicit, explicit data collection. Explicit may
be modified by required, indicating this category is typically required for service;
voluntary, indicating sharing this information is at the discretion of the user; defaulted
indicating this data takes on default values that may be changed by the users. The
label automatic indicates information that was automatically collected via client-side
instrumentation. Instances of these categories, drawn from the sample, are listed in
Table 4.1.
Blanket Includes all information described in a privacy policy. This category is
included here for completeness; it is used in the next section to describe the
granularity of data purposes
PII / Contact (explicit, required) Information the online service provider cate-
gorized as "personally identifiable," characteristically information that, atomi-
cally, facilitates direct contact with an individual
Preferences (explicit, defaulted) Preferences and settings to be applied to online
service provider features
Communication with Online Service Provider (explicit, voluntary or re-
quired) Information contained in any communication between the user and
the online service provider, typically qualified over any communication medium
Communication with Users (explicit, voluntary) Information from communi-
cations between a single user and a specific, known set' of users that is either
mediated or facilitated by online service provider features
Financial Transaction (explicit, required) Information about purchases and pay-
ment information
User Generated and Community Information (explicit, voluntary) Informa-
tion generated by users that contributes to an online service provider hosted
community; this is distinguished from Communication with Users because in-
formation is published to the community as a whole, rather than targeted to
one or more specific users, such as instant messages or e-mail.
HTTP (automatic) Information from standard HTTP session data sent by a browser
when a request is sent to the server
URL (automatic) Information that can be extracted from variables embedded in
a URL
Code Instrumented (automatic) Information collected about a user's behavior
that is reconstructed from client-side instrumentation tools and scripts
(Statistical) Aggregate Information (automatic) Statistical information about
a particular sub-population of an online service provider's users
Other Sources (automatic) External sources of information about users that is
used to either supplement or validate information collected from other cate-
gories.
Explicit Categories Instances
PII / Contact name, e-mail, physical address, telephone
number
Preferences Opt out settings, user communication settings
Communication with OSP Customer service communications
Communication with Users Messages to other users, group messages
Financial Transactions item purchased, purchase history, payment in-
formation
User Generated/Community blogs, wall postings, reviews
Tacit (Automatic) Categories Instances
HTTP IP address, browser type, operating system
URL search terms, locale, search settings
Code Instrumented cookies, web beacons, click events, mouse over
events, hover events, referrer address
Aggregate Information number of uses in a demographic range, quan-
tity of advertisement views
Other Sources newspaper articles, profiling services
Table 4.4: Instances of
Providers
Categories of Data Collected by Online Service
The categories above can be partitioned into two groups: those conceptually fa-
miliar to the user (they have meaningful metaphors) and those describing technical
data collection methods. These categories are not explicit in the privacy policies.
They are largely derived from lists of "examples of data we collect." Familiarity with
the types of data is important to conceptualizing what is actually being collected and
the implications. The partitioning of Table 4.4 highlights the distinction between
meaningful and technically obscure categories. Users are familiar with the data and
attendant personal information that constitutes 5 the instances listed alongside the ex-
plicit categories. The automatic categories are less intuitive. Some of the instances,
such as IP address and search terms, may be useful to advanced users, but other
instances, such as browser type, various click events, cookies and the vague descrip-
tions of their applications, web beacons, and the description of variables embedded
in URLs are not intuitive to the casual user. In many cases, automatic categories are
qualified with blanket purpose statements, such as improving services and web site
customization, which may make these data categories seem like innocuous technical
data. Framing these individual categories as "innocuous" is a positive alternative to
the negative connotation users would associate with categorizing these as mechanisms
that facilitate surveillance and the construction of possibly inaccurate aggregate im-
ages.
4The language is intentionally used to distinguish communication between users and the publi-
cation of information to an entire population, such as a blog or a review.
5The term constitutes is used precisely here; it does not imply an understanding of how these
data may be combined with other visible or automatically collected data.
4.2.4 Data Purposes
The data purposes described by the policies, are, like the explicitly described data cat-
egories, imprecise and typically defined in terms of examples of general data purposes.
Purposes can be categorized by data category and actors involved in the actions that
comprise a particular purpose.
Categorizing along data category, the broadest purposes apply to the blanket data
category, which includes all data described in a privacy policy. The blanket category
is less useful as an informative, discriminatory category. It is used by online service
providers to make broad statements that bind to all data collected by the online
service provider and data that is covered by the privacy policy. All of the policies in
the sample included some form of blanket statement that indicates that information
collected from users is to improve service and provide a more customized experience.
This language contributes to what has been referred to as the "service-and-utility"
framing of online service provider privacy policies. For instance, one of the blanket
statements from the Yahoo! privacy policy states:
Yahoo! uses information for the following general purposes: to customize
the advertising and content you see, fulfill your requests for products and
services, improve our services, contact you, conduct research, and provide
anonymous reporting for internal and external clients. [136]
Privacy policies typically include this information at the beginning of the policy as a
blanket statement and repeat it as references to sharing information are made to re-
iterate the general themes (metaphors) of service improvement driven customization.
Applying Sch6n's framing awareness, the implied dichotomies in these privacy
policies are "customized/generic" and "improvement/stagnation." It is arguable that
these metaphors do not act as generative metaphors: they do not give insights into pri-
vacy implications or the tools that attend to these implications. An alternate framing,
drawing on Solove's concepts of surveillance and intrusion, does provide insights into
the tools that would improve user privacy. For instance, a "surveiled/anonymous"
dichotomy might better convey the implications of engaging services that collect and
aggregate "innocuous" usage data. This alternate framing may highlight the privacy
implications, but obscures the benefits and utility of customized advertisements that
some users may prefer.
Privacy policies indicate that the aggregate image created allows them to better
target advertisements to an individual's interests and to better customize the services
to users' needs. Stated at this level of abstraction, culling the advertisements to those
that interest the user and using this information to further customize the service can
come across as net positives in terms of users' overall utility. This framing is effective
because, when individuals are presented with positive abstract categories, they tend
to refine them into the more concrete categories that appeal to them individually.
The precise interests inferred by online service provider and advertisers' construc-
tion of an aggregate image may in fact reflect the information the user viewed or
categories of services the user engaged in, but the user may not consider the precise
interests inferred appropriate. Thus, vague articulations do not effectively convey the
implications necessary for a privacy policy to act as an efficacious decision tool. In
Solove's terms, it may be argued that, without some more precise articulation that
conveys meaningful implications, general data purposes result in either blind accep-
tance without due consideration of the implications or decisional interference due to
technical knowledge barriers.
Beyond blanket statements, privacy policies' data purposes focus on the situations
under which user information is shared with third parties and advertisers. Across
the sample, three categories of third parties are consistently identified: operations
support, advertisers, and platform developers. Online service providers reassure users
that they do not sell, rent, or trade users' PII to any third parties without users'
permission. This does not cover the implications of data collected and shared by third
parties themselves. The following sections describe these relationships, as articulated
in the privacy policy sample and provide evidence for the mixed context problem
described in Chapter 1.
4.2.4.1 Operations Support
Operations support describes general categories of information shared with third par-
ties to provide necessary support functions. Instances of operations support provided
by online service providers include order management and fulfillment, order shipping,
data analysis, marketing, customer list management, search management, credit card
processing, customer service, hosting, processing transactions, statistical analyses,
and fraud detection (to name a few listed in the sample). The general trend in the in-
stances given is that online service providers offload non-core services to third parties,
mostly along the lines of logistics management and specialized analytics. Like data
categories, online service providers do not provide precise criteria regarding what is
shared.
Operations support is generally accompanied by a reassurance that PII is shared
on a need-to-know basis. Only the information necessary for a third party to perform
their function is shared with that third party. For instance, Amazon states:
[Third party operations support] have access to personal information needed
to perform their functions, but may not use it for other purposes. [5]
Amazon does not make mention of contractual obligations to respect users' privacy.
Other online service providers provide stronger "need-to-know" statements. For
instance, LinkedIn states:
These third parties do not retain, share, or store any personally identifiable
information except to provide [operations] services and they are bound by
confidentiality agreements which limit their use of such information. [76]
A number of the online service providers in the survey further reaffirm need-to-know
statements with the reassurance that third party operations support is under con-
tractual obligation that limits their use of the information. Some go even further,
indicating that operations support is required to meet the same privacy standards as
set out in the policy.
Online Service Provider Operational Support Contract
Amazon simple reassurance
Facebook unspecified contractual
Yahoo unspecified contractual
Twitter unspecified contractual
MySpace simple reassurance
Linkedln unspecified contractual
Google binding
Overstock simple reassurance
eBay unspecified contracta
Microsoft simple reassuranceb
Table 4.5: Categories of Data Collected by Online Service Providers
The category simple reassurance indicates that there is a need-to-know statement
regarding information shared with and information purposes of third parties. The
category unspecified contractual indicates the online service provider claims contrac-
tual limitations, but does not specify more. The category binding indicates that the
online service provider indicates contractual limitations guarantee the third party
will adhere to the privacy standards set forth in the privacy policy.
aThis is the loosest invocation of unspecified contract. All of the others are discussed in the
context of protecting privacy, but the description in eBay's privacy policy [40] only indicates that
operations support is "under contract" with no specific privacy connotations.
bThis is the strongest of the simple reassurance category. Microsoft indicates operations sup-
port is "required to maintain ... confidentiality," [84] implying, but not specifying, a contractual
enforcement mechanism.
Table 4.5 summarizes online service providers privacy guarantees relative to third
party operations support. Although the difference in guarantees is useful for liability
purposes, the specific information shared and the actual third party identities are not
fully disclosed. Some online service providers provide partial lists of third parties; all
of these qualify any list with the disclaimer that these lists are not complete, may
change, and are not authoritative. Moreover, these qualifications usually refer to PII;
sharing non-PII and the resultant aggregate images is not typically addressed. This
implies non-PII and the associate aggregate image may not receive the same level of
security protection as P11, even though it is arguably very descriptive. Coupled with
the potential for re-identification, this framing may actually conceal re-identification
privacy risks by demoting non-PII to a second-class category of information with
respect to information security requirements.
4.2.4.2 Advertisers
Advertisers are the other primary category of third party addressed by online service
provider privacy policies. All privacy policies make some mention of advertisers. The
first commonality is that all online service providers indicate that their privacy policy
binds only to the online service provider. Advertisers (and Platform developers in the
next section) may have different privacy policies; the user is advised to review those
Online Service Provider Specificity
Amazon explicit
Facebook none
Yahoo explicit
Twitter none
MySpace implicit a
LinkedIn explicit b
Google implicit
Overstock none
eBay implicit
Microsoft explicit
Table 4.6: Specificity of Third Party Advertiser Segmenting Implications
Three levels of specificity of third party advertiser segmenting implications were
identified in the sample: explicit, implicit, and no mentions. The category seg-
ment indicates an explicit statement indicating advertisers may assume marketing
segments is included in the online service provider privacy policy. The implicit cat-
egory indicates that examples of segments are given, but a conceptual description
of segmenting is not elaborated. The category none indicates neither explicit nor
implicit mention of segmenting was given by in the privacy policy.
'The discussion of non-structured profile information used to serve advertisements could be in-
terpreted as implicit and thus it is categorized as such.
bLinkedIn is exceptional in this regard, providing substantial information about the implications
of information sharing.
policies'. This contributes to the mixed context problem. A second trend is that
all of the online service providers in the sample make at least one reassurance that
information shared with advertisers, either directly by the online service provider or
collected via cookies or other instrumentation, is not personally identifiable.
Although advertisers do not have direct access to P11 held by an online service
provider, the online service providers admit that advertisers do have direct access
to the user through interactions with advertisements served directly from advertiser-
owned hosts and/or through web beacons. Typically, the discussion follows the themes
established regarding information online service providers do share with advertisers,
namely that non-PII is not personally identifiable. Some online service providers
(summarized in Table 4.6) do make mention of simple implications of advertisers
collecting information about users. With the limited exception of Linkedln, disclo-
sure of the implications of advertiser data aggregation is a simple statement about
segmenting.
An important distinction needs to be made between discussing the implications
of segmenting and the practice of segmenting. The objective of many marketing
campaigns is to use combinations of user segments to effectively target ads. Online
service providers are not required to provide users with any additional information
regarding what third party advertisers can or cannot do with non-PII data they can
6 Section 4.2.6 covers the opt-out choices that sometimes accompany these suggestions
collect 7 . The following is an instance of a segmenting disclosure statement from
Yahoo!:
Yahoo! does not provide any personal information to the advertiser or
publisher when you interact with or view a targeted ad. However, by
interacting with or viewing an ad you are consenting to the possibility
that the advertiser will make the assumption that you meet the targeting
criteria used to display the ad. [135]
This particular statement is somewhat abstract. Others give concrete examples of
the type of segmenting that may occur
Although Amazon.com does not provide any personal information to ad-
vertisers, advertisers (including ad-serving companies) may assume that
users who interact with or click on a personalized advertisement meet
their criteria to personalize the ad (for example, users in the northwestern
United States who bought or browsed for classical music). [5]
These are both examples of explicit disclosure of simple, uncombined segmenting
practices.
4.2.4.3 Platform Developers
Platform developers are another category of third parties that can collect information
from online service provider users. As the name implies, platform developers create
applications for online service providers categorized as platforms (see Table 4.1). Like
the content served by or on behalf of advertisers, online service providers reiterate
that the privacy policy only binds to the online service provider and that users should
review the privacy policy of the platform developer before using the application or
sharing information with or via the application. A range of obligations, relative to the
online service provider privacy policy, were observed and are summarized in Table 4.7.
The implications of these differentiated obligations is, like the dilemma with ad-
vertisers, that the user is again confronted with another content provider that may
impose a different set of privacy rules. For instance, even though the user may have
established a relationship with Linkedln, they must also trust that LinkedIn's part-
ners will behave similarly. In the case of Facebook, users are exposed to applications
that may or may not be aligned with the expectations derived from interactions with
Facebook itself. As a final example, MySpace provides a third party application
platform, but does not support (or encourage) using these applications in its privacy
policy:
MySpace does not control the third party developers, and cannot dic-
tate their actions. When a Member engages with a third party applica-
tion, that Member is interacting with the third party developer, not with
7The FTC, in [51], strongly encourages online service providers to disclose information about
how non-PII is used and its implications. As of July 2009, the FTC has not mandated disclosure of
practices regarding segmenting or combination of non-PII.
Online Service Provider Platform Developer Obligations
Facebook non-contractual
Yahoo none
MySpace none
Linkedln
Partners contractual protections, vetted
Standard contractual protections
Google none
Microsoft none
Table 4.7: Platform Developer Obligations with Respect to Online Ser-
vice Provider Privacy Policy
The content analysis surfaced three categories of platform developer obligation rela-
tive to the online service provider's privacy policy: contractual equivalent, contrac-
tual protections, non-contractual, and none. The category contractual equivalent
indicates that the privacy policy indicates platform developers are contractually
obligated to protect users privacy at the same level as described in the online
service provider privacy policy. The contractual protections category contains on-
line service providers that indicate protections are contractually enforced, but does
not strictly indicate they are equivalent to those described in the online service
provider's privacy policy. The category non-contractual indicates that the online
service provider asserts platform developers are required to respect users' privacy,
but indicates neither contractual obligations or the level of protection relative to
the online service provider's privacy policy. Finally, the category none indicates
no mention of privacy protections is made other than encouraging the user to read
the privacy policy of the platform developer. In addition to these categories, an
adjacent category, vetted, is used to indicate a subset of platform developers have
a trusted status with the online service provider and automatically have some level
of access to user information.
MySpace. MySpace encourages Members not to provide PII to the third
party's application unless the Member knows the party with whom it is
interacting. [86]
The differentiated privacy regimes within a single online service provider architected
environment is arguably confusing and forces the user to balance expectations about
a relatively known environment (the online service provider) with expectations about
a foreign, poorly understood environment (a platform application, advertiser content,
and/or combinations of these). Even assuming the user reviews the conflicting poli-
cies, there is no guarantee the privacy policies of the platform applications are aligned
with users' privacy preferences or the policies of the online service provider.
Confounding this problem is the issue of collateral damage from a users' friends
using third party applications. The problem arises when a user Alice is a friend of
Bob, who uses an application C developed by Charlie. Alice has chosen to share
information set I with her set of friends F, of which Bob is a member. Alice does not
wish this information to be shared with others outside of F. Even though Alice does
not use platform application C, it may have access to some of the information only
intended for (context) F because application C may access any information available
to Bob. As a result, Alice's preferences may be violated inadvertently by Bob through
his use of application C.
Of the platforms listed in Table 4.7, only Linkedln explicitly discloses this issue.
Linkedln describes the problem:
If you, your connections, members of your network, or other Users of
Linkedln use any Platform Application, or if you interact with a Platform
Application being used by any of them, such Platform Application may
access and share certain information about you with others. Because a
Platform Application can make calls on behalf of the User interacting
with it to access non-public information, the level of detail accessible by
the Platform Application is constrained by the same settings that govern
visibility of your data to that User on Linkedln. [76]
Under this scenario, an immediate recourse to preserve the privacy preferences ex-
pected, based on who one has selected as a friend, is to only connect with people who
are not running untrusted platform applications. This distorts privacy preferences
because the trust relationship between users is no longer based on actions taken di-
rectly by the parties involved, but by action taken by their associates, here, a third
party application.
The preference distortion can be explained in terms of bounded rationality and ra-
tional ignorance [109, 90]. Bounded rationality indicates that humans have a limited
capacity for reasoning about a situation in a finite amount of time, thus bounding
pure rational choice that assumes perfect information and sufficient time to process
all necessary information [109]. A consequence of bounded rationality is rational ig-
norance [90]. When faced with more information than an individual can process,
individuals choose to address the issues they perceive (through their bounded under-
standing of the problematic situation) to be most salient. Under a model of rational
ignorance, rather than spending the time to investigate individual X's application
usage practices to determine whether X poses a threat, the user may artificially limit
their social network to only those individuals they already know well enough or, more
likely, assume nothing bad is going to happen and not even consider the issue of an
application's access to their information. In either case, if the user even considers
mixed context, the user's actual preferences may be distorted by a context comprised
of elements with different policy guarantees and potentially conflicting privacy impli-
cations. This confounds the process of making privacy decisions based on previous
experience with the architect of the environment, the online service provider.
4.2.5 Mixed Context
The information that contributes to identifying online service provider environments
as mixed contexts is also interleaved with discussions of information available to adver-
tisers, the tacit data collection methods used, and the implications of user segmenting.
Providing the information necessary to identify these implications is referred to as
mizxed context disclosure. Mixed context disclosure builds on online service provider's
careful articulation that their privacy policy only binds to their content. Their policy
does not apply to content outside their domain that they link to or to content pro-
vided by and embedded in the environment by third parties. In that sense, when a
user visits an online service provider, they are intending to visit a particular context,
but because of differentiated privacy policies that are tacitly imposed when advertise-
ments and web beacons are embedded in an environment, they are actually exposed
to multiple sets of rules regarding how their behaviors will be recorded and analyzed.
Although context is not explicitly discussed by the online service providers in their
policies, the existence of differentiated context is surfaced from the implications of
online service providers as mixed content environments.
The problem of mixed context is confounded by the fact that the online service
provider architected environment comprises content contributed by a dynamic set of
actors (observers, in the sense that they can each collect information about users).
These actors are referred to as content providers. It is arguable that static configu-
rations of content providers (online service provider, advertiser, developer) could be
reconciled into a consistent representation of context that draws on the privacy rules
set out by these contributors. In Nissenbaum's terms, each of these particular con-
figurations is a source of privacy norms, would comprise a unique set of actors, and
may elicit a unique privacy response from the user. Rather, while the online service
provider's privacy policy remains the same, the advertisements are not guaranteed to
originate from the same actor upon every engagement. Considering advertisements
are presented based on the inferred preferences of the user based on the aggregate
image and advertising segments associated with the primary online service provider
content being viewed, advertisements may change with each visit, presenting the user
with an ephemeral context whose privacy implications have not been considered. The
user is faced with two burdens: understand all possible combinations (perfect infor-
mation) or following up on each new configuration (inviting rational ignorance) as
they occur. The first is impossible. The second is made difficult because configura-
tions are ephemeral and unpredictable and do not occur with sufficient frequency to
develop expectations even if the user was aware of their existence and implications.
A possible solution to this problem is presented in the next chapter, focusing on tools
that highlights online service provider architected environments as mixed contexts
and the implications for the reputations of contributing actors.
Moving to the substantial implications of mixed context, in terms of norms of
appropriateness and norms of dissemination, mixed contexts allow advertisers that
serve advertisements across domains to construct detailed images of individuals based
on the categories the advertisers have targeted. In term's of Solove's information
dissemination, this is a form of increased access; as per earlier discussion, increased
access does not constitute a privacy violation itself, but the disclosure, exposure,
or distortion resulting from increased access does. Recall online service provider's
limited categorizations of online service provider segmenting disclosure in Table 4.6
and the quotes from Yahoo! and Amazon in Section 4.2.4.2. The advertising agent can
construct a more detailed aggregate image of the user based on a variety of segment
information, collected from a variety of contexts, by combining of a unique, advertiser
assigned cookie, knowledge of which user segments advertisements are targeted to, and
repeated exposure (across contexts) to a particular advertising agent over the course of
multiple sessions. The advertiser may also know the URL and content categorizations
of the environment in which the advertisement is being served, providing further
information to contribute to an aggregate image of the user. In effect, each of these
environments from which information is collected may be considered a context in
which the user has "shared" certain information. As a violation of contextual integrity,
acting on information collected in one context (violation of dissemination) may be
inappropriate in other, unrelated environments.
In terms of Solove's categories, the information dissemination related deficiencies
described above constitute an intrusion. In a sense, context creates a boundary
and the integrity of that boundary is maintained by the norms of dissemination
and appropriateness. An example is an individual reading a forum about Viagra in
which an advertiser is legitimately serving advertisements. Using either the content
categorization of the forum or the segment information the advertiser is targeting,
the advertising network modifies the user's aggregate image to reflect an interest in
Viagra. The user later visits a travel web site looking to book a vacation for a few
days trip to Bermuda. If the same advertising network serves advertisements for the
travel website, recognizes the user, and serves an advertisement such as "Don't forget
the Viagra" or "Find local drugstores selling Viagra in Bermuda," this constitutes
an intrusion. Based on contextual integrity, information about the user's interest
in Viagra may be inappropriate for the travel context, especially if he is discussing
travel plans with other individuals that see the advertisement and assume it has been
targeted.
4.2.6 Choice and Opt-Out Options
The variety and scope of choice is critical to the efficacy of privacy policies and the
tools supporting users' privacy decisions. Like the limited information conveyed by
general categories of data and purposes, the tools supporting opt-out are also lim-
ited in scope. For instance, in many cases it is unclear whether opt-out means the
collection of tacit data is disabled or whether it continues and the associated adver-
tisements are no longer displayed. General categories of opt-out were identified and
apply to various categories of data and data collection methods. Notably absent were
online service provider supported capabilities for limiting engagement with specific
agents of advertisers and third party applications.
4.2.6.1 Categories of Opt-Out
Three opt-out models were identified in the sample: complete, recent activity, and
categorical. The other dimension of opt-out models that received little attention is the
ability to opt-out of data collection by some services provided by a platform online
service provider, but allowing data collection by others of the same online service
provider. This problem also extends to advertisements embedded in online service
provider architected environments and to a certain degree platform applications. The
problem with managing precisely what agents a user is engaging with will be referred
to as the agent selection problem.
The first opt-out model is referred to as complete opt-out and opts the user out
of all tacit data collection by the online service provider. One mechanism for this
opt-out model is to disable cookies for either that online service provider or for the
browser as a whole. In the policies, this option is often accompanied by an admonition
of this practice by the online service provider, indicating the user may not garner the
full benefits from the service. For instance, Amazon's privacy policy states:
The Help portion of the toolbar on most browsers will tell you how to pre-
vent your browser from accepting new cookies, how to have the browser
notify you when you receive a new cookie, or how to disable cookies al-
together. Additionally, you can disable or delete similar data used by
browser add-ons, such as Flash cookies, by changing the add-on's settings
or visiting the Web site of its manufacturer. However, because cookies
allow you to take advantage of some of Amazon.com's essential features,
we recommend that you leave them turned on. For instance, if you block
or otherwise reject our cookies, you will not be able to add items to your
Shopping Cart, proceed to Checkout, or use any Amazon. com products and
services that require you to Sign in. [5, Emphasis added]
Another instance discussing disabling cookies is per Overstock:
We use cookies to provide you with the best level of service by keeping
track of what you have in your shopping cart, remembering you when you
return to our store and using them to help us show you advertisements
which are relevant to your interests. They cannot harm your computer
and they do not contain any personal or private information. You must
accept cookies to shop through the Site. You can erase or block cookies
from your computer if you want to (your help screen or manual should
tell you how to do this), but the Site may not work correctly or at all if
you set your browser not to accept cookies. [93]
The Overstock quote is an excellent example of both the admonishment of disabling
cookies and the "service-and-utility" framing. Note that cookies are presented as a
necessary tool for maintaining a user's shopping cart. They are also used to help
show the user advertisements that are "relevant" to the user, again appealing to
the "customized/generic" framing discussed earlier. The last portion of both the
Overstock quote and the Amazon quote (and common to all of the privacy policies in
the sample), is the "all-or-nothing" character of the admonishment. If one disables
cookies for the online service provider, both advertising and online service provider
functionality is affected. The policies present the loss of utility as further deterrence
to disabling cookies. Some online service provider's allow the user to opt-out of
receiving targeted advertisements, but it is questionable whether this simply disables
the display of advertisements while tacit data is still collected or whether tacit data
collection itself is disabled. Table 4.8 lists which online service provider's provide this
feature.
Another option to completely opt-out of the display (but not necessarily ensure
the complete disabling of tacit data collection) of third party advertising is through
the use of browser extensions that limit the execution of scripts and the use of cookies.
Instances of Firefox browser extensions are Adblock [94] and TACO (Targeted Adver-
tising Cookie Opt-Out) [133]. These block advertisements, but may not occlude all
tacit data collection by the online service provider. For instance, even though scripts
and cookies may be disabled, web beacons, data embedded in URLs, and other tacit
means of data transfer may be occurring. Although these tools are useful for users
that prefer not to share any information and that do not garner utility from targeted
advertising, this is not a robust solution that acknowledges a heterogeneous space of
users' privacy preferences 8. Strategies to facilitate developing empirically informed,
robust solutions are discussed in the next chapter.
The second method of managing tacit data collection is referred to as recent opt-
out. This option was only provided by Amazon, but warrants discussion because
of both the potential for appropriately granular opt-out options contrasted with the
limitations and burdens placed on the user. Recent opt-out allows the user to review
a list of the most recent items they have viewed that will contribute to the aggregate
image of their shopping habits maintained by Amazon. If the user wishes to remove
an item so it does not contribute to their shopping image, they can. This list only
shows the most recent items viewed, not all items that contribute to the shopping
image. To make effective use of Amazon's implementation of recent opt-out, the user
must be vigilant to avoid allowing items that do not represent their genuine interests
from being committed to their shopping image. Once an item has been committed to
8 The extreme nature of some of these more represent the ideologically driven privacy preferences
of some developers, couching the utility of the tool within their subset of preferences. This ideo-
logical privacy framing is the dual of the "service-and-utility" framing in that it is couched in the
"surveillance/privacy" framing. Rather, a more balanced reframing would attempt to find genera-
tive metaphors that facilitate tools that attend to the most populous segments of the spectrum of
privacy preferences.
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Amazon 1' /
Facebook -
Yahoo -
Twitter
MySpace b
Linkedln /
Google / /
Overstock /
eBay /
Microsoft /
Table 4.8: Opt-out Options by Online Service Provider
The denotations of complete, recent, and categorical are as described in the atten-
dant paragraphs. For the denotation of complete, a "/" indicates that the online
service provider provides an option to opt-out of all ads targeted by the online
service provider based on tacit data. This places the customer in the "generic"
mode of advertisement targeting, which is also referred to as random. A "-" in
the complete column indicates the online service provider provide a discussion of
cookie-based complete opt-out. It is important to note that the denotation as com-
plete is presented as an approximation to an ideally "complete" opt-out from all
targeted advertising. Revisit the discussion of work-arounds in the accompanying
text.
aThis is a very loose form of categorical because the user is not selecting from a discrete set
of categories, but is providing the positive and negative feedback necessary to dynamically infer
categories of ads preferred by the user.
bThe categorical distinction is between structured and non-structured data, not specific categories
of interests.
the user's shopping image, the only recourse to "correcting" this image is to remove
the entire image. This last resort can be considered a form of "all-or-nothing" opt-out
because the user must forgo the utility of the customized service to avoid possible
privacy conflicts, in particular the perceived distortion.
The third category of opt-out is categorical opt-out. This form of opt-out is
also referred to under the name of "relevant" advertising [93], interest-matched (Ya-
hoo!) [136] or what Google refers to as interest-based advertising [56]. Categorical
opt-out allows the user to select the categories of advertisements they wish to see
based on a list provided by the online service provider. This is akin to the advertise-
ment blockers described earlier, but supported by the online service provider rather
than implemented as a third party browser extension. An exemplary instance of the
information asymmetry is drawn from Microsoft's privacy policy:
Even if you choose not to receive personalized advertising, Microsoft will
continue to collect the same information as you browse the web and use our
online services. However, this information and any information collected
from you in the past won't be used for displaying personalized ads. [85]
Microsoft is the only online service provider that made the fact that these prefer-
ences only affect the display of advertisements, not the underlying collection of data,
explicit. A variant of categorical opt-out is the advertisement feedback enabled in
Facebook advertisements (this was not discussed in depth in the Facebook privacy
policy) and is denoted in Table 4.8.
These mechanisms only ensure that advertisements pertaining to the rough cate-
gory of interests selected will not be displayed even though that information may still
be collected and used. In effect, this linkage illustrates a relationship between the
kinds of information conveyed in a privacy policy and the tools developed to support
this policy. Absent precise categories and implications, users do not have a baseline
of comparison for determining whether a privacy tool does in fact protect them from
the privacy implications that may give rise to harms. In effect, these tools are not
opt-out options in the sense of the complete opt-out that ensures opting out of the
personalized advertisements because the user has opted out of tacit data collection.
The distinction is whether the primary harm is (a) the nuisance of unwanted adver-
tisements and the potential discomfort attendant with those or if the harm is (b) the
maintenance of an aggregate image. The next chapter will link the problem of vague
categories and the dearth of implications to absent standards setting mechanisms and
tools of engagement at the institutional level.
Chapter 5
Hybrid Solutions
... legislative processes can be time consuming and have the potential to be
out of date before they can be enforced. That's why self-regulation is a
crucial tool for industry to be able to react quickly to immediate policy
needs.
Luc Delany in Google's European Privacy Policy Blog [38]
This chapter presents approaches that highlight the trade-offs amongst privacy
actors. These approaches do not necessarily propose one substantive privacy pol-
icy over another, but rather proposes processes that facilitate the design of privacy
policies and standards. The essence of this approach creates a feedback process that
uses constructive conflict to evaluate the framing and requirements associated with
privacy policies and the supporting set of tools available to online service providers,
advertisers, civil society organizations, developers, and regulators. Through a pro-
cess of issue reframing and empirical feedback, shared concerns and strategies may
be developed that highlight mutually beneficial strategies rather than pursuing actor-
specific first-best solutions. To ground this process in familiar problems, applications
to the mixed context and aggregate image problems will be demonstrated.
5.1 Design of International Institutions
The discussion of governance forums follow Koremenos' definition of international
institutions "as explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that
prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior" [74, p. 762]. The institutional de-
sign elements and characterizations presented by Koremenos are intended to develop
institutions that "help resolve problems of decentralized cooperation" [74, p. 766].
Koremenos identifies five key dimensions of institutional design: membership rules,
scope of issues, centralization of tasks, rules for control, and flexibility. In terms of
these dimensions, the hybrid solution proposed here attempts to correct the failures
of the US Safe Harbor compromise.
The EU Data Protection Directive and US Safe Harbor (henceforth the current
institutions) were designed by an exclusive membership, excluding key actors with
dissonant views. The current institutions also have scope issues, attempting to cover
many different privacy contexts with a single, abstract set of privacy principles. The
two institutions differ in centralization, but fail in that they go to extremes. In the
case of the EU Data Protection Directive, centralization of regulation is a limiting
factor, especially considering that it is driven by a single category of actor (regulators)
and it is unclear how effective the EU Data Protection Directive has been [75]. The
US Safe Harbor is too decentralized an application of the self-regulatory regime,
giving rise to the information asymmetries that inhibit self-regulatory processes from
binding. In terms of solutions, both institutions place (centralize) the burden of
privacy requirements elicitation and privacy tool design and implementation on online
service providers and advertisers. Paralleling the problems with centralization, the
rules for controlling the institution are overly rigid and overly flexible, respectively.
In terms of the EU Data Protection Directive, little has changed since the days of
mainframes, despite substantial discussion in Working Papers. With regards to the
US Safe Harbor, the information asymmetries and perceptions created by the SH-FIPs
obscure emerging privacy deficiencies that could incentivize changes to notions such
as what is and is not personally identifying (viz. the discussion of P11 and aggregate
image). Finally, as products of legislative regulatory processes, both institutions are
flexible, as evidenced by the laxity of data categories and data purpose articulations.
What is absent is the incentive to leverage this flexibility into the design of more
precise standards of privacy, here centered on context-based privacy regimes. These
failures are taken as learnings that may be applied to the design of more efficient and
effective institutional arrangements for developing privacy standards.
The objective of the process described here is to establish constructive conflict
amongst actors whose interests are tied to online privacy regulation and the atten-
dant standards. Drawing on Nissenbaum and Solove's theories of privacy, an effective
privacy regime should construct privacy standards based on common framings of
empirically-informed contexts. This requires an institution that is sufficiently re-
silient to maintain a dialog among actors with disparate interests 2. To this end, the
membership of the privacy standards forums (henceforth simply forums) are inclusive,
comprising government regulators, online service providers, advertisers, developers,
and civil society organizations. Although there is a need for a privacy regime that
operates as an umbrella for managing forums, this discussion will focus on develop-
ing an empirical understanding of the tools of engagement used within the forums
themselves. Concrete instances of this process are presented through application of to
aggregate image and mixed context problems (Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, respectively).
While forums are centralized venues, the strategies presented structure the discussion
of trade-offs and facilitate negotiating a distribution of tasks that avoid placing undue
burden on individual actors and that lend validity and legitimacy to outcomes.
The basic rules for controlling the institution are posited here as an agreement
amongst government regulators. As a backstop against disintegration or empty for-
'The reference to the days of mainframes is attributed to Kuner [75], but can also be linked to
the control metaphors common to the era when IGOs initially developed the FIPs (see Section 2.1).
2See [31] for an interview with the FTC's head of the Bureau of Consumer Protection that
includes discussion of this disparity.
malism, government regulators will act as regulatory authority of last resort in the
event of deadlock amongst actors. Considering the current response to the threat of
FTC regulation [32, 34, 59, 58] and the aversion for static regulation, it is argued
this institutionalized backstop will incentivize genuine participation. Other rules will
be required to ensure continuous progress, but these may be developed by forum
participants based on experience in initial forums, again enforced by the government
regulators as a backstop to deadlock or disintegration. Substantive decisions should
be a product of non-governmental actors (as those closest to the necessary data and
with the motivation to engage in the process), relegating regulators to a position
of ensuring self-regulatory mechanisms are in place. In other words, regulators are
present to ensure progress is made toward substantive privacy standards, but do not
directly contribute to specific outcomes. As may be apparent, these rules are in-
tended to provide sufficient flexibility in allocating substantive tasks such as data
collection, analysis, standards evaluation, and validation to relevant actors that best
fit the problematic situation and relevant context(s).
5.2 Surfacing Requirements
The proposed approach for "policy driven" design leverages a critical analysis 3 of
privacy policies to facilitate a (re)framing process that provides both critical insights
into the technologies described and that surfaces requirements that inform more con-
crete design of the attendant tools. Sch6n's generative metaphor has been presented
in Section 3.4. Earlier discussions have focused on the use of meaningful framings
that comprise metaphors that overcome information asymmetries rooted in technical
knowledge barriers. Here, the notion of a generative metaphor is leveraged to cre-
ate "new perceptions, explanations, and inventions" [106] in the domain of privacy
policy articulations and the supporting tools. In particular, the (re)framing process
is intended to draw a critical eye to the "ready-made category schemes" extant in a
particular group's framing of the privacy problem. Through a process of constructive
conflict, facilitated by the forums, the reframing process engages actors' ready-made
categories to construct framings that provide mutual benefits.
This thesis has presented three possible framings of the privacy problem. The first,
evidenced in the privacy policy sample, is the "service-and-utility" framing focused
on notions of customization as a means to improve service. A competing framing is
centered on the "surveillance/privacy" metaphor, noting the negative connotations of
surveillance may dominate any notion of positive benefits from customization. The
third framing, comprising notions of the aggregate image (versus innocuous individual
categories) and mixed-context (as opposed to homogeneous) as central concepts, is a
product of this policy analysis. As generative metaphors, these framings have been
used to articulate insights into the privacy implications of engaging online services
and the deficiencies in the accompanying tools. Constructed over the course of this
thesis, this framing is sufficient to highlight the privacy deficiencies, but would require
3 The term critical is in the literary analysis sense and serves as a link between Sch6n's generative
metaphor and Ant6n's goals.
empirical analysis to determine whether they are meaningful to a wider audience.
Codifying the insights from the generative metaphors resulting from (re)framing is
where Anton's GBRAM is applied.
A key premise of Anton's work is the idea of surfacing system requirements from
organizational artifacts, effectively grounding requirements in empirical evidence.
Ant6n's thesis [6] develops the GBRAM in an organizational setting, drawing on
interviews with employees, reviews of process documentation, and reviews of other
organization artifacts that convey perspectives on how the organization achieves its
goals. The objective of GBRAM is to extract natural language representations of the
goals articulated4 . Natural language representations facilitate comparisons of goals
for consistency, categorizations that can help identify common themes that may have
been previously scattered throughout an artifact or across multiple artifacts, and
identifying conflicts amongst these goals. In more recent work, Anton has applied
GBRAM to online privacy policies, identifying goals that support privacy and iden-
tifying goals that derogate privacy protections with exceptions necessary for efficient
operations, among other objectives [9, 14, 11, 8, 10, 7, 12, 13].
A key benefit of this process is that the qualitative, textured narratives elicited
from organizations are translated to structured natural language that is sufficient
for further refinement into more formal software requirements. In addition to the
benefits for comparison, this intermediate form also preserves the vocabulary familiar
to organizational actors. The common vocabulary facilitates ongoing discussion and
refinement of the accuracy and precision of both policies and requirements before they
are translated to more formal representations foreign to the lay user. An important
distinction for the application proposed here is the validity of the source of goals;
Anton indicates that:
[W]e believe that stakeholder disagreements can be incorporated into the
goal-based framework simply by admitting multiple sets of goals, indexing
each set with the stakeholder that wishes to achieve them. We leave it
to the politics of the situation to determine which set of goals (which
stakeholder) will prevail. [9, p. 141]
Translating to this work, a manifestation of multiple, conflicting sets of goals are the
conflicting framings of privacy policies.
The collaborative approach to policy-driven design will inevitably give rise to
conflicts between actors with differentiated vested interests in online service platforms.
The forums are intended to give rise to constructive conflicts rather than dysfunctional
"compromises." As discussed throughout the analysis, differentiated interests and
perceptions (i.e., Sch6n's ready-made categories) give rise to differentiated framings
of the problem. Problem reframing is a process for resolving conflicts over interest-
based framings, producing a common framing that is more suitable to an inclusive set
of actors. As per Sch6n, this is not a synthesis of existing framings. Rather, reframing
identifies alternate generative metaphors that surface novel insights into the system
and the design process. Reframing is an iterative process that, given institutional
4Or uttered, if you prefer the anthropological and ethnographic terminology.
incentives for ongoing collaborative forums, can contribute to developing context-
informed privacy standards derived from meaningful policies that have been vetted
5by actors dependent on privacy regulation outcomes
Although this process can potentially reduce conflicts over policy framing and
provide insights into the design of privacy enhancing, tools, it does not resolve the
problems of having sufficient empirical understanding of common privacy contexts
and expectations. This approach also recommends the instrumentation of online
service provider architected environments to include mechanisms that convey (to
users) why salient elements of the online environment behave the way they do and
to include mechanisms for providing feedback that can be used to better understand
users' perception and understanding of a particular context. Under fear of regulation
by the FTC, the advertising industry has taken a first step to providing additional
information to users regarding why they are seeing a particular advertisement and
how behavioral data is used to customize advertisements [32, 33]. The mechanism
proposed is a small icon that will appear along with advertisements and that, when
selected, will describe why the advertisement is being served. One criteria for this tool
should be whether the information provided is meaningful, or if it simply satisfices
by providing vague articulations under the "service-and-utility" framing.
5.3 Institutional Arrangements
The members of privacy standard development forums will require input from rep-
resentatives of government privacy regulators, online service provider legal and de-
velopment representatives, representatives from advertising networks and agencies,
representatives of platform application developers, and civil society organizations (as
a proxy for users). In contrast to the interest-biased memberships that designed the
EU Data Protection Directive and US Safe Harbor, respectively, these categories of
actors represent the (inclusive) variety of interests in privacy standards. For instance,
the initial draft of the EU Data Protection Directive excluded business representa-
tives, relying on government authorities focused on enforcement mechanisms. This
closed membership resulted in enforcement mechanisms perceived by American busi-
nesses as "onerous" threats to innovation in the information economy. Similarly, the
US Safe Harbor was designed by the Clinton administration and industry interests. In
this case, the closed membership pandered to e-commerce interests and derogated the
EU Data Protection Directive FIPs in favor of a self-regulatory compromise embod-
ied by Aaron's 'safe harbor.' In both cases, rather than attempt to balance interests,
these institutional configurations simply excluded incompatible interests.
Taking the requirements elicitation process described previously as a set of "meta-
5Although these forums seem to be difficult to construct, instances will be described briefly in the
context of institutional configurations that can leverage this process to resolve the problems related
to aggregate image and mixed-context.
6 Privacy enhancing does not necessarily imply nominally stronger privacy outcomes in the sense
of protecting more information. Rather, it speaks to facilitating more accurate representation and
expression of user's actual privacy preferences.
requirements," a number of possible configurations of actors may be possible. For
instance, the choice of FIPs as a comprehensive policy-structuring choice and the rel-
ative uniformity of the privacy sample provides little evidence for subtler distinctions
between different services, such as sales, auctions, search services, social networks,
and other categories falling under the umbrella of online services. Depending on the
interests and the willingness to collaborate, different strategies of collaboration may
be necessary for different domains. For instance, the types of context specific privacy
practices and the attendant configuration of actor responsibilities may be different
for an online auction site such as eBay than for advertising, photo sharing applica-
tions, or even differences between the privacy standards for different domains of social
networking (recall the different tone of LinkedIn versus Facebook). The differences
in roles may be rooted in vested interests, relative political power, and the real and
perceived burdens ("onerous" or not) imposed on actors in one role or another. A
common theme in the configurations discussed below will be the role of government
regulators, in particular the FTC. The FTC's unique jurisdiction over online service
providers may allow it to operate as a mediator that incentives collaborative discourse
on policy and technical directions rather than directly participating in the production
of substantive policy.
Taking the FTC as the mediator and online service providers' legitimate argument
that self-regulation is the more flexible and responsive regulation process 7, the objec-
tive is to facilitate collaborative standard setting under the umbrella of self-regulatory
paradigm. One outcome is to ensure policies convey meaningful privacy implications
and inform users of the implications of engaging online service providers, empowering
users to make informed decisions and moving the character of online services closer
to experience goods. Another element necessary to understand how to balance the
interests involved is considering the current and possible tools of engagement that
may be brought to bear by each category of actors. Considering the recent failure
of P3P [41] and Bennet's critique of static data purposes and categories [18], one
focus is to understand and design tools of engagement. This includes two distinct
objectives: investigating the categories of tools of engagement and how to minimize
the transaction costs of designing and implementing these tools.
Tools of engagement range from constructive conflicts that illustrate how best to
allocate the burden of designing and implementing privacy tools to the collection of
empirical data on users' experiences with privacy tools and the surfacing of user re-
quirements. The latter revisits the discussion of understanding context and the data
collection necessary to accurately characterize norms of appropriateness and dissem-
ination. One objective of privacy standards setting forums is to develop tools for
collecting data about users' privacy choices, the types of contexts they would like to
7 Self-regulation is a very broad term and captures a wide variety of institutional arrangements.
The proposals presented here most resemble notions of private ordering [107] and private author-
ity [127]. These describe a shift from administrative law arrangements, such as substantive rule
making performed by an administration such as the FTC, to private authorities comprised of pri-
vate actors. The efficacy and efficiency of these, in contrast to more conventional arrangement is
discussed abstractly by Macey [78]. An instance of a successful, self-sustaining implementation of
private authority (a "private" legal system) is regulation of disputes within the cotton industry [22].
construct, and which tools are most efficacious. This in itself has privacy implications
and would require explicit opt-in from users that are interested in contributing infor-
mation about their privacy behaviors and preferences towards improving the related
tools. Such a "policy experiment" would require careful design and protection of
users' privacy, but could also yield substantial grounded information about how real
users make privacy decisions in real environments.
Early laboratory experiments contributed to understanding how users use privacy
policies and the divergence between actual and espoused privacy preferences [4, 20,
29, 30, 62, 67, 99]. While valuable, much of this work is based on coarse grained
categories of privacy. Here, the objective is to continuously surface common privacy
motifs from empirical evidence of privacy choices made in situ. Examples of these
might comprise how users create groups of friends to share information with and how
they categorize different kinds of friends (acquaintances, individuals they interact with
terrestrially on a regular basis, categorizations based on terrestrial context, such as
work, family, and hobbies, etc.). Understanding these categorizations may facilitate
operationalizing these motifs into empirically informed templates of common privacy
configurations. These templates may provide an approximation that can be further
customized to match unique user preferences.
Disseminating privacy templates contributes to resolving multiple privacy defi-
ciencies. In one dimension, templates reduce the burden on the user to create a
configuration of privacy settings "from scratch." Empirically derived templates also
have a knowledge distribution aspect that can help users see how other (potentially
more privacy savvy) users have chosen to manage their online privacy. This kind
of learning from example has the effect of sharing knowledge and experience with-
out requiring substantive technical understanding. The application of templates may
have collateral benefits for online service providers as well. Recently, Facebook up-
dated its privacy settings by adding finer-grained controls to content posted, but the
"default" settings (template) suggested by Facebook have been criticized as relaxing
privacy protections rather than improving them [68]8. In terms of templates, the
effect was that a more public template was imposed alongside finer-grained privacy
options-this seems contradictory. An alternative would have been to present users
with a menu of context-informed privacy templates that better reflect their usage
habits. This strategy would have allowed Facebook to leverage the benefits of legit-
imately finer-grained privacy settings by folding the more public profile template in
with templates that reflect more conservative 9 privacy preferences. This process also
returns the discussion to the issue of framing. Regardless of the actual efficacy of
8 This is also an instance of imposing a particular privacy ideology on a group of users. Mark
Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, has been criticized for claims that this public sharing of information
is the new norm [69]. This is in stark contrast with the variety of privacy norms implied by Solove and
Nissenbaum. The recommendations here argue that the resolution to these disputes is the empirical
construction of templates based on representative subsets of the user population. There are also
implications for actors identifying the application of a particular template and making assumptions
based on that. The question of what the choice of template says about an individual is an interesting
aspect of future research.
9 1n this context, conservative implies a pre-cautionary restriction of information sharing. Zucker-
berg's privacy claim may be classified as more liberal.
the templates developed, if the policy framing and presentation of these templates
preserves the "service-and-utility" framing characteristic of the policy sample, the
benefits will be lost. Identifying meaningful metaphors that emerge from empirical,
context-informed templates may contribute to the reframing process described ear-
lier, identifying a more rich vocabulary (and typology) of privacy preferences and
implications. In a sense, implementations of the process for constructing templates
could be interpreted as collecting usage artifacts from the environment (in the sense
of Anton's grounded process of surfacing requirements in the GBRAM) that preserves
a vocabulary familiar to the user.
An immediate criticism of the processes described above is that they are idealistic
and require substantive buy-in from the actors involved, in particular online service
providers. The collaboration necessary to achieve these objectives will require careful
mediation of collaborative forums amongst the relevant actors. The following outlines
modes and tools of engagement available to each category of actor, with an eye toward
balancing the burdens of implementing privacy protections with the vested interest
of the actor at hand. For instance, the data collection necessary for constructing
privacy templates may be performed by online service providers and advertisers with
requirements to share these templates with other actors, it may be a collaborative
effort between civil society organizations that develop browser extensions to collect
this information, or it may be a role that can be fulfilled by platform developers.
The choice of configuration will depend on negotiations amongst actors, the power
relationships between these, vested interests, and how efficaciously mediators and
"honest brokers" can help identify imbalances that threaten collateral benefits. Al-
though recent forums have engaged the relevant actors, the interests of these actors
are still rather disparate, often debating "basic premises" [31]. The discussions below
address existing roles and how a collaborative approach may improve the efficacy
and efficiency of regulatory and policy outcomes. This discussion also addresses the
sources of information, in particular the capabilities to collect context or usage infor-
mation, and how the distribution of information affects the distribution of burden in
the privacy standard development process.
5.4 Applications
To ground these approaches in familiar problems, these processes will be elaborated
in terms of the aggregate image and mixed context problems described earlier. Rather
than present a single solution, potential strategic options are presented to highlight
combinations of roles, burdens, tools of engagement, and trade-offs that can arise in
the policy and tool design space. The typical claim of "onerous" burden is contrasted
with scenarios that describe a distribution of burden that requires actors engage in
various levels of collaboration to achieve individual and common goals. In many of
these cases, the objective is to surface the mutual and collateral benefits of coopera-
tion that may not be obvious when focusing solely on individual, first best solutions.
The following framing of applications of this collaboration process is certainly not a
complete set of all options, but does represent key interests and trade-offs evidenced
in the current adversarial regulation process. Another key element is the role of a
feedback loop that introduces evidence of changing privacy paradigms in the context
of emergent technologies and the inevitable deficiencies in the current privacy frame-
work new technologies will highlight. To sustain this feedback loop, the forum must
also establish tools for collecting information about the technological environment,
a common framing based on this information, and tools that reify the agreed-upon
framing. The following illustrates how this process is applied to the aggregate image
and mixed context problems.
5.4.1 Aggregate Image Revisited
The fundamental problem with the aggregate image is that, as framed, it is presented
as the innocuous collection of tacit data used to customize services. Not only is the
framing arguably misleading, but the underlying information asymmetries indicate
that lay users may not understand the full privacy implications of tacit data collec-
tion. To address this problem, collaborative standards construction processes should
develop meaningful policies and attendant tools that inform users of the implications
of the aggregate image in a way that preserves the benefits of customization but also
highlights the potentially harmful implications. This is in contrast to the one-sided
framings such as "service-and-utility" and "privacy/surveillance." One key problem
is how to frame the implications of the aggregate image as "personally identifying"
or not. Another problem is the ability to access and correct the image to account for
distortions. The hurdles are claims of "onerous" burden by the various stewards of
aggregate images and the prospect of limitations to innovation.
Depending on the quantity of information, the granularity of detail, and how much
of this information can be used in a re-identification process, the aggregate image may
or may not be "personally identifying." Adjacent to the fidelity of the aggregate im-
age is the issue of opt-in versus opt-out. Questions regarding how much access to the
aggregate image is appropriate and what categories of targeting segments used by ad-
vertisers can be made meaningful to users are essential to designing tools that improve
users' access to this information. The burden in this case is (1) who should develop
a typology of data categories, (2) who should develop the vocabulary for describing
these to lay users, (3) who should translate these into goal-based requirements, and
(4) who should implement the tools for managing the aggregate image. These steps
will require negotiations amongst actors over both the substantive categories and the
granularity of the categories. The decisions on categories, in turn, impact the de-
sign and implementation of tools for managing categories and the resultant aggregate
image.
The information about categories should be based on empirical data regarding
what kinds of information users would actually choose to share or keep private. One
strategy for collecting the information necessary for operationalization (also applica-
ble in general to mixed context) is to solicit a representative sample of volunteer users
to share the tacit data collected about them over a set period of browsing. This is an
exercise in designing a social science experiment that collects sufficient information
to represent the variance in categorizations and that can capture a representation of
the context in which they occur. This will also require data collection to occur over
a sufficient amount of time to be representative of common browsing habits. Taking
this as a guideline, the specific experimental design will be a product of the forum.
As may be obvious, the collection of data for this sample is intrinsically private and
will require explicit opt-in by users. Another factor in the data collection, directly
related to burden, is the technical means for collecting this information.
To facilitate constructive conflict, presenting the actors with a strategic menu of
options, each representing a potential set of trade-offs, for revising data category stan-
dards may facilitate productive negotiations. For example, one strategy for surfacing
data categories is to incentivize online service providers to collect this information
themselves and share the outcomes with the forum to facilitate development of a con-
tinuous data categories standards and revision process. Another strategy that reduces
the burden on online service providers is for online service providers to provide an API
for accessing (tacit) category information collected during browsing sessions. Plat-
form developers or third party browser extension developers (perhaps supported by
civil society organizations) could build tools for users to install in the process of par-
ticipating in this experiment. Combinations of civil society organizations and online
service providers could share the burden of developing analysis tools. Yet another op-
tion is the independent development of browser extensions that facilitate annotation
and categorization of online service provider practices by civil society organizations.
Finally, although not necessarily empirically informed, the backstop option is the
possibility of government-backed regulation and development of category standards
that may intrinsically deprive interests of the opportunity to contribute as much as
the collaborative approach does.
Evaluating this menu of options, the trade-offs are intended to induce construc-
tive compromises based on private negotiations among actors. For example, data
collection and distribution to the forum by online service providers and advertisers,
although perhaps considered onerous, may be to their advantage because they can
ensure their interests in the benefits of customization are presented alongside civil
society's interests in privacy implications. The second and third option place the
surfacing of categories in the hands of third parties, in particular civil society or-
ganizations. As groups focused on privacy as strong information protection, they
do not necessarily have any incentive to present a balanced case for the benefits of
customization. The third option is a stronger case of framing by privacy-interests
if organizations are required to surface data categories on their own, giving rise to
outcomes that may not fully represent online service provider and advertiser interests
in conveying benefits. The fourth scenario is undesirable for a number of reasons:
online service provider and advertisers will argue that it stifles innovation; it is a
static, incremental solution that may not weather underlying technological changes;
it is not empirically grounded and thus may be just as insufficient as vague categories
(and replicate the failures in P3P).
Again, the objective is not to claim that one (or any) of the strategies listed above
will solve the problem, but rather to construct a forum for starting from a set of strate-
gies (developed beforehand by participating actors) that will incentivize the kind of
bargaining that can identify a more mutually beneficial strategy that preserves the
dynamic, flexible character of self-regulation. For instance, starting from the menu
above, some combination of the first and second option may emerge. Such an op-
tion may find online service providers and advertisers sharing data categories but also
making APIs available to third parties that perform their own analyses, allowing for a
form of institutional intercoder validity. Although encouraging two analyses of bene-
fits and implications, one from the perspective of online service providers/advertisers
and the other from the perspective of civil society organizations, may conflict, it
provides a richer landscape of metaphors that contribute to the reframing process
and may give insights to more meaningful metaphors that neither group would have
identified on their own. In effect, the collaborative forums are intended to facilitate a
form of constructive conflict that will yield compromises that, in contrast to the US
Safe Harbor, give rise to a grounded framing of the aggregate image.
Anton's GBRAM can be applied to the artifacts (documentation) of the common
framing to surface system requirements and to identify latent inconsistencies. In some
cases, inconsistencies may be technical coordination problems, others may warrant re-
evaluation by interested actors. As discussed in the conceptualization of this process,
retaining the common vocabulary of the framing accommodates consistency checking
and requirements elicitation without creating premature technical barriers. Once re-
quirements are agreed on, allocation of tool development is the next step. Similar to
the menu of strategies illustrated above, the development of privacy tools follows the
same constructive conflict process of allocating burden based on access to resources
and vested interests. These tools would ideally be developed as a framework sup-
porting continuous re-evaluation of privacy framings. Closing the loop, this will help
identify new usage patterns related to emerging technologies, attendant deficiencies,
and previously unidentified deficiencies.
As an illustrative instance of tool design, one feature would be to capture a rep-
resentation of the environment in which the tool is deployed. This representation
would allow analysts to see the process the individual was engaged in, for example
setting the privacy settings on a picture or modifying a particular privacy template.
This could be refined into a mechanism for capturing contexts in which privacy tools
are used and where users report difficulties. This kind of empirical data collection
then allows analysts to better understand contexts based on rich, empirical evidence
of usage patterns. Given empirical understandings of contexts, sharing information
about these contexts may provide collateral benefits for advertising by helping users
best identify what contexts they consider innocuous (and thus fodder for advertising)
versus those that are off-limits. This, in turn, can also be incorporated into the design
of privacy templates. Thus, the collateral benefits of privacy elicitation processes be-
come a mechanism for eliciting actual preferences regarding privacy and advertising,
further highlighting the role of designing around shared concerns.
The instrumentation of privacy tools to be context sensitive closes the feedback
loop. Like "initial" empirical information regarding data categories and purposes,
context information should be made available to all actors and form the basis of the
next round of privacy standards discussions. For instance, an emerging advertising
domain is the smart phone (device), especially those that provide geo-location services
to developers. Although the notion of the aggregate image presented here does not
include implications of terrestrial location, it is not hard to conceive of the aggregate
image beginning to incorporate travel patterns. As this technology matures and is
deployed more widely, the implications of aggregate image (and mixed context) will
spill over from purely online environments into the terrestrial contexts an individual
frequents.
5.4.2 Mixed Context Revisited
The process of developing standards for resolving the problems associated with mixed
context follows the same iterative feedback loop applied to the aggregate image:
collect data, develop a framing that represents the trade-offs amongst common and
disparate interests, surface requirements, develop tools, repeat. The following briefly
highlights the conflicts and trade-offs amongst interested actors in each step of the
feedback process.
Data collection trade-offs are embedded in the articulation of the benefits of pro-
viding targeted advertising versus limiting the degree of targeting based on context.
For example, one option is, like above, for online service providers and advertisers
to collaborate to develop representations of mixed contexts, sharing the these repre-
sentations with related actors. Another possibility is for some combination of civil
society organizations and third party developers to implement browser extensions for
use by a representative sample of users. Yet another option that avoids the use of
a representative sample is to develop spiders that visit online service providers and
record the configurations of mixed context they experience based on searches for pop-
ular goods and services. Conflict over the validity, precision, and accuracy of these
strategies is to be expected. Again, the backstop might be an option in which gov-
ernment regulators require full opt-in as an "onerous" disincentive to failing to find
a useful compromise. As per the earlier discussion, this is the least desired outcome.
As evidenced by recent reactions to the FTC's threats of regulation by advertisers,
a precisely articulated, higher probability application of this option is expected to
incentivize cooperation.
The notion of mixed context frames the problem, but it is not a solution in and
of itself. One dimension of the problem is that evidence of mixed context is buried
in online service provider privacy policies. A recent solution that places indicators of
mixed context directly in the user's workflow is the introduction of an icon associated
with advertisements that, when engaged, will inform the user why they have been
targeted by that particular advertisement [33]. In addition to targeting information,
mixed context information may also be embedded with this icon, providing a mean-
ingful description of how the privacy policy associated with that advertisement differs
from the policy of the online service provider. For example, rather than retaining the
uniform blue color of the proposed icon, the icon may change colors to yellow or red
based on how much that advertisement conflicts with the privacy policy of the on-
line service provider or user's preferences. Coupled with efficacious opt-out tools, the
user may examine the sources of the conflict and choose whether to block just that
category of advertisements, whether to correct a distortion of their aggregate image,
or whether to block that particular advertiser or advertiser network. Following the
theme of instrumenting these tools, data may be collected regarding how frequently
opt-outs occur, on what grounds, and what the (inevitable) deficiencies of these tools
are. For instance, users that opt out of advertising rather than optimizing their aggre-
gate image may face penalties to incentivize participation necessary to preserve the
revenue model while also maintaining an accurate aggregate image. Finding the ap-
propriate balance in such a penalty structure would require empirical analysis of how
users react and the impact on online service provider revenues. Ars technica recently
performed an experiment where they blocked users that used a certain advertising
blocking extension [501. Formalizing this into an empirical study of the economics
of aggregate image accuracy, targeted advertising, and thresholds of utility for users,
online service providers, and advertisers is the kind of empirical evidence necessary
for efficacious design of privacy and customization tools. An extension for the mobile
case may be to choose to opt-out of ads based on location.
This type of strategy places control of how information is used directly in the
user's workflow and adds an element of experience that does not require a deep
understanding of the technical sources of mixed context. For example, if a user visits
an online service provider and all the advertisements have red indicator icons, this
will signal the user that the online service provider is not vetting the privacy policies
of advertisers and networks effectively. A surfeit of red indicators damages the user's
perception of that online service provider. Taking the example a step further, civil
society organizations may develop browser extensions that collect metrics on how
many conflicts occur as users visit online service providers as a means to give online
service providers reputation scores based on whether they frequently accommodate
advertisers or networks with poor or conflicting privacy practices. Online service
providers may also monitor these values as a "magnitude of preference alignment"
that can help them better vet advertisers or remove those whose policies have changed
to the detriment of the environment. Taking this a step further still, online service
providers may coordinate with civil society to invite re-evaluation of a previously
poorly rated page (environment), giving online service providers both a rating in
terms of preference alignment and responsiveness to ill-behaving advertisers.
Under this scenario, meaningful signals are provided to individuals as a means
to make immediate decisions based on information about the privacy implications of
a particular environment. In the example of the civil society organization's browser
extension, this helps resolve certain aspects of collective action problems and is a
strategy that may better incentivize genuine cooperation by online service providers
and advertisers. Moreover, this would also have the effect of incentivizing online ser-
vice providers to pressure advertisers and advertising networks to implement better
privacy policies or to disallow the collection of personal information in lieu of a tar-
geting protocol that does not give advertisers direct access to user information. In
either case, the reputation incentive acts on online service providers, the category of
actor that arguably has the closest relationship with advertisers and thus perhaps the
most influence.
As discussed earlier, the extent to which these tools are deployed and the sub-
stantive form, content, and the allocation of development tasks are products of the
compromises and common interests developed in the forum. By employing similar
closure-based mechanisms for collecting and categorizing information about context,
future iterations of this standards making process can introduce finer-grained tools
for helping users construct representations of context. As with the icon configura-
tions, non-obtrusive incorporation of these tools can facilitate a more experience-based
understanding of the online environment and elicit preferences in situ rather than ex-
pecting users to express preferences in one visit to a monolithic privacy preferences
pane.
5.5 Limitations and Discussion
While this process has potential, it is also limited by the willingness of actors to col-
laborate. The reactions of the advertising industry to threats of government enforced
regulation give some evidence that the backstop strategy described above will work.
Although these recommendations focus on fostering constructive conflict amongst
categories of actors to resolve the kinds of problems identified in the policy sample,
the process also requires more research into the institutional arrangements that will
make this constructive conflict process more resilient.
An argument may be made that this is not very different from existing self-
regulatory mechanisms. In terms of the feedback loop, it is conceptually similar:
identify a harm, collect information, regulate. The difference here is that this process
has been institutionalized into a tighter feedback loop that concurrently accommo-
dates technological innovation while also encouraging actors to share information so
that, as a group, they can proactively identify and reconcile privacy deficiencies early
in the design process. In contrast, the current process is dysfunctional in that many
compromises are simply empty signals that engage in the bare minimum to resolve
conflicts. As noted multiple times, this incrementalist approach may actually ob-
scure solutions to emerging problems. The continuous sharing of information and
continuous dialog creates an environment in which innovation can occur, but can be
monitored by the actor best suited (or best motivated) to identify privacy deficiencies.
Appendix A
EU Data Protection Directive
Bennett's discussion of the EU Data Protection Directive [19] is one mapping of
the Articles describing substantive privacy prescriptions (Chapter 2 of [44]) to Rei-
denberg's First Principles. Although the secondary analyses provide useful starting
descriptions, they were not sufficient for the granularity of analyses applied here. The
focus of this work is to highlight the granularity of the FIPs recommendations and
the type of enforcement laid out in the black letter of the directive. The following
descriptions are a synthesis of a content analysis of the EU Data Protection Directive
text [44] and secondary analyses drawn from the literature. The following provides a
brief overview of the EU Data Protection Directive's structure, but narrows quickly
to a mapping of substantive privacy prescriptions to the FIPS and a description of
prescribed enforcement mechanisms. For a fine-grained, point-by-point analysis, see
Kuner [75].
A.1 DPD-FIPs
Openness Articles 10, 11, 18, 19, and 21 address issues regarding openness. Article
10 requires the data controller disclose their identity and representatives (Article
10[a]), purposes for processing (10[b]), and information regarding the recipients and
categories of recipients of information, whether information queries are voluntary, and
the existence of the rights of access and correction (10[c]). This latter element of 10[c]
highlights the difference between giving notice of a requirement and fulfilling it. The
openness criterion is fundamental because it ensures citizens (users) are aware that
information is being collected, with whom it is shared, and what they can do about
it.
Article 11 pertains to information indirectly collected about a data subject; in
other words, information that is not collected by a controller that has not directly
interacted with the data subject. Article 11 requires the same disclosures of controller
identity, purposes, recipients, etc. as required for Article 10. The FTC's report on
behavioral advertising [51] sheds more light on this distinction.
Article 18 requires data controllers disclose data purposes to the appropriate data
authority before carrying out automatic processing. This requirement serves open-
ness because these purposes are subsequently logged in the publicly available register
required by Article 21. Article 18 also allows data controllers the option to appoint a
personal data protection official that will maintain their own public register of data
processing operations. Article 19 provides a more precise set of information necessary
when giving notice to the supervisory authority. Notice includes name and address of
the controller and the controller's representative, purpose(s) of processing, categories
of data and data subjects related to processing, "recipients or categories of recipient to
whom the data might be disclosed" [44], transfers to third countries, and a description
sufficient for preliminary evaluation of compliance with security requirements.
These openness requirements ensure information is conveyed to the data subject
(Articles 10 and 11) and to the supervisory authority (Articles 18, 19, and 21). The
public registers required by Article 21 ensure any EU citizen may review the pro-
cessing practices of a data controller before they choose to engage that controller.
Related to review of these practices, these Articles supporting openness do not pro-
vide operational guidance regarding how much information should be provided about
the categories of data subjects or categories of information collected. In its role as
a proactive tool' for providing citizens with the information necessary for making
privacy decisions, these categories, more precisely, the granularity of these categories,
is important for making decisions about whether data purposes are aligned with the
citizen's privacy preferences.
The Articles supporting the remaining FIPs are requirements imposed on the data
processing operations. From an engineering perspective, these may be considered very
high-level requirements imposed by regulation.
Access and Correction Articles 12, 14, and implicitly the accuracy requirements
in Article 6[d] support the principle of access and correction. Article 6 addresses data
quality issues. In particular, 6[d] requires data be "accurate and, where necessary,
kept up to date" [44].
Article 12 articulates the operational elements necessary to support Article 6[d].
In particular, it requires the controller provide access to whether data about a subject
is being processed, what categories of data are being processed, and recipients and
categories of recipients. This information is the same as required for disclosure by
Article 10; henceforth these will be referred to as Article 10 data. Article 12[b]
explicitly indicates access and correction measures comply with the "provisions in
this Directive" and, as noted above, complies with quality requirements in Article 6.
Article 12 also requires the controller notify third parties of updates to changes made
to personal data.
Article 14 covers the data subject's right to object to processing on "compelling
legitimate grounds" [44], modulo overrides by national legislation or national security
interests. Article 14 also gives the data subject the right to object to (and thus halt)
'The notion of a proactive tool is akin to the notion of a privacy policy as a decision making
tool. It is presumed that this proactive paradigm, especially with regards to openness, is intended
to provide the citizen with the information sufficient for making efficacious privacy decisions. The
categories described by privacy policies are an artifact of this regulation and are ideally intended to
be a source of information in this decision making process.
data purposes related to direct marketing or require the controller notify the subject
if data is to be used for direct marketing purposes.
Collection Limitation Notions of collection limitation show up in Articles 6, 7,
and 8 with exceptions articulated in Articles 8 and 9 and general exceptions articu-
lated in Article 13. Article 6[a] explicitly indicates data should be "processed fairly
and lawfully" [44].
Article 7[a] indicates the data subject must give unambiguous consent. Note that
this does not specify how consent is structured; it may be opt-in or opt-out. This is
addressed at length in Regan's discussion in [101].
Article 8 indicates certain special (also referred to as "sensitive") categories of
data are to be prohibited from processing. These categories include "personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade-union membership, or the processing of data concerning health or sex life" [44].
Pragmatic derogations of this prohibition are described in Article 8[2], in particular
those relating to health data. Article 8 allows these special categories to be processed
by explicit consent (opt-in) of the data subject. It is important to note that the option
for giving consent (lifting the prohibition) may be expressly disallowed by Member
State legislation (Subparagraph (a) of Article 8[2]).
Article 9 makes collection exceptions for journalistic purposes and for purposes of
freedom of expression.
Article 13 provides a blanket set of exceptions that apply to Articles 6[1], 10,
11[1], 12, and 21. These exceptions apply to national security, defense, public secu-
rity, crime investigation and processing, economic and financial interests of the state,
operations related to these categories, and for purposes of protecting the rights of
others. Henceforth these will be referred to as the Article 13 exceptions.
Use Limitation As indicated in Bennett's articulation of collection limitation, col-
lection, use, and disclosure are often coupled. This is evident in the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive. Articulations of use limitation is often interleaved with or adjacent to
articulations of collection limitations; disclosure is coupled to these to a lesser degree.
Article 6[b,c,e] and Article 7[b-f] prescribe use limitations. Article 8's discussion of
special data categories, Article 9's discussion of journalistic and freedom of expression,
and Article 13 all apply as exceptions to use limitations.
Article 6 on data quality indicates that data may only be collected for a specific
purpose [b] (recall Bennett's "fishing expeditions"), that is must not be excessive [c],
and that it may be retained for no longer than necessary (retention limitations) [e].
These give conceptual usage limitations, but do not provide insights into who should
decide these limitations or how they should be determined. Kuner's analysis, from
the perspective of compliance with EU privacy law, notes that the limitations vary
from state-to-state, introducing potentially incompatible and confusing overlaps [75].
Disclosure Limitation As implied above, prescriptions for disclosure limitation
are less frequent and often implicit in usage limitations. Disclosure limitation is cov-
ered in Article 6[b], 7[a], 10[c], 11, and 14[b]; each of these applies some form of
what Reidenberg referred to as the finality principle. Part of Article 6[b]'s require-
ments of specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes includes limitation regarding
who uses data for a particular purpose. Article 7[a] has a similarly implicit disclo-
sure limitation; consent is coupled with information regarding who will have access to
information shared by a data subject. The source of these implicit disclosure limita-
tions is Article 10, in particular 10[c], which requires controllers provide information
regarding recipients or categories of recipients to the data subject. Similarly, Article
11 requires the same for controllers that do not receive information on a data subject
directly from the subject. Finally, Article 14[b]'s limitations on data purposes related
to direct marketing ensures controllers cannot use data subjects' information for di-
rect marketing or share it with third parties that intend to use it for direct marketing
without consent.
Security The requirements for confidentiality and security are covered by Articles
16 and 17. Article 16 on confidentiality requires controllers requires only employees
and agents of the controller directly involved in fulfilling legitimate data purposes and
services may access the data subjects' information. Article 17 imposes information
security requirements on the controller. Article 17[1] requires "appropriate technical
and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful
destruction or accidental loss, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where
the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and against all other
unlawful forms of processing" [44]. This covers what generally falls under the rubric
of enterprise information security. The subparagraph of 17[1] provides an impor-
tant disclaimer: "such measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risks represented by the processing and the nature of the data to be protected." [44].
Paragraphs 17[2] and 17[3] require controllers impose these requirements on third
parties that perform operations on data subjects' information on behalf of the con-
troller. This requires a contract or a legally binding act, kept in writing, between the
primary controller and the third party.
A.2 Privacy Regulation and Enforcement
Ensuring a uniform enforcement of the espoused privacy principles is a key political
element of the EU Data Protection Directive. Long notes that the primary effect of
the EU Data Protection Directive is not the substantive privacy prescriptions pro-
vided above, but the introduction of powerful national supervisory authorities and
their attendant powers to monitor and enforce the EU Data Protection Directive.
As a proactive regulatory paradigm, centralized monitoring and enforcement, applied
uniformly to public and private data controllers, is one way to ensure FIPs are ap-
plied as a comprehensive, socially protective regulatory instrument. The EU Data
Protection Directive requires member states enact national laws compatible with and
equivalent to the FIPs set out in the EU Data Protection Directive. Supervisory
authorities as the monitoring, investigation, and enforcement are described in Article
28; Articles 29 and 30 describe the role of the working group in maintaining the EU
Data Protection Directive and coordinating with authorities.
Under Article 28, each member state must have a supervisory authority responsi-
ble for monitoring data controllers and enforcing the EU Data Protection Directive.
The supervisory authority is expected to be an independent policing organization
capable of performing investigations, initiating interventions before processing starts,
invoking legal proceedings, and hearing complaints against data controllers. Bennett
notes that this substantially extends the powers of pre-existing supervisory authori-
ties [191. In addition to Article 18 and 19's (discussed with regard to the openness
principle) requirements for supervisory authorities to maintain a register of data con-
trollers and attendant data purposes, Article 20 confers powers referred to as "prior
checking" [44]. Prior checking requires Member States determine what forms of pro-
cessing are detrimental and requires the supervisory authorities examine these pro-
cesses before they are invoked. This depends on Article 18 and 19 requirements that
the data controller notify the supervisory authority of such data processing. Although
not explicit in the EU Data Protection Directive, it may be assumed that the exam-
ination of processes is not immediate; Kuner reports that supervisory authorities are
already overwhelmed with other duties [75].
The Data Protection Directive's Article 29 Working Group (created by Articles
29 and 30) is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the efficacy of the EU
Data Protection Directive and reporting and advising on issues relevant to the EU
Data Protection Directive. The Article 29 Working Group is advisory only; reports
are submitted to supervisory authorities, the European Commission, the European
Parliament, and the European Council, but are not binding in any way. As per para-
graphs (66-67), powers regarding the transfer of data to third countries is conferred
on the EC, modus vivendi 2 . As will be discussed at more length below, the US Safe
Harbor Agreement is an instance of modus vivendi: the European Parliament voted
against it but the EC used its authority to realize the agreement.
A.3 Transfer and Derogations
Articles 25 and 26 are largely responsible for the externality that the EU Data Pro-
tection Directive imposes on non-European Economic Area countries. Article 25
establish that private data may only be transferred to third countries deemed ade-
quate by The Committee. Adequate privacy standards require comprehensive privacy
regulation and the attendant enforcement mechanisms3.
Article 26 establishes derogations from the adequacy requirements intended to
accommodate transfers acceptable to the data subject. Adequacy may be assessed
2Modus vivendi literally means "way to live" but is more accurately translated to "agree to
disagree." This ensures that, despite disagreement between the EC, the Council, and the Parliament,
decisions by the EC, once decided, are authoritative and the other bodies will not hamper further
progress on other matters in a pursuit of an unrelated disagreement with the EC. This ensures
forward progress.
3As per Long [77].
two ways: on an individual, case by case, basis or for the entirety of the EU by the
Article 31 Committee. On a case by case basis, Article 26 allows individual Member
States to authorize data transfers (or sets of transfers) to organizations with states
deemed inadequate if the data subject gives consent and it is in the data subject's
interest or if the state has determined that, in this case, appropriate safeguards are
in place (typically resulting from contractual obligations). Standard contracts exist
for this purpose [42, 43]. The Article 31 Committee vets decisions made by the
EC. The Article 31 Committee is comprised of representatives from Member States.
The Article 31 Committee is not transparent; Bennett refers to it as a "mysterious
body" [19] and Kuner indicates that identifying Committee decisions and even the
identities of the actual members can prove difficult [75]. A key role of the Article
31 Committee is determining adequacy of non-EEC countries' data laws and the
development of model contracts for case-by-case data transfers.
With regard to adequacy criteria, Bennett [19] makes an important note that
"these rules and measures must be complied with, obviously meaning that symbolic
value statements are insufficient." The emphasis on "complied with" further high-
lights the enforcement role of the national supervisory authorities and the perception
that these authorities are a necessary component for upholding privacy. In this vein,
self-regulation (viz. the US) may read "symbolic value statements" under some in-
terpretations.
Under Article 25, if a member state recognizes a third country as not having
adequate privacy protections, it notifies other member states and the Commission.
Further, member states are thus required to prevent data transfer to the inadequate
country. Article 25[5] does indicate the Commission should, "at the appropriate
time," negotiate some form of agreement that would remedy the adequacy problem
and allow data transfers to resume. In this case, that negotiation produced the US
Safe Harbor agreement.
Article 26 makes it possible for EU data subjects to waive the right to the EU
Data Protection Directive protections and consent to data transfers to countries that
have not met the EU Data Protection Directive's adequacy standards. Article 26
takes the form of a list of exceptions for which derogation is valid: among these are
unambiguous consent, fulfilling a contract, legal obligation on the part of the data
controller, or acting in the vital interest of the data subject. While EU member states
may make these arrangements of their own volition, they must do so on a case by case
basis with data controllers and must report these authorizations to the Commission
for review.
The European Commission (EC) originally found the sectoral, self-regulatory pri-
vacy paradigm of the US inadequate. One factor was that the fragmented sectoral
privacy regulations did not meet the more comprehensive expectations of the EU
adequacy standards. In terms of the enforcement objectives of the EU Data Protec-
tion Directive, a self-regulatory scheme is substantially different from the supervisory
authority's powers of monitoring and enforcement. Article 25[5] and the desire to pre-
serve essential trans-Atlantic data flows gave rise to the negotiations that ultimately
resulted in the US Safe Harbor agreement.
A.4 Role and Efficacy of Data Authorities
According to the letter of the EU Data Protection Directive, the role of the supervi-
sory authorities is to monitor, investigate, and enforce national data protection laws
that correspond to the EU Data Protection Directive. Beyond this charge, Kuner
reports that violations of the EU Data Protection Directive and attendant penalties
do occur, but information is not visible because supervisory authorities do not have
the resources to engage in widespread enforcement, the growth of Internet commerce,
and that penalties incurred are not publicly available. Kuner provides a short list of
enforcement actions across the EU but also indicates that many enforcement actions
are settled informally between the controller in question and the DPA. The criteria
for enforcement also vary across the EU; some of these operate proactively while oth-
ers only address "egregious" cases. Penalties available to the supervisory authorities
range from orders to take action, fines, and criminal penalties.
The process of bringing claims against controllers also varies across states. In some
states, the supervisory authority may bring actions of their own volition, independent
of complaints by citizens. The UK DPA is an example of this mode of bringing actions
against controllers. Another process requires a data subject complaint first to the data
controller and, if no response is received, the complaint may be forwarded to the DPA.
An instance of this mode is the Italian DPA. This latter form, in which the process
is initiated by a complaint by the data subject, is very similar to the reactive regime
espoused by the US (Section 2.3). This latter form also serves as a counterexample to
the proactive interpretations of the black letter of the EU Data Protection Directive.
Finally, beyond their black letter role, the DPAs also play a consultative role for
data controllers. In many cases, there may be confusion over whether a particular
regulation applies and how certain processes may be viewed by the DPAs. Although
Kuner reports that routine questions are not asked, the DPAs are considered generally
useful for thornier issues, such as transfer of medical records (interpretation of the
Article 8[3] exceptions for the transfer of medical data and the related national laws
may not be clear). While the DPAs do have substantial experience and can provide
very useful advice, they are also reluctant to provide "hard legal advice on an informal
basis" [75]
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Appendix B
US Safe Harbor FIPs
The US Safe Harbor FIPs (SH-FIPs) are slightly more precise than Bennett's FIPs
in Section 2.1, but arguably less so than the DPD-FIPs, as argued by the Article
29 Working Party [15]. Although Aaron's notion of the Safe Harbor was an effec-
tive mechanism for finding common ground and moving negotiations forward, the
combination of imprecise principles and "off-the-shelf," unmodified self regulatory
mechanisms open the door to abuse, satisficing, and ultimately, the categorization of
this mechanism as an empty formalism.
The SH-FIPs themselves comprise the principles of notice, choice, onward transfer,
security, data integrity, access, and enforcement [124]. Operational clarifications are
appended in the form of FAQs [119]. The following maps the SH-FIPs to Bennett's
FIPs as a means for common comparison with the DPD-FIPs described in Section A.1.
Openness The Openness principle is implicit in the Safe Harbor requirement for
notice. Two elements of the Safe Harbor framework ensure the openness requirement.
The first is registration as a participant in the Safe Harbor, described in the Self-
Certification FAQ [121]. Self-certification requires submitting contact information,
the organization's description, and a description of the organization's privacy policy
(including how to access this privacy policy). The list of registered organizations is
published on the Department of Commerce web site [123]. Individual organizations'
listing include information submitted during certification and whether the registration
is current.
The second element of openness is implicit in the SH Principle of Notice. Notice
requires an organization inform individuals of the purposes to which their information
will be put, how to contact the organization, type of third parties to whom personal
information may be disclosed, and choices individuals have regarding use limitation
and disclosure. Implicit in notice is the fact that a database of personal information
is being maintained by the organization, along with the purposes of this database.
Access and Correction The principle of access and correction is covered by the
SH Principles of Access, and Data Integrity. The SH Principle of Access requires
individuals be able to access, review, correct, amend, or remove elements of personal
information held by an organization as a means to correct inaccuracies. There are
two exceptions to the SH Principle of Access: if the cost of access is disproportionate
to the risk to the individual or if access violates the rights of others.
Collection Limitation The Principle of Collection Limitation is not explicitly
articulated in the SH Principles. The SH Principle of Notice indicates individuals
must be informed of the purposes for which information is collected, which implicitly
bounds the types of information to that purpose. Beyond this implicit limitation, the
SH Principles focus more on use and disclosure limitations.
Use Limitation The SH Principle of Choice and Data Integrity address use lim-
itation. The SH Principle of Data Integrity ensures that an organization may not
use personal data for purposes beyond those for which it was originally collected.
Data Integrity also indicates that information should be reliable in the sense that
it is accurate, complete and current for its intended use. Choice ensures users may
opt out if an organization intends to share their personal information with a third
party or if the organization wishes to use the information for purposes other than for
those for which it was originally collected. Choice includes an exception: consent is
not necessary for disclosure of personal data to third parties working on the behalf
(or acting as agents) of the organization. Taken together, this leads to a notify and
opt-out structure, where organizations may choose to engage in new data purposes
as long as they notify individuals and give a reasonable amount of time for those
individuals to opt out.
Disclosure Limitation The Principle of Disclosure Limitation is covered by the
SH Principles of Notice, Choice, and Onward Transfer. As per above, the Principles
of Notice and Choice are necessary for an organization to share personal information
with third parties. Building on Notice and Choice, Onward Transfer focuses more
on the liability issues related to disclosure. If the organization ensures that the third
party subscribes to the SH Principles, is subject to the EU Data Protection Directive
, or is subject to the restriction of a different adequacy finding, the organization is
not liable for abuses by the third party (unless the organization makes an agreement
otherwise). The organization is liable if it shares information with a third party its
knows or should have known would process the information in a manner inconsistent
with the restrictions above and did not try to prevent this processing.
Security The Security requirements are quite simple, stated in a single sentence:
Organizations creating, maintaining, using or disseminating personal in-
formation must take reasonable precautions to protect it from loss, misuse
and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.
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B.1 Self-Regulation and Enforcement
The US Safe Harbor Agreement is considered to fall into the category of self-regulation.
The SH Principle of Enforcement describes three requirements for enforcement:
1. independent recourse mechanisms for investigating and resolving disputes and
complaints
2. verification procedures for ensuring the espoused privacy practices are true and
are implemented as described
3. obligations to correct issues that result from compliance failure along with sanc-
tions and consequences sufficient to ensure compliance
To further clarify the implementation of these, the Dispute Resolution and Enforce-
ment FAQ describes "[h]ow ... the dispute resolution requirements of the Enforce-
ment Principle [should] be implemented, and how an organization's persistent failure
to comply with the Principles be handled" [120].
Organizations must first satisfy three additional requirements for points 1 and
3 above. The first is to participate in private sector compliance programs that are
compliant with the Safe Harbor Principles and that incorporate appropriate enforce-
ment mechanisms. The second is compliance with the legal or supervisory authorities
related to complaints and resolutions. The third requirement is a commitment to
cooperate with data protection authorities from either the EU or authorized repre-
sentatives. The FAQ also encourages the design of other mechanisms for enforcement
as long as they meet the requirements set out by the Enforcement principle and re-
lated FAQs; this will be revisited in later discussions of more efficacious self-regulatory
mechanisms.
To facilitate enforcement, the FAQ indicates that consumers should be encour-
aged to raise complaints with the organization before pursuing independent recourse.
Recourse mechanisms should be clear, easily available and affordable, and should
provide individuals the information necessary to effectively navigate the procedure.
Following the invocation of recourse mechanisms, if the organization is found to be
out of compliance, the FAQ indicates a range of sanctions and remedies. Reme-
dies include reversal and correction of the non-compliant actions by the organization.
Sanctions include publicity regarding the violation as a means to affect an organiza-
tion's reputation, requirements to delete data, removal or suspension of compliance
seal if applicable, and compensation.
Authoritative, legal enforcement, in the form of sanction, is through the FTC.
Section 5 of the FTC Act' prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
As applied here, if the privacy policies of an organization that self-registers with the
Safe Harbor are not upheld, the publication of that policy is considered deceptive
and thus actionable under Section 5. This could result in court orders to cease
the challenged practices, followed by civil or criminal contempt proceedings if the
practices continue. The FAQ also addresses "persistent failure to comply" [120]. In
'15 U.S.C. @45
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the case of a repeat offender, Safe Harbor benefits are denied and thus the organization
may no longer be able to handle EU citizens' data. In the case an organization fails
to comply with dispute resolution mechanisms, it must notify the Department of
Commerce or face possible actions under the False Statements Act 2.
B.2 Enforcement History: FTC Actions
In terms of FTC enforcement, a recent report on behavioral advertising [51] indicates
that it has brought 23 actions relating to deceptive privacy claims and improper
disclosure. A review of the complaints and press releases for these actions indicates
that nearly all of these are violations of either Section 5 of the FTC Act or violation
of consumer financial information protections under the Graham-Leach-Bliley (GLB)
Act. In both of these cases, the organization has been found to have inadequate
security measures. In the case of the violations of the FTC Act, these are typically
described as misrepresentations of the privacy guarantees made by the organization to
consumers. Under the GLB, the case is typically mishandling or improper destruction
of consumer information, leading to improper disclosure of this information.
These cases highlight the reactive nature of privacy regulation as enforced by
the FTC. These cases are typically brought to the FTC after the face, when an
incident endangering user privacy has already occurred. The remedies have been
sanctions against the organization, publicity (via the FTC website), and required
third party audits of the organizations' security infrastructure for some period of time
(typically every two years for 10 to 20 years). This reactive enforcement is an example
of sanction-based deterrence intended to encourage organizations to shore up their
security practices rather than face the prospect of the burdens imposed by having a
third party identify and recommend remedies. As the enforcement mechanism of last
resort couched in a largely self-regulatory scheme, the intended effect is to encourage
genuine compliance with the FIPs in lieu the imposition of audits that bring with
them the onerous burdens organizations are trying to avoid via self-regulation.
An important aspect of these enforcement actions is that they focus almost exclu-
sively on information security practices, not on any of the other behaviors proscribed
by the general FIPs, the SH-FIPs, or the DPD-FIPs, such as collection and use limi-
tations.
218 U.S.C. §1001
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Appendix C
Nominal Compliance with US Safe
Harbor
In this document, nominal compliance indicates that a given policy complies with the
black letter of the US Safe Harbor FIPs. As noted in Section 2.3.2, the US Safe Harbor
FIPs comprise the principles of Notice, Choice, Onward Transfer, Security, Access,
and Enforcement. In addition to these principles, the US Safe Harbor Agreement
also addresses sensitive data, self-certification, verification, and criteria regarding the
timing of opt out choices in the US Safe Harbor FAQs. The following describes the
compliance of the privacy sample with regards to the six principles and the criteria
from the facts, making note of substantive deviations in each category.
Of the six US Safe Harbor principles, the content related to the Principle of Notice
receives the most attention and has the most precise information. Although the most
precise in comparison to the other principles and criteria, it is still in terms of broad
categories of data purposes and categories. The remaining principles and criteria are
addressed in varying depth.
C.1 Principle of Notice
The Principle of Notice can be decomposed into data purposes, contact information,
disclosure to third parties, opt out choices, and categories of data collected.
Contact information is the most simple; each policy provides an e-mail address
for reporting privacy violations, a corporate contact, the contact information for the
department handling privacy issues, and contact information for the dispute resolution
provider, if they are participating in a third party program. The remaining categories,
data purposes, disclosure to third parties, opt out choices, and categories of data
collected are often addressed based on either the category of information collected or
the method by which data is collected.
The broad data purposes given by a privacy policy are to provide and improve
service, provide the user with a customized experience, and provide relevant adver-
tisements. Under providing service, privacy policies indicate with whom they share
information. All privacy policies address sharing information with third parties that
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provide operational services, such as contractors. The policies indicate that only
the information necessary for performing the contractor or third party's function is
shared.
The privacy policies also give notice that clickstream data is collected. As de-
scribed in the discussion of automatic data collection, the description of clickstream
data largely addresses the mechanisms used to collect this data and the most general
uses, such as improving efficiency and or customization. Online service providers do
not volunteer more precise information regarding the categorization of clickstream
data, the inferences made from clickstream data, or the implications of how click-
stream data is combined with other data.
An option to opt out of the use of clickstream data is provided by most online
service providers. With the exception of Google, the opt out is all or nothing. Google
provides a slightly more refined opt out feature, allowing users to opt out completely
or select what categories of advertisement they wish to see. If a user opts out,
clickstream data is not used to perform any advertisement customization but may
still be collected. Some privacy policies provide direct links to opt out of clickstream
data collection either through their own site or via the NAI [87]; others simply describe
how to opt out with reference to the online service provider's account or profile
management tools.
In addition to sharing data with contractors for operations related purposes, the
privacy policies also indicate that aggregate data collected about users is shared with
other third parties, in particular advertisers. The privacy policies specifically reassure
users that PII is not shared. Online service providers indicate that the information
shared cannot be used to identify users individually and is often aggregate data,
such as how many users viewed a particular advertisement or the number of users
browsing a particular topic. These assertions appeal to the fact that, individually,
these categories of information are not personally identifiable but do not reassure the
user whether the organizations with whom their information is shared can reconstruct
their identity based on a larger collection of data. This is particularly the case with
regards to advertisers whose data collection spans multiple domains via the use of
web beacons.
Online service providers also provide notice that some of the content shown on
an online service provider's pages may be provided by and hosted by third party
advertisers. Online service providers make it clear that the assertions and guarantees
made within a privacy policy bind only to the content provided by the online service
provider, not the content and actions of advertisers even though the online service
provider allows them to display adds on their site. This disclaimers and qualifica-
tions usually come with the reassurance that advertisers are not allowed to collected
conventional PII, but may be able to read and write cookies, know what page a user
is viewing, and know what demographic and marketing segment the ad was targeted
to. The online service provider's privacy policy suggests the users review advertis-
ers' privacy policies, as they may differ from the assertion made in the online service
provider's policy. The effect is that the environment presented by a page primarily
hosted by an online service provider may contain a dynamic mix of privacy policies
comprised of the privacy policy of the online service provider and any subset of the
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advertisers that may be serving ads for that page.
Privacy policies also provide information about how long information is retained.
Some privacy policies provide explicit information regarding how long information is
retained, while others provide vague bounds based on need, legal requirements, and
other "reasonable" retention periods. Privacy policies also differentiate between the
types of information retained. P11 is typically retained for as long as an individual
maintains an account with the online service provider. In conjunction with notices
regarding access (see below), privacy policies also indicate that older versions of PII
may be retained under the auspices of customer service (e.g. undoing changes), follow-
ing up on fraud and abuse, and for legal purposes. In a similar vein, privacy policies
also indicate that information may be retained after an account is closed for similar
purposes. Few online service providers indicate how long voluntary information is
retained, again referring to "reasonable" retention periods.
Online service provider's also give users notice that non-PII will be combined
with categories of information from the same page, the user's session, across user ses-
sions, across services provided by within the domain of the provider, from information
gathered by affiliate organizations, or from other public sources or sources the user
has shared information with and provided consent to distribute. Each online service
provider does not make all of these categories explicit to the user, but these cate-
gories can be derived from a careful reading of the policy. The notice of combination
is sometimes accompanied by a recommendation to read the privacy policies of other
services within the same domain.
C.2 Principle of Choice
Online service provider's privacy policies generally rely on opt out mechanisms to
comply with the principle of choice. In most cases, the tone of the policy is that one
should share their voluntary information and in exchange one will have access to the
value service provided, accompanied by reassurances that their PII is not shared (see
discussion in the previous section) and that it is protected, secured, and accessible. In
terms of tone (but not substantial information regarding purpose), Linkedln deviated
from this trend. LinkedIn's privacy policy had a "buyer beware" tone that permeated
the whole of the privacy policy.
You willingly provide us certain personal information, which we collect
in order to allow you to benefit from the LinkedIn website. If you have
any hesitation about providing such information to us and/or having such
information displayed on the LinkedIn website or otherwise used in any
manner permitted in this Privacy Policy and the User Agreement, you
should not become a member of the LinkedIn community. [76]
In contrast to the inviting tone of other privacy policies, LinkedIn explicitly indicates
that if a user is in any way uncomfortable with the kinds of information shared within
'See Section 4.2.3.1 for the distinction between conventional P11 versus non-PII and a discussion
of the purposes of online service provider's information combination practices.
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the LinkedIn community, they should not become a member.
LinkedIn's blunt expression of expectations and user choice is a refreshingly frank
in contrast to tone and language of other online service provider privacy policies that
seem to be attempting to elicit a feeling of trust, security, and benefit. The blunt
tone of the LinkedIn privacy policy reflects its roots in professional and business
networking and belies the attitude projected by the site as a whole: this is a place
of business. Despite this distinct tone, the LinkedIn privacy policy, like the other
privacy policies in the sample, provide little more than marginal choice regarding
how user information, in particular automatic information, is used.
As noted in the discussion of Notice, users are often directed to the opt out feature
of the online service provider or the NAI [87], for nearly all of the services provided
(except Google), users are given an all-or-nothing choice regarding data collection.
The opt out choice is tacitly provided as an alternative to disabling cookies completely
or, for the more sophisticated user, disabling cookies for a particular domain. Rather,
almost all the opt out mechanisms disable behavioral advertising 2. The user is gen-
erally admonished from doing this, indicating that opting out of the use of cookies
and other tracking mechanisms reduce the utility of the site because advertisements
are not customized to their habits and preferences. In effect, online service providers
tacitly encourage the user to reconsider the tension between the utility of advertise-
ment customization and their privacy preferences3 . In this case, only a marginal
choice is given regarding a subset of the purposes to which automatic data are put.
The marginal choice is all-or-nothing: the user may garner the utility of customized
advertising by acquiescing to whatever combination automatic information (modulo
sensitive data, see Section C.7.1) the online service provider and/or advertisers see fit
or garner none of the utility and have access to generic advertising placement. This
highlights both the precision of the choices available regarding behavioral advertising
and that the user is not given any choice regarding other uses of automatic data.
The alternative to the online service provider supplied opt out mechanisms is to
disable all cookies. Disabling cookies is generally admonished by the online service
provider privacy policy because it may interfere with the innocent functionality of the
online service provider as a web application, depriving users the full benefits of the
service. Although disabling cookies will limit the aggregation of data from multiple
temporally distributed sessions, IP information is unlikely to change over the course
4of the average session
2Different policies refer to what is essentially behavioral advertising by different names. Google
refers to this application of automatic data as interest based advertising [56]. Amazon refers to it as
relevant advertising [5]. Nearly all of the online service providers appeal to the benefits and utility
of customized advertising in contrast to the nuisance of semi-random advertisements.
3 This also has implications for understanding whether users' espoused privacy preferences match
the the actual preferences expressed by their behaviors when faced with these types of situations.4 This is true for desktop machines, still generally so for laptops even though the frequency of
mid-session changes to IP is logically higher, but IP address information is probably much less
consistent per session for mobile users.
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C.3 Principle of Onward Transfer
With regard to privacy policies, online service providers are clear to assure users
that they do not share, sell, or rent conventional PII with third parties without the
user's consent. The definition of onward transfer from the US Safe Harbor Principles
(Section 2.3.2) is defined first as depending on the principles of Notice and Choice to
ensure individuals know with whom what categories of information are shared and
are given a choice regarding this sharing. The discussions of these dimensions of the
privacy policies in Sections C.1 and C.2 cover much of the sample's compliance with
onward transfer.
The discussion of Notice in Section C.1 indicates that information may be trans-
ferred to agents of the online service provider that provide operations support, af-
filiated companies in joint ventures, advertisers, or other third parties with whom
the online service provider does business. With the exception of some online ser-
vice providers advertising practices, online service provider's privacy policies do not
provide any additional precision to the description of what agents comprise these
categories. In the case of advertisers, some privacy policies provide a list of adver-
tisers they allow to serve adds to users, but the onus remains on the user to follow
the links, find the advertiser's policy, and reconcile this policy with both the hosting
online service provider's policy and the user's own privacy preferences.
C.4 Principle of Security
The principle of security is quite possibly the least precise element of the privacy
policies in the sample. Overall, compliance with the security principle gives the
impression that it is included purely for purposes of compliance and to avoid liability
issues. Generally, security compliance general references "reasonable" application of
standard industry grade security practices (as a category). The Security Principle
and FAQs criteria regarding access (see below) provide online service providers with
an exception: security and access can both be limited in proportion to the probably
harm to the user if their request is not fulfilled. This clause is repeated in each of the
privacy policies in the sample as limiting the scope, frequency, and type of security
and access requests.
Like the other descriptions in the privacy policies, these assertions address fairly
imprecise categories of information and processes and do not give detailed guidance
on what would be considered onerous to the online service provider. In some cases,
examples of onerous requests are provided, such as requesting changes in data stored
in archive, removing the contribution of individual data points from aggregate data,
or situations where the security or change requested would infringe on the rights of
others. In other cases, the categories of protections are only slightly more precise,
making general references to the application of industry standard encryption, digital
and physical audits of databases, and other business processes. As is the trend with
each of the Principles, the privacy policies assert practices that fall into broad cate-
gories, but do not provide sufficient information to differentiate them in any significant
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way.
C.5 Principle of Access
Compliance with the Principle of Access has been described in part in the discussion
of Notice. In the process of describing categories related to scope, type, and temporal
limitations on the information collected, online service providers also tell the users
that many of these preferences may be modified using the account settings features of
the online service provider. In the case of P11, these features usually refer to the forms
that allow users to update contact and billing information. In some cases, there are
direct links to the account settings features, in other cases simple in text references,
leaving it to the user to navigate to these features on their own. References to opt out
features are similar: privacy polices references these as they come to the portion of
the privacy policy that gives notice regarding automatic information collection as it
relates to advertising or behavioral tracking. Like the account settings, some policies
provide direct links, others simply describe the feature and expect the user to seek it
out.
The lack of information regarding precisely how PII and automatic data are com-
bined (discussed with the Principle of Notice, Section C. 1) is also a problem for access
to this information. Opt out mechanisms are available to disable behavioral advertis-
ing, but this does not indicate whether these opt out mechanisms actually stop the
actual collection of the data for other purposes. The description of the Access Prin-
ciple, access implies the ability to review, correct, and delete personal information
collected about an individual. Of the online service providers in the sample, Amazon
was the only one that provided instance-by-instance access to a subset of automatic
information
Amazon's browsing history provides the user with customized history based on
behavioral data. The browsing history account settings are an instance of limited
access to automatic information that is used for customization. Upon entering Ama-
zon's site, the user is presented with a customized list of recommended items and
the general categories from which these items are drawn in a simple tag cloud. The
browsing history allows the user to remove recent items viewed and searches, but the
ability to modify the categories displayed in the tag cloud is not available.
In many ways, this resembles the onus of checking the privacy policy for changes:
the user is responsible for keeping track of searches, within their workflow, and re-
moving these searches as they happen. If the user decides to review the browsing
history, it may only contain the most recent searches, not the full history of searches.
The history of searches may remain, but the only visible artifact is a corresponding
category in the recommendations categories tag cloud. Further, it is not clear how a
user would tweak the categories in the tag cloud without using the 'Delete All Items'
feature of the browsing history management form. Combining the onus of continually
checking the recent browsing history and the loss of all useful customization when rel-
egated to 'Delete All Items' option still preserves the all-or-nothing character of users'
exchange of privacy options for the utility of customization. It is also important to
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note that although this is the most precise tool for managing automatic information
within the sample, it is, as implied above, still rather coarse grained. Further, this
tool prioritizes the online service provider's control of the uses of automatic informa-
tion over configurations that allow the user to better express their privacy preferences,
potentially to the detriment of a more complete purview of users' behaviors.
C.6 Principle of Enforcement
Compliance with the Principle of Enforcement competes with the Principle of Secu-
rity for least coverage in privacy policies. Most policies include reassurances that the
privacy policies and practices are reviewed on a regular basis. For those that partic-
ipate in a third-part compliance program, these assurances are accompanied with a
reference to that compliance program. In general, those that self-regulate provide an
e-mail address and physical mailing address to which one may address complaints. In
the case of those that participate in third party programs, the privacy policy indicates
that if the user should first contact the online service provider via the provided con-
tact information and if the resolution is not satisfactory, the user should then contact
the third-party compliance program.
C.7 Compliance with US Safe Harbor Criteria
In addition to the US Safe Harbor Principles, the US Safe Harbor agreement also
provides additional criteria in the FAQ [122].
C.7.1 Sensitive Data
The sensitive data criteria establish that certain sensitive data (religious and ethnic
information, sexual preferences, etc.) should not be recorded without the explicit
consent of the user. Only a few sites describe sensitive data precisely what sensi-
tive data is; LinkedIn provides the most useful discussion of sensitive information.
In its discussion of consent to processing information about the user, it indicates
that information provided in the user generated profile may allow others with access
to this information to infer other information such as nationality, ethnic origin, or
religion[76].
The primary criteria regarding the sensitive data FAQ is a list of exceptions. These
exceptions are generally covered when the privacy policy gives notice regarding what
information is collected. The notice regarding legal exceptions and vital interests
generally covers both sensitive information uses and sharing of information in the
event of a fraud investigation or due to legal requirements.
C.7.2 Self-Certification
The self-certification criteria requires that those online service providers that do self-
certify also indicate that they adhere to the US Safe Harbor Principles. This is
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generally a single statement either at the beginning of the document when introducing
the privacy policy and relevant contact information or included with the enforcement
notice near the end of the privacy policy.
C.7.3 Timing of Opt Out
The Timing of Opt Out pertains to ensuring users have reasonable access to opt out
mechanisms. With respect to the published privacy policies, this is tied to the Princi-
ple of Choice and giving notice of either central (all-or-nothing) opt out mechanisms,
links to the opt-out mechanisms, or indicating that any non-administrative e-mail
the user may receive will contain instructions or a link to opt out of any further un-
wanted communications. The objective is that the user has immediate access to opt
out mechanisms and that they are obvious and available.
C.7.4 Privacy Rights of Minors
In addition to the privacy requirements imposed by the US Safe Harbor Agreement,
privacy policies also contain clauses that indicate compliance with COPPA (Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Act)'. Each of the privacy policies includes clauses
indicating age restrictions on users. Although some disallow users under 18, all indi-
cate that users 13 are either strictly prohibited or their account must be created by
a parent using the online service provider's parental controls.
5Available in [105].
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